Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BISHKEK701, CRIME FIGURE WITH SUSPECTED TIES TO GOVERNMENT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BISHKEK701 2006-05-11 12:01 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bishkek
VZCZCXRO1169
OO RUEHDBU RUEHDT RUEHLMC
DE RUEHEK #0701/01 1311201
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111201Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7363
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMCT/MCC THRESHOLD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0560
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1547
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0203
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1929
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1311
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EUR MIKE RANGER, DS/DSS/IP JANE 
COLON, DS/IP/SCA, DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/OP, S/ES-O/CME, 
DS/ER/CC, DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/NEA/SA F. SCOTT GALLO, DS/DSS/IP 
KATIE PARSONS, DS/DSS/ITA JUDITH MCGINLEY, DS/IP/SA SCOTT 
BULTROWICZ, DS/IP/NEA DONALD WEINBERG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KCRM ASEC KG
SUBJECT: CRIME FIGURE WITH SUSPECTED TIES TO GOVERNMENT 
MEETS (VERY) BLOODY END 
 
REF: A. BISHKEK 503 
     B. BISHKEK 186 
     C. 05 BISHKEK 1555 
 
Classified By: DCM Donald Lu, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  According to press reports and the Interior 
Ministry (MVD), notorious mob figure and parliamentary 
candidate Ryspek Akmatbayev (reftels a and b) was killed by 
unknown persons on May 10 approximately 12 kilometers outside 
of Bishkek.  According to the MVD, Akmatbayev was shot 28 
times by two gunmen while exiting a mosque in the village of 
Kok-Jar.  Two children inside the mosque at the time of the 
attack were also wounded by stray bullets.  Over the past 
eight months, Akmatbayev had come to symbolize the alarming 
new visibility and power of organized crime in Kyrgyzstan, as 
well as the growing links between criminal figures and the 
government.  His violent death, although certainly 
predictable, was a great relief to many in the Kyrgyz 
government.  It remains unknown whether his death was tied to 
the removal earlier that day of National Security Service 
(SNB) Chairman Aitbayev, who was suspected by many of being 
Akmatbayev's protector.  However, the timing of the murder ) 
only hours after Aitbayev's dismissal ) is highly suspect. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
VIOLENT END TO A VIOLENT MAN 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) According to various reports, Akmatbayev was gunned 
down in the village of Kok-Jar, approximately 12 kilometers 
south of Bishkek in the Alamedin Valley.  PolOff, unaware of 
what had transpired two hours prior, drove by the mosque 
where Akmatbayev had been shot; there was a crowd of about 
100 just outside the front doors and about 30 cars parked 
nearby.  MVD sources reported that two gunmen jumped out of a 
dark Audi and shot Akmatbayev 28 times using Kalashnikov 
rifles.  Akmatbayev's numerous bodyguards reportedly ran away 
as soon as the shooting started, but quickly returned and 
stuffed his dead body into a car before driving away to 
Akmatbayev's hometown of Cholpon-Ata in Issyk-Kul Oblast. 
Akmatbayev was reportedly buried less than a day later, on 
May 11.  (Note:  It is not yet known whether any senior 
government figures attended the funeral.  Several cabinet 
officials and ranking parliamentarians attended his brother's 
funeral seven months ago.  End note.) 
 
MVD MINISTER: AKMATBAYEV'S CRIME NETWORK IS FINISHED 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  (C) On May 11, Interior Minister Sutalinov told the 
Ambassador that police had recovered the car used by 
Akmatbayev's killers.  He said three Kalashnikov rifles were 
found inside, but that only two had been used.  Sutalinov 
said that the police had a suspect (a mob rival of 
Akmatbayev's), but that no arrests had been made.  He 
predicted Akmatbayev's family and associates would not cause 
any trouble, claiming "they've got no money, and without 
Ryspek the crime network is finished."  Sutalinov confirmed 
that Akmatbayev was buried at 1400 on May 11. 
 
NO PERSON, NO PROBLEM 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (C) COMMENT:  Many in Bishkek are breathing a huge sigh 
of relief at the death of Kyrgyzstan's most feared man. 
Beginning shortly after the death of his brother Tynychbek in 
October of 2005 (reftel c), Ryspek Akmatbayev came to play an 
increasingly visible and destabilizing role in Kyrgyz 
politics, with his parliamentary candidacy (and the 
 
BISHKEK 00000701  002 OF 002 
 
 
President's refusal to stop him) coming to symbolize 
organized crime run amok, with government complicity.  That 
the government was unable or unwilling to rein him in, along 
with the fact that President Bakiyev and other officials 
repeatedly refused even in private to condemn Akmatbayev 
(while defending and even praising him publicly) led many 
observers to believe that Bakiyev was either blackmailed by 
or otherwise beholden to Akmatbayev.  In the end, there is no 
question that Akmatbayev had become a major political 
liability for President Bakiyev, due to the significant 
damage he had done to Bakiyev's image. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT CONT'D:  Although Akmatbayev had countless 
enemies in the criminal underworld, it has not gone unnoticed 
that he was killed the same day President Bakiyev sacked SNB 
Chairman Tashtemir Aitbayev.  Political observers in Bishkek 
are almost unanimous in their belief that Akmatbayev and 
Aitbayev were somehow linked (the two actually spoke face to 
face in public during a March 31 Ryspek-led demonstration in 
Bishkek), with many claiming that Aitbayev had for years been 
acting as Akmatbayev's "krysha" (his protector, in Russian 
mob slang).  Many had speculated that even the perception 
that Akmatbayev was being protected by either the SNB or the 
Presidential Administration served to shield him from his 
many criminal rivals.  In this sense, Aitbayev's dismissal 
could have been tantamount to giving Akmatbayev's mob-world 
enemies a green light to go after him. 
 
6.  (C)  COMMENT CONT'D:  It remains altogether possible that 
senior government figures were likewise somehow involved, 
though no specific information is known at this time that 
would support such a theory.  Akmatbayev had threatened to 
kill Prime Minister Kulov.  Minister of Interior Sutalinov 
has spoken passionately about his hatred for Akmatbayev, whom 
he blames for the killing of a fellow senior police officer. 
The fact that Akmatbayev's considerable security detail 
turned and ran at the first sign of trouble could imply that 
they too might have been somehow involved in the murder. 
Regardless, Akmatbayev's death is likely to be a great relief 
to the Bakiyev Administration. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT CONT'D:  It is less clear what will happen 
next.  According to MVD contacts, Akmatbayev's family and mob 
underlings, having lost their leader, are running scared and 
are unlikely to cause any trouble in the near future. 
Akmatbayev's death could well cause a near-term scramble for 
control of his considerable business assets and organized 
crime network, touching off yet another round of tit-for-tat 
mob killings.  It is also unclear as yet what role, if any, 
Akmatbayev's remaining brother will try to play.  On the 
other hand, his death could also lead to an easing of 
tensions between President Bakiyev and the opposition, in 
that Bakiyev's unwillingness or inability to stop Akmatbayev 
had become one of the opposition's primary rallying calls 
against Bakiyev. 
YOVANOVITCH