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DE RUEHWN #0911/01 1461908
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P 261908Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2574
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1443
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J5 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHCV/USDAO CARACAS VE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000911 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016 
TAGS: PBTS EPET EFIS PREL BB TT XL
SUBJECT: BARBADOS/TRINIDAD MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE:  THE 
INSIDE STORY 
 
REF: BRIDGETOWN 635 
 
Classified By: DCM Mary Ellen T. Gilroy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
Permanent Secretary Teresa Marshall invited representatives 
from the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. to the MFA for a private 
briefing on the recently settled Barbados/Trinidad maritime 
boundary dispute.  Marshall painted a picture of slippery 
Trinidadian negotiators operating in bad faith and putting on 
a show to keep Barbados from going to arbitration.  Marshall 
characterized Barbados' assertion of historic fishing rights 
off Tobago as a "long shot" negotiating position rather than 
a serious claim.  She said the Government of Barbados (GOB) 
is glad to have the case resolved and soon plans to solicit 
bids from oil companies for the right to prospect for oil in 
the no-longer-disputed territory.  She was less optimistic on 
the possibility of quickly concluding a fisheries agreement 
with Trinidad.  To formalize its other maritime boundaries, 
the GOB plans to assert a continental shelf claim to the east 
and negotiate firm maritime borders with Guyana in the south 
and France (Martinique and Guadeloupe) in the north.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Barbados MFA Permanent Secretary Teresa Marshall 
called Chiefs of Mission from the U.S., U.K., and Canada to a 
private MFA briefing May 17 to explain further the April 11 
ruling on the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago maritime boundary 
dispute handed down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
the Hague (reftel).  Both countries initially claimed victory 
in the dispute.  Perhaps in reaction to this ambiguity, 
Marshall sought to clarify Barbados' position and give a 
behind-the-scenes view of the dispute from the GOB 
perspective. 
 
------------ 
Shady Trinis 
------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) In a series of anecdotes accompanied by several maps 
on Powerpoint, Marshall took the assembled group through the 
history of the case.  She described Barbados PM Owen Arthur's 
2004 decision to take the case to arbitration as a last 
resort, after several rounds of fruitless negotiations with 
Trinidad.  She hypothesized that Trinidad was motivated by 
its oil and gas unitization deals with Venezuela and the 
desire to exploit undersea oil and mineral wealth from as 
large an area as possible.  Marshall indicated that Trinidad 
had an aggressive initial claim (far north of the eventual 
arbitral award), and maintained the same position throughout 
five rounds of bilateral negotiations.  She offered a litany 
of charges against the Trinidadian side to back up her 
statement that Trinidad had negotiated in bad faith while 
trying to establish "squatter's rights" by scheming to drill 
oil wells in the disputed territory. 
 
------------- 
Case Timeline 
------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Although Barbados and Trinidad had been negotiating 
bilaterally on this dispute since 2000, events began 
escalating in 2003 when Barbados and Guyana concluded 
negotiations on a bilateral Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
treaty.  Those two nations asserted that a 1990 maritime 
boundary treaty between Trinidad and Venezuela unfairly 
carved up areas claimed by Barbados and Guyana.  Barbados 
Prime Minister Owen Arthur and Guyanese President Bharrat 
Jagdeo cornered Trinidadian Prime Minister Patrick Manning in 
2003 at an international conference and extracted a pledge 
from Manning to ask his Cabinet to review the 1990 treaty. 
(Note:  Marshall pointed out that Manning was the opposition 
leader in 1990 and had originally opposed the treaty with 
Venezeula.  End note.)  At this same time, GOB frustration 
with Trinidad was building as the fifth round of bilateral 
boundary negotiations ended with no change in the aggressive 
Trinidadian claim.  The straw that broke the camel's back 
occurred when Trinidad arrested several Barbadian fishermen 
off the coast of Tobago in 2004.  PM Arthur immediately 
imposed monitoring licenses on CARICOM imports (a first step 
towards trade sanctions against Trinidad) and called PM 
Manning to Barbados for an emergency meeting. 
 
¶5.  (C) When the urgent meeting convened in Barbados in early 
2004, PM Manning took a hard line, insisting the 1990 treaty 
was unchangeable.  Marshall quoted Manning as saying, "If you 
 
want to take me to court, go ahead."  The GOB took that 
statement as a clear sign Trinidad was unwilling to 
negotiate.  Marshall said the GOB had an internal discussion 
and decided to take the case to the Hague.  As she put it, 
there were three reasons for the Barbados decision:  1) 
Trinidad was clearly unwilling to negotiate, 2) Trinidad had 
worked out oil and gas unitization deals with Venezuela 
affecting the disputed territory without input from Barbados 
or Guyana, and 3) Trinidad was filibustering on fisheries by 
not negotiating seriously.  Furthermore, the possible start 
of Trinidadian oil exploration in disputed territory could 
give them "squatter's rights" that would hurt the GOB 
position during arbitration. 
 
