VZCZCXRO8405
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHDE #2598/01 1291359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 091359Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0306
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNNAR/VIENNA NARCOTICS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3262
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 002598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/9/2016 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR IR SOCI
SUBJECT: UNODC OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DRUGS, POLITICS IN IRAN 
 
REF: A. DUBAI 1452; B. DUBAI 528; C. 5089 
 
DUBAI 00002598  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
1.(C) Summary:  Tehran-based representative of the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Roberto Arbitrio recently discussed with 
PolEconChief the work of UNODC in Iran and various aspects of 
the drug problem in Iran.  UNODC's Tehran office is involved in 
projects related to all aspects of the drug problem, including 
supply and demand reduction, judicial reform, and police 
training, as well as human trafficking.  Arbitrio also discussed 
his own assessment of the political situation in Iran since 
President Ahmadinejad took office.  He also said reputable 
sources had told him Iran recently gave Iraqi radical cleric 
Muqtada Al-Sadr 50 million USD.  End summary 
 
2.(C) In an April 6 meeting -- which included UNODC staff, UNVIE 
Deputy Pol/Econ Counselor, and PolEconChief -- Italian UNODC 
Iran Field Representative Roberto Arbitrio (please protect) 
discussed UNODC's operations in Iran.  Its three strategic 
objectives are to assist the government in reducing trafficking 
in narcotics into, within, and outside the country; to 
contribute to the development of effective prevention, 
treatment, and rehabilitation measures in drug abuse and 
HIV/AIDS; and to promote the rule of law through strengthened 
crime prevention measures and the provision of legal assistance, 
including in the areas of crime prevention, anti-corruption, and 
human trafficking.  (Note:  This cable focuses primarily on 
Arbitrio's assessment of the drug situation; full UNODC 
documentation of its programs in Iran is being sent by pouch to 
INL. End note) 
 
Supply Reduction 
---------------- 
 
3.(C) Anti-narcotic forces monitor Iran's borders, particularly 
the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan.  While they are 
police in name, they operate with more of a military mentality. 
Arbitrio, who has visited sections of Iran's borders, reports 
that much of the border is heavily fortified, but that there are 
problems monitoring mountainous regions.  Furthermore, the 
smugglers are heavily armed and willing to shoot.  He said the 
heads of smuggling groups factor into their operations that a 
percentage of smugglers will be killed and a percentage of the 
drugs confiscated.  Iranian soldiers die regularly in 
interdiction efforts, in part because the smugglers often are 
better armed.  Iran raised once with UNODC its wish list of 
high-tech equipment for drug interdiction operations, such as 
drones and satellite phones, but now seems to understand UNODC 
will not play a role in any such acquisitions.  (Note:  Iran did 
not attempt to reintroduce a resolution during the most recent 
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2006 in Vienna that 
would have facilitated access to remote sensing through UNODC. 
End note) 
 
4.(C) Most of Iran's interdiction efforts are along the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border.  This has frustrated Turkey, which 
has accused Iran of doing little to stop the outflow of drugs 
into its territory.  However, Arbitrio has heard that 
Iranian-Turkish cooperation is improving.  (Note: During the 
October 2005 Paris Pact meeting in Istanbul, Turkey and Iran 
were encouraged to increase cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation.  However, Turkish diplomats in Vienna have told 
UNVIE Poloff that there is still little trust between the two 
sides.  End note].  However, he said, the military forces 
controlling both sides of the Iran-Iraq border are doing much to 
stop drug smuggling.  Arbitrio reported that there appear to be 
two routes running through Iraq: one in the north, involving 
Kurdish smuggling to Turkey; and one in the south through the 
Basra region and then onward to either Jordan or the Gulf. 
 
5.(C) Arbitrio reported it is clearer who controls the drug 
trade along the borders than inside the country.  Powerful 
families in Sistan-va Baluchistan control the input into Iran, 
and, as mentioned, to the west Iranian Kurds are helping onward 
smuggling into Iraq.  There is also evidence of Iranian 
involvement in the drug trade in Europe, although he could not 
say if these Iranians were from one particular region or ethnic 
group.  However, he said it is less clear who handles the 
internal drug trade in Iran. 
 
6.(C) He also noted that most of the refined opium coming into 
Iran is processed in Afghanistan, not in Iran, although he has 
heard indications some opium is now being processed after it 
enters Iraq, in labs in Basra.  Arbitrio said that the head of 
the Iranian Drug Control Headquarters, Fada Hossein Maleki, told 
him that he believed the Basra route and production facilities 
were an increasing problem.  Arbitrio said that he has seen 
little evidence of production of synthetic drugs in Iran, but 
mentioned he had heard of two recent large drug seizures, 
including one in Mashhad, of ecstasy. 
 
DUBAI 00002598  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
7.(C) He acknowledged that his sources on drug issues are for 
the most part the Iranian government, and that the UNODC reports 
to Iran's Drug Control office.  That said, he said he did not 
see indications of sanctioned government involvement in the drug 
trade, other than isolated cases of bribery of local officials. 
 
Demand Reduction 
---------------- 
 
8.(C) Arbitrio says the new government wants religion to play a 
bigger role in addiction treatment and surmises this could be 
one reason for increased budgets for the bonyads.  He thought 
that one motivating factor for the government to take on the 
drug program was the fact that reports of high levels of 
addiction hurt the image it wants to project as a religious, 
morally superior nation.  The government also sees in the issue 
an area for positive interaction with other countries, 
particularly given that other countries will suffer from Iranian 
inactivity against drug traffic. 
 
