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PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0228/01 1311924
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111924Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2521
INFO RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1842
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0330
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0131
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE:  WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT THINKING? 
 
REF: (A) DILI 189; (B) DILI 203; (C) DILI 213; (D) DILI 219; (E) DILI 220 
 
DILI 00000228  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  Despite the widespread popular belief in East 
Timor that the ongoing political and security crisis can only be 
resolved if the President invokes the constitutional provision 
permitting the dismissal of the Prime Minister, President Gusmao 
and his close associates have made clear to Emboffs and other 
interlocutors that he would not consider such an action unless 
the situation were to become far worse than it is now.  His 
reluctance is motivated by several overlapping practical and 
legal concerns.  First, although the President reportedly agrees 
with an analysis by his legal advisors that he has the 
constitutional power to dismiss the Prime Minister when it is 
"necessary to ensure the regular functioning of the democratic 
institutions," it is not clear that this point has been reached. 
Second, the President believes that no matter how strong the 
legal and factual case for dismissal might become, it is not out 
of the question that elements of the armed forces (FDTL) and 
possibly of the police (PNTL) loyal to him might defy any such 
action by the President, leading to further bloodshed.  Finally, 
the President believes there is an excellent chance Alkatiri 
will be defeated in the upcoming Fretilin Party Congress, which 
would greatly enhance the prospects for an immediate and 
peaceful change of government.  President Gusmao is deeply 
disappointed in Alkatiri, believes there are credible reports of 
many more killings during the weekend of April 28-30 than have 
been officially reported, and is worried --- despite his view 
that the majority of FDTL and PNTL would be loyal to the 
President in a crisis --- about the possitibility of illegal 
violence by elements in FDTL led by Colonel Lere. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) In two recent meetings with President Xanana Gusmao and 
numerous discussions with his close political associates and 
others who have spoken with the President, Emboffs have learned 
that President Gusmao has no intention of yielding to what 
appears to be the widespread popular demand (see Reftels) that 
he dismiss Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and oversee the 
formation of a new government.  Gusmao has generally avoided 
direct answers to questions about what actions he might consider 
taking in various circumstances, instead urging Ambassador and 
other interlocutors to do everything possible to calm the 
situation in order to avoid the need to consider difficult 
options.  However, he told a senior United Nations Office in 
Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) official yesterday (May 10) that dismissal 
of the Prime Minister is not an action he would consider under 
anything like the present circumstances.  The President 
indicated that it would be particularly inappropriate to 
consider such an option so soon before the Fretilin Party 
Congress scheduled for May 17-20, which he suggested might 
resolve or at least clarify the situation. 
 
¶3. (S) Despite his present unwillingness to consider dismissing 
the Prime Minister, the President reportedly believes he has the 
constitutional authority to do so if the situation were to 
degenerate to the point where governmental institutions could 
not function effectively.   The President's Chief of Staff, Agio 
Pereira, told Ambassador Rees that the President's legal 
advisors have prepared an analysis of the President's powers 
under the Constitution to deal with a crisis of this sort. 
Although Pereira declined to share the analysis with Ambassador, 
he referred to article 112 of the Constitution, which provides 
in pertinent part that the President may "dismiss the Prime 
Minister . . . when it is necessary to ensure the normal 
functioning of the democratic institutions, after consultation 
with the Council of State."  The Council of State is a 
 
DILI 00000228  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
constitutionally mandated institution composed of prominent 
individuals appointed by the President, the Parliament, and the 
Government.  The majority of the members of the Council, 
including several of those appointed by the Government, are 
generally regarded as thoughtful and independent. Article 112 
dos not require that the Council support the President's 
decision, only that he consult with the Council.  (Note:  The 
legal advisors who prepared the analysis for the President are 
believed to be two Portuguese law professors who were formerly 
provided as advisors to the President by UNOTIL.  Although they 
have returned to Portugal, they have continued to advise the 
President on issues such as the criminal defamation provisions 
of the proposed Penal Code.) 
 
4) (C) Although Article 112 also contains other language that 
could be construed as further limiting the President's power of 
dismissal to a list of specified situations --- e.g., the 
beginning of a new legislature, the rejection of the 
Government's program for the second time by Parliament, and the 
approval of a motion of censure --- the most straightforward 
reading of the provision is that these circumstances are cases 
that automatically "entail" (implicam) the Prime Minister's 
dismissal, whereas the broader "necessary to ensure the normal 
functioning of democratic institutions" clause is an additional 
grant of discretion to the President.  All the relevant actors 
appear to agree with the President's interpretation on this 
point, although the Prime Minister grudgingly refers to this 
grant of power as a "constitutional coup d'etat."  See Ref D. 
 
5) (C) Pereira told Ambassador the President has no present 
plans to invoke article 112, and does not believe that the 
current crisis will degenerate to the point where replacing the 
Prime Minister would be necessary to preserve democratic 
institutions.  Rather, the chief of staff says the analysis the 
President requested from his legal advisors was just to make 
sure he understood the constitutional situation in anticipation 
of a wide range of possible scenarios.  This is consistent with 
what the President himself has told Ambassador and others in 
recent conversations, in which he has repeatedly urged a united 
message that the situation is getting better and life is 
returning to normal. 
 
