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Viewing cable 06BERLIN1227, IRAN: GERMAN PARLIAMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BERLIN1227 2006-05-05 15:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXRO5687
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHRL #1227/01 1251535
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051535Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2911
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0804
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6947
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1610
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7487
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0062
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0341
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 8349
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1302
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0208
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR P, T, ISN/RA, EUR/AGS, EUR/PRA, AND NEA/IR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2016 
TAGS: KNNP PARM MNUC PHUM EU GM IR
SUBJECT: IRAN:  GERMAN PARLIAMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
CHAIRMAN VISITS TEHRAN 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor John Lister; reasons 
 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In a May 4 press conference, Ruprecht 
Polenz (CDU), Chairman of the German Parliament's Foreign 
Affairs Committee and frequent commentator in the German 
media, provided a readout of his May 2-3 visit to Tehran. 
Polenz said that the nuclear subject had come to dominate the 
public discourse in Iran to the point that it now is 
inhibiting further discussion of social and political 
reforms.  He emphasized that it is essential that Iran "hear 
from all sides" that Iran's nuclear program is a serious 
concern of the international community, and not just the 
United States.  Polenz highlighted the importance of 
maintaining unity between Europe, the United States, and the 
rest of the international community in dealing with Iran.  In 
that context, Polenz said he believes that, as a next step, a 
"weaker" resolution supported by the entire UNSC would be 
more important than having a more strongly-worded resolution 
that lacks the full support of the UNSC members.  Polenz 
repeated his previous calls for the United States to engage 
in talks with the Iranians regarding the nuclear dispute. 
(Comment:  Polenz does not argue that the USG should supplant 
the EU3 in any future negotiations, but that the USG should 
supplement the EU3 effort more directly in some ill-defined 
way.  End Comment)  Polenz also touched briefly on other 
topics of his discussions in Tehran, including Iranian 
threats against Israel, regional security, and human rights. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (U) During his May 2-3 visit to Tehran, Polenz met with 
various Iranian officials and parliamentarians, including: 
Hassan Rouhani, former Secretary-General of the Iranian 
National Security Council (and former Iranian chief nuclear 
issues negotiator); Deputy FM Manouchehr Mohammadi; Deputy FM 
Sa'id Jalili; Gholamali Haddad Adel, President of the Iranian 
Parliament; and Ala'eddin Borujerdi, Chairman of the Iranian 
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee.  Polenz was 
accompanied by Marieluise Beck, a Green party representative 
from the German Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee. 
 
-------------------- 
Iran/nuclear Problem 
-------------------- 
 
3. (U) Polenz reported that the nuclear problem was the key 
issue on the agenda of his visit.  He said that the subject 
had come to dominate the public discourse in Iran to the 
point that it now is inhibiting further discussion of social 
and political reforms.  Polenz reported that the Iranian 
press and opposition parties had been given "directives" from 
the Iranian regime to support the official Iranian line on 
the nuclear dispute, and that censorship was increasing.  He 
speculated that Iranian President Ahmadinejad might well view 
an escalation of the dispute as to his advantage, insofar as 
it distracts Iranians from focusing on his failure to keep 
his campaign promises to boost employment and fight 
corruption. 
 
4. (U) According to Polenz, the Iranians view the nuclear 
issue as a dispute between Iran and the United States, and 
argue that the USG has pressured the Europeans and others 
into supporting the U.S. position.  Polenz emphasized that, 
in light of this erroneous view, it is essential that Iran 
"hear from all sides" that Iran's nuclear program is a 
serious concern of the international community, and not just 
the United States.  Responding to questions regarding media 
reports that Iranian parliamentarians had called for Germany 
to play a mediator role, Polenz insisted that Germany could 
not and would not play such a role, since Germany was aligned 
with its European and other partners in its concerns about 
Iran's nuclear program.  Polenz highlighted the importance of 
maintaining unity between Europe, the United States, and the 
rest of the international community in dealing with Iran.  In 
that context, Polenz said he believes that, as a next step, a 
"weaker" resolution supported by the entire UNSC would be 
more important than having a more strongly-worded resolution 
 
BERLIN 00001227  002 OF 003 
 
 
that lacks the full support of the UNSC members. 
 
5. (U) Polenz said the main sticking point of the nuclear 
dispute is getting Iran to agree to suspend its uranium 
enrichment program.  He readily admitted not having an answer 
to the problem, in the face of continued Iranian 
recalcitrance.  However, he argued that any successful 
resolution would require the international community to apply 
pressure, "in careful doses" (to avoid counterproductive 
escalation), and to offer incentives.  Polenz also referred 
to various concepts for providing nuclear fuel assurances to 
Iran as being worth exploring further, to counter Iranian 
arguments that they need to develop nuclear enrichment 
capabilities so as not to be vulnerable to 
politically-motivated interruptions in fuel supply. 
 
6. (SBU) Polenz repeated his previous calls for the United 
States to engage in talks with the Iranians regarding the 
nuclear dispute, arguing that a number of factors tied to any 
future resolution, including Iranian "security concerns," 
would require direct U.S. involvement.  (Comment:  Polenz 
does not argue that the USG should supplant the EU3 in any 
future negotiations, but that the USG should supplement the 
EU3 effort more directly in some ill-defined way.  End 
Comment)  He also suggested that the prospect of 
normalization of relations with the United States could be an 
additional incentive for Tehran, though he remarked that U.S. 
officials had rejected the idea during his recent 
consultations in Washington.  Asked by a reporter how 
President Bush's announced July visit to Germany might affect 
the Iran-related diplomacy, Polenz said that, following 
President Bush's February 2005 visit to Germany/Europe, the 
USG had decided to support the EU negotiations by offering to 
cease blocking Iran's application for WTO membership and 
easing restrictions on the export of civil aircraft parts to 
Iran.  Polenz speculated that President Bush's upcoming visit 
might lead the USG to think of other such incentives it could 
offer. 
 
7. (U) Regarding press speculation of potential military 
options, Polenz said that his recent discussions in 
Washington had reassured him that the USG is committed to 
seeking a diplomatic solution.  He further commented that he 
thought that maintaining some ambiguity with regard to the 
question of military action "need not damage the current 
diplomatic effort."  On the subject of possible sanctions, 
Polenz said that Iran needs to understand that no country can 
afford to isolate itself in a globalized world.  However, he 
concluded that, beyond noting that sanctions options were 
being considered, he did not wish to comment in detail in 
public.  Beck commented that economic sanctions can be 
problematic, and even backfire, and therefore need to be 
approached carefully. 
 
------------------------------ 
Iranian Threats Against Israel 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (U) Polenz said that he had raised German outrage about 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's threats against Israel. 
According to Polenz, his Iranian interlocutors responded by 
claiming that former Iranian President Rafsanjani had 
rejected Ahmadinejad's statements, and that Ayatollah 
Khamenei had stated in the Iranian Parliament that Iran has 
no intention of attacking anyone.  Polenz conceded that he 
was unable to evaluate the substance of such claims, but 
noted that he had emphasized the Roadmap and two state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in all of his 
discussions. 
 
----------------- 
Regional Security 
----------------- 
 
9. (U) Polenz said that he also had discussed Iraq and 
Afghanistan while in Tehran.  He said he emphasized to the 
Iranians that they should have a strong self-interest in 
 
BERLIN 00001227  003 OF 003