VZCZCXRO4987
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #1149/01 1351533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151533Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5111
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/PHD AND INR/AA 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2011 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS PINR SG
SUBJECT: THERE'S TALK OF ANOTHER ELECTION POSTPONEMENT, BUT 
WADE PRESSES AHEAD WITH PREPARATIONS 
 
REF: A. DAKAR 1011 
 
     ¶B. DAKAR 0817 
     ¶C. DAKAR 0681 
     ¶D. DAKAR 0565 
     ¶E. 05 DAKAR 1563 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Roy L. Whitaker for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (C) Some in the ruling Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) 
say poor logistics will require technical postponement of the 
February presidential and parliamentary elections to June 
2007, past expiration of Wade's constitutional term.  We have 
told them we would find that unacceptable.  The opposition 
may propose Wade stay in office until 2009 in return for a 
national unity cabinet and guarantees of a transparent 
election.  Wade, meanwhile, appears intent on engineering 
electoral victory: he is micromanaging PDS factional spats 
and would defy tradition by giving the security forces the 
vote.  Ex-Prime Minister and presidential candidate Idrissa 
Seck has become all but invisible.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DARNED NEWFANGLED ELECTION TECHNOLOGY! 
-------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) We have reported (Refs A and B) that a new 
computerized system to register voters has not worked well in 
rural areas.  As of early May, the national election 
commission did not have enough computers nor vehicles to send 
them to remote villages, while electricity shortages and lack 
of portable generators made the few available computers 
unusable.  Election commission consultant Mouhamadou MBodj 
assured us May 10, though, that sufficient equipment and 
transport had been found, were now en route to rural 
constituencies, and should allow widespread registration 
before a new extended deadline of August 30. 
 
¶3.  (C) On May 11, Senegalese Radio and Television (RTS) 
Administrative Director Mouhamadou Moutapha Dieng, who is 
close to Interior Minister Ousmane NGom, said it was 
"logistically impossible" to complete election preparations 
by the end of Wade's presidential term in February.  A 
technical postponement of up to four months was necessary, 
with elections likely just before late June's heavy rains. 
We expressed surprise because on May 3 NGom had told the 
Ambassador that preparations were going well, with over 3.5 
million voters registered nationwide and over 1.5 million 
registered in the greater Dakar area.  NGom added that 
600,000 new biometric identity and voter registration cards 
had already been distributed.  On May 12, we saw Dieng again 
to voice strong concern about any delay beyond Wade's mandate. 
 
AVIAN INFURIATION: THE OPPOSITION AND WADE'S FALCONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶4.  (C) The opposition coalition was recently expanded, and 
now includes ex-Socialist spokesman and Parliamentary Chair 
Abdourahim Agne.  Agne, arrested in 2005 for calling people 
into the streets to remove Wade from power (Ref E), told us 
over lunch the opposition feared Wade would "do anything" 
including use violence to remain in power.  Even if Wade were 
reluctant, Agne said, hard-line "falcons" Justice Minister 
Sheikh Tidjane Sy, Interior Minister NGom and Wade's palace 
staff would press to use strong-arm measures.  Since it was 
unclear whether Wade would allow elections in 2007, and to 
avert violent confrontation, the opposition was preparing to 
respond to Wade's repeated calls for a national dialog and to 
offer him a deal. 
 
¶5.  (C) Calling Wade old and tired, Agne said he did not 
really wish to stay in power another five years.  Rather, all 
he wanted was to complete the large-scale construction 
projects he has just begun, and, if Arab capitals allow it, 
hold a Dakar summit of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conferences.  Agne says the opposition will thus propose a 
deal allowing Wade to stay in office until 2009, and giving 
him and his family immunity from prosecution.  In return, 
Wade would bring senior members of opposition into his 
cabinet, with firmer guarantees of authority than he gave 
them in 2000.  This national unity government would then 
establish transparent election ground rules. 
 
¶6.  (C) Sensing that Agne's proposed deal with Wade was his 
own initiative, we checked it out with Ibrahima Sene, a major 
labor movement figure and ally of Independent Labor Party 
leader and key opposition strategist Amath Dansokho.  Sene 
agrees the falcons will not leave power readily and will push 
Wade to postpone and in effect cancel 2007 elections.  Wade 
will need a major pretext for doing so, one based on major 
 
DAKAR 00001149  002 OF 003 
 
 
social instability.  Sene thinks there are three situations 
Wade will try to turn into such a pretext: renewed fighting 
in the Casamance or the possibility of ethnic violence either 
by Northern River Valley Toucouleur against resettled 
Casamancais rebels, or by southern Peuhl against in-migrating 
Mouride Baye Fall peanut farmers.  A deal may well be 
necessary to ease Wade out of the presidency, Sene assumes, 
though he thinks a referendum may be necessary to legitimize 
it. 
 
¶7.  (C) We have not yet been able to determine if major 
opposition players Moustapha Niasse and the Socialists are on 
board with any deal to prolong Wade's term.  For the moment, 
they appear preoccupied with another question: whether MP's 
should leave the National Assembly on June 30, as they 
believe the Constitution mandates, or remain until 
parliamentary elections postponed from May 2005 are finally 
held. 
 