------------------ 
Barbados' Position 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Barbados initiated its case at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in the Hague on February 16, 2004.  When the 
Hague case began, Trinidad cut its aggressive claim to the 
north nearly in half, further fueling the GOB perception that 
its CARICOM neighbor had been negotiating in bad faith. 
Barbados based its case on three arguments:  1) The 
maintenance of traditional fishing grounds off the coast of 
Tobago, 2) Boundary delimitation based on a median line 
between the two countries, and 3) Non-recognition of the 1990 
Trinidad-Venezuela maritime boundary treaty. 
 
------------------- 
Trinidad's Position 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  According to Marshall, maritime boundary 
negotiations ordinarily start at the median line between the 
two countries and then each side presents special 
circumstances that would warrant a deviation from the median. 
 Trinidad started with a claim well past the Barbados side of 
the median.  It supported its claim by arguing that Trinidad 
has a longer coastline than Barbados.  (Note:  Marshall 
called the Trinidadian methodology "novel" and not based on 
generally accepted practices of maritime delimitation.  End 
Note.)  Marshall disclosed that at one point Trinidad was 
even willing to lay claim to the seabed and give Barbados the 
water above.  She found this proposal humorous, and observed 
it was not a workable solution. 
 
--------- 
The Award 
--------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  As covered in reftel, Trinidad eventually received 
315 square nautical miles over the median line.  Marshall 
said this award was made in deference to its longer 
coastline.  Importantly, Trinidad is cut off at the 200 
nautical mile mark and cannot lay claim to the continental 
shelf.  Barbados, however, does have access to the shelf and 
must make a formal claim by 2009.  Also, Marshall remarked 
that the ruling indirectly affected Trinidad's 1990 treaty 
with Venezuela.  The Hague court decided that a small sliver 
of EEZ given to Venezuela in that 1990 treaty was not 
Trinidad's to give.  To keep control of that area, Venezuela 
would have to negotiate with Guyana.  The next step for 
Barbados is to formalize its other maritime boundaries.  The 
GOB plans to assert a continental shelf claim to the east and 
negotiate firm maritime borders with Guyana in the south and 
France (Martinique and Guadeloupe) in the north. 
 
--------- 
Fisheries 
--------- 
 
¶9.  (C) According to Marshall, Trinidad kept bilateral 
fisheries negotiations going purely to keep Barbados from 
going to arbitration.  As an example of Trinidadian 
posturing, Barbados Deputy Prime Minister Mia Mottley (the 
GOB lead in this case) said in a post-ruling presentation to 
parliament that Trinidad offered "to allow Barbadian 
fishermen access off Tobago during the months of April and 
May even though it is well known to all and sundry that it 
was during November to February that the flying fish are 
found in the waters off Tobago."  Marshall also conveyed the 
GOB's view that Trinidad had delayed the creation of a 
Barbados-Trinidad joint scientific committee on fisheries, 
blocked progress on a common CARICOM fisheries policy, 
falsely claimed that overfishing was reducing flying fish 
 
stocks, and greatly exaggerated the number of Barbadian 
fishermen operating near Tobago. 
 
¶10.  (C) Although the panel decided it did not have 
jurisdiction to rule directly on the fisheries dispute, it 
made a statement binding the two sides to work out a 
bilateral agreement (reftel).  Marshall said even this 
statement by the panel was a small victory, and only came 
about because of a throwaway comment that John Jeremy, the 
Trinidadian Attorney General and lead negotiator, made during 
his country's closing statement to the arbitrators.  He 
remarked, "We would be happy to negotiate a bilateral 
fisheries agreement with Barbados."  The panel took him at 
his word and made his statement binding upon the Government 
of Trinidad and Tobago.  Marshall expressed doubt that the 
GOB could quickly conclude a fisheries agreement with 
Trinidad. 
 
--- 
Oil 
--- 
 
¶11.  (C) As mentioned reftel, oil exploration rights have 
been at the heart of this dispute.  Marshall explained that, 
at the time arbitration began in 2004, the GOB instituted a 
moratorium on offshore exploration in its waters.  Now that 
the Hague court has made its ruling, the GOB plans to quickly 
solicit bids for exploration licenses and has sent a letter 
to that effect to interested companies.  Previous prospecting 
for oil by ConocoPhillips was unsuccessful and that company 
relinquished its license in 2004.  The GOB, however, remains 
hopeful that someone can find oil in its newly defined 
maritime territory.  ExxonMobil has expressed interest in 
bidding for the license, and other companies will likely 
follow suit. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) This maritime boundary dispute had sown discord 
between CARICOM partners Barbados and Trinidad for years. 
Now that the matter is settled, the two sides should be able 
to move on and repair the damage to their relationship. 
Barbados Deputy PM Mottley used the old adage, "Good fences 
make good neighbors" in her parliamentary statement to 
describe how the ruling would ease tensions between the two 
countries.  Although admittedly one-sided, Marshall's account 
offers a rare inside glimpse into one of the many internecine 
battles within CARICOM.  Such squabbles over boundaries, 
trade, and immigration have generated mistrust between 
countries and made the regional integration process slower 
and more difficult. 
KRAMER