9.(C) In a discussion of the proposed boot camps to sequester 
drug users from the general prison population (Ref A), Arbitrio 
said this government initiative was a response to an order from 
the president to "do something" about addicts.  Drug addiction 
treatment is mandatory in these boot camps.  According to 
Arbitrio, the Ministry of Health and others opposed the concept, 
but they downplayed their opposition until the government 
shifted its attention.  There were supposed to be "thousands" of 
these boot camps, a number then revised to "hundreds," and 
finally resulting in "dozens" of them. 
 
10.(C) Arbitrio and other foreign representatives have visited 
some prisons in Iran.  He acknowledged that he cannot speak 
about conditions for political prisoners there, but said that 
conditions for the general prison population were much better 
than what he has seen on prison visits in Central Asian 
countries. 
 
11.(U) UNODC has a special anti-addiction program in the city of 
Bam, where drug use has skyrocketed after the 2003 earthquake 
there. 
 
12.(C) Arbitrio also said that although the Ministry of Health's 
drug-related statistics are basically reliable, the new 
government is trying to resurrect 1999 numbers of around a 
million drug users.  Current statistics indicate 4.5 to 6 
million drug users. 
 
Rule of Law 
----------- 
 
13.(C) In the past, the Iranian government claimed that Iran had 
no problem with organized crime, but it is now starting up an 
anti-organized crime unit.  UNODC is working with the Iranian 
government to train officers to conduct investigations, as well 
as training judiciary.  It also has a program to work against 
human trafficking. 
 
Foreign Partners 
---------------- 
 
14.(C) Foreign contributions - which fund the bulk of UNODC 
programs in Iran - have continued, despite the chill in Iran's 
international relations.  However, UNODC has not received any 
foreign funding for one project for increased internal drug 
surveillance at airports, train stations, etc. 
 
15.(C) Arbitrio praised US academic institutions' involvement 
with drug efforts in Iran, including high-level Iranian 
officials participating in US university programs (Ref B and C). 
 He also praised the US State Department's annual report on 
drugs for reflecting Iranian counter-narcotic efforts. 
 
Arbitrio's Assessment of Iranian Politics 
----------------------------------------- 
 
16.(C) According to Arbitrio, the Iranian government continues 
to work with UNODC and overall, has made little change to its 
drug policies since Ahmadinejad became president.  Arbitrio 
noted that the biggest change impacting him was increased 
surveillance of his activities.  He also noted a degree of 
crackdown on NGOs accused of acting on behalf of foreign 
governments. 
 
17.(C) Arbitrio said there was an ongoing power struggle between 
conservative pragmatists and hard-line conservatives, resulting 
in mismanagement of the government.  He said he had met 
 
DUBAI 00002598  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ahmadinejad at a meeting for foreign ambassadors and 
multilateral organization representatives, and had concluded the 
new president is a "true believer" in his religious rhetoric. 
Ahmadinejad's only message that day to his audience was "bring 
back monotheism and study the message of the prophets." 
Arbitrio thinks the supreme leader initially thought he could 
control Ahmadinejad but has since tried to distance himself from 
him.  Khamenei empowered Rafsanjani (by giving oversight 
responsibility to the Expediency Council, which Rafsanjani 
chairs), but Arbitrio said he has seen no follow through action. 
 He said he has heard - anecdotally - that there have been five 
attempts on the president's life, and that the motivation for 
these attempts was related to internal power struggles, not 
ethnic strife.  He mentioned separately the recent attack 
targeting provincial officials in Sistan-va Baluchistan and said 
he had heard that armed men split the government delegation on 
the bus into Sunni and Shia and killed the Shia.  He questioned 
the assumption that the perpetrators were drug smugglers, asking 
why they would deliberately try to stir up trouble in their area 
of operation. 
 
18.(C) Arbitrio did not have a high opinion of the intellectual 
skills of the new government.  He mentioned that Supreme Council 
for National Security Chairman Ali Larijani did not have a "high 
intellect," and that people he knew from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs were not impressed with the rest of the nuclear 
negotiating team. 
 
19.(C) He is hearing rumors that the new Assembly of Experts, 
following next November's election, will try to push out Supreme 
Leader Khamenei.  He doubts that Ahmadinejad will be pushed out 
of the scene, saying he is making full use of his presidential 
powers but is nonetheless a puppet for the "people in Qom." 
 
20.(C) Finally, Arbitrio said "knowledgeable sources" 
(presumably governmental officials) told him Iran gave Iraqi 
radical cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr 50 million USD during Sadr's trip 
to Iran. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
21.(C) Arbitrio's comments on the drug situation in Iran 
complements what we are hearing from Iranian medical personnel 
involved in drug treatment programs (Ref A-C), and Arbitrio 
seemed to share their pragmatic attitude toward drug policy.  It 
is particularly noteworthy that UNODC has included in its 
efforts a project on combating human trafficking.  Arbitrio's 
comments on the political situation are useful, as an outsider 
(an Italian) living in Tehran and working with the Iranian 
government; however, it is difficult to assess how plugged in he 
is.  He asked to keep in continued contact but said it was not 
advisable to be in direct communication while he is in Tehran. 
 
22.(U) This message was cleared by UNVIE. 
DAVIS