WADE APPEARS TO BE PREPARING HIS CAMPAIGN 
----------------------------------------- 
¶8.  (C) While his underlings and foes may be thinking of 
putting elections off, Wade appears to be tweaking and 
twisting law, custom and ruling Democratic Party of Senegal 
(PDS) machinery to assure an effective campaign for 2007. 
 
¶9.  (C) We have reported on the PDS' sometimes almost 
kaleidoscopic factionalization (20 internal "tendencies" in 
one region alone).  Prime Minister Macky Sall began in late 
2005 to curb faction power and autonomy and restructure the 
party, but he failed openly in Saint Louis and managed at 
best elsewhere to paper over differences.  Wade has now 
dismissed and reversed Sall's efforts and asked him instead 
to preside over a commission that will share posts among 
"longtime militants, ... local notables, ... and new 
militants from other parties."  In a show of not totally 
forlorn hope, though, Wade will allow his Prime Minister to 
"pursue party renewal in all institutions where consensus 
exists." 
 
¶10.  (C) At the same time, Wade is proposing to broaden the 
vote by allowing the army, gendarmerie and police to vote. 
This is a break from Senegalese (and French colonial) 
tradition, and has predictably been roundly criticized by the 
opposition.  Wade probably predicts gendarmerie, police and 
army officer corps will vote heavily for him, though this is 
not certain, and some argue army enlistees will mirror the 
population-at-large's multi-party diversity. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In what may be a trial balloon, Wade has allowed 
friendly media to speculate he will hold two electoral 
rounds, but that the second round will include four rather 
than two candidates.  Some call this absurd and a patent 
attempt to divide his key rivals' vote, and ask for any 
examples of multiple candidate run-off elections elsewhere. 
 
WADE'S NEMESIS SECK MAY TELECOMMUTE THE CAMPAIGN 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶12.  (C) Ex-Prime Miniter Idrissa Seck began his insurgent 
campaign well with an enthusiastic early April turnout in 
Kaolack.  Things have not gone as smoothly since.  Saying he 
is still in the PDS, Seck rejected the calls by Kaolack 
religious leader Mamoune Niasse to form a "third force." 
Another potential ally, youth leader Talla Sylla, signaled to 
us that he now intends to contest the election independently. 
 Finally, Seck cancelled a trip to Saint Louis, home to 
several bitter PDS enemies, over concerns about threats to 
his personal security.  MP Awa Gueye Kebe told us Seck's 
bodyguard was not enough; the gendarmerie was unwilling to 
give effective protection; but Seck rejected her strong 
recommendation to set up a personal militia.  Instead, she 
said, Seck may run his campaign from home or headquarters via 
private radio and travel by surrogates.  The strategy would 
be to hold back, avoid being arrested and imprisoned again, 
and mount a dramatic and decisive January campaign. 
 
¶13.  (C) There are signs he still hopes to reconcile with 
Wade.  His elder cousin, Alioune Badara Niang, torn between 
family obligation to protect Idrissa and deep fealty to the 
old friend and President whose watercolor image he displays 
reverentially on his living room wall, is trying to bring the 
two together.  Niang, after looking at informal polls, sees 
deep discontent with Wade but thinks Socialists are still 
widely despised and the opposition coalition bereft of a good 
candidate.  He concludes Seck will finish first or second in 
the first round and Wade third, at which point he will 
persuade Wade to rein in the falcons and back Seck for 
president.  Seck, in return, would grant Wade and his family 
members immunity from prosecution and allow him to retire in 
 
DAKAR 00001149  003 OF 003 
 
 
dignity. 
 
MARABOUT FEARS OF VIOLENCE 
-------------------------- 
¶14.  (C) The Tidjane Brotherhood has long been critical of 
Wade's closeness to the rival Mourides.  They are also 
increasingly fearful of social or political violence.  Within 
the last weeks, an influential Tidjane politician told us, 
Tidjane spokesman Abdou Aziz Sy Junior urged the Mouride 
Khalif in Touba to dissuade Wade from taking any provocative 
political measures.  The Mouride Khalif replied that he 
"didn't follow politics all that closely," but of course 
would do anything to encourage social peace. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶15.  (C) Many Senegalese are certain Wade, and especially the 
hard-line and allegedly violence-prone "falcons" around him 
"will do anything" to retain power.  At the same time, and 
somewhat inconsistently, some believe he seeks to stay in 
office only long enough to leave public works projects as his 
legacy; assure legal preconditions he and his family need to 
retire in comfort and dignity; and, perhaps, to host an 
Islamic summit in Dakar.  To avoid violence and yet assure 
Wade does not serve an entire second term, some in the 
opposition want to offer him extension of his time in office 
until 2009 and immunity from prosecution, in return for a 
national unity government and guarantees of transparency when 
elections are finally held. 
 
¶16.  (C) Unfortunately, the deal the opposition may offer 
would mean further manipulation of the Constitution and 
national political consensus.  In late 2004, the 
PDS-dominated Parliament passed a law amnestying political 
crimes.  Last year, Wade determined parliament should stay in 
office beyond its constitutionally described term.  Wade's 
retention of power for another two years, even if approved by 
referendum, would be a step back from the successful 2000 
election, when a government that had been in power for 40 
years opted to accept rejection in a free and fair election. 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶17.  (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar/. 
JACOBS