6) (S) Notwithstanding this upbeat assessment of the current 
situation, the President has told Ambassador that he blames 
Alkatiri for the current crisis, both because he ignored 
institutional problems within the military (FDTL) that a 
commission headed the President himself identified in a report 
two years ago, and because he unconstitutionally and 
ill-advisedly called in the military without consulting the 
President, whom the Constitution designates as Commander in 
Chief.  He also told Ambassador that "if I had been consulted I 
would not have agreed." 
 
7) (S) Although the President does not claim to know for sure 
how many people were killed in Dili and Tasitolu over the 
weekend of April 28-30, he regards as highly credible the 
allegations that there were many more deaths than the 5 
officially reported.  The President believes this partly because 
of his long familiarity with Colonel Lere, the alleged 
ringleader of the alleged atrocities, of whom he says, "even 
when we were fighting in the jungle he would do this sort of 
thing."  The President is also deeply suspicious of the motives 
of FDTL members who denied him access to Tasitolu at gunpoint on 
April 29 when he arrived unannounced to investigate the claims 
of mass killings.  According to Pereira, the President saw a 
dead body on a hillside near FDTL headquarters in Tasitolu 
before he was turned away, and a secretary who was traveling 
with him also saw the body.  The President suggested that "it 
might be better for the investigation of Tasitolu to proceed 
slowly.  People need more time to find courage to say what they 
saw.  And Matan Ruak needs time to get into full control of 
FDTL."  The President says Matan Ruak is now more or less back 
in charge, but that Lere now has his own relationship with the 
Prime Minister and very strong reasons to resist any effort to 
 
DILI 00000228  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
find the truth.  According to the President, Lere is now saying 
that "we will take orders only from the Government, not from 
Xanana.  And if they try to blame us, then we'll see." 
 
8) (S) (Please strictly protect the information in this 
paragraph.)  Despite his firm intention not to invoke his power 
under article 112 to dismiss the Prime Minister, the President 
has clearly been conducting a discreet but detailed survey over 
the last few days of who in the FDTL and police (PNTL) would 
support him in the event circumstances were to change to the 
point where he found it necessary to invoke this power, or in 
other extreme circumstances such as an attempted coup d'etat by 
Colonel Lere or Minister of the Interior Rogerio Lobato.  The 
President believes the substantial majority in both institutions 
would follow his orders, including the "Los Palos Group" of 
about 300 FDTL members under Lt. Col. Aluk as well as Police 
Commissioner Paulo Martins and the vast majority of PNTL 
members.  Although the President did not allude to the dissident 
military police and other FDTL and PNTL members who are 
currently AWOL under the leadership of Major Alfredo Reinado and 
Major Marcos Tilman, it is clear that these groups would also 
follow his orders.  See Ref E.  The President told Ambassador 
that "they used to say the army belonged to Xanana and the 
police belonged to the Government.  It was never really true. 
But now it is more complicated."  He believes Alkatiri rejected 
the ex-FDTL petitioners' demands and then activated the FDTL to 
quell the April 28 riot partly in order to change this equation 
by bringing the whole armed forces over to his own side.  Now, 
according to the President, Alkatiri has discovered that his 
move backfired:  the public now associates the Prime Minister 
with Colonel Lere and the real or perceived military excesses of 
April 28 and the ensuing days, while a majority both FDTL and 
PNTL would still follow the President if a constitutional crisis 
were to occur.  Despite these elaborate scenario planning, the 
President reiterated that he has no intention of taking action 
against Alkatiri, either constitutional or unconstitutional. 
Rather, he wants to know what support he could count on in the 
event he needed to assert his authority as Commander in Chief to 
stop an illegal action by elements in the military. 
 
9) (S) One reason the loyalties of the military are of great 
interest to the President is that he believes that during the 
days after April 28 he himself was the object of an "action", 
which he says may have been only a surveillance action, by what 
he believes to have been a group of FDTL members who conducted 
operations behind his house during the night of Wednesday, May 
¶3.  The President's military advisor, Lt. Col. Pedro Klamar 
Fuik, told Embassy USDR that he has previously received death 
threats and threats against his family, and that he is still 
under unspecified pressure from FDTL members associated with 
Colonel Lere. 
 
10) (C) The President also told Ambassador that if the Fretilin 
Party Congress is held on schedule May 17-20 there is an 
excellent chance that Ambassador Jose Luis Guterres will defeat 
Alkatiri.  However, the President fears that "if there is more 
violence, they will use it as an excuse to postpone the 
Congress.  If it is held now, Alkatiri cannot win." 
 
11) (C) Comment:  Embassy Dili is confident that President 
Gusmao intends to act in strict accordance with the 
Constitution.  It is also clear that he understands the likely 
human costs of an imprudent use of a constitutional grant of 
authority that should only be used in the most extreme 
circumstances.  He does, however, appear to be preparing for a 
wide range of possible scenarios, including those in which he 
might have to intervene in a constitutional crisis caused by 
others.  End comment. 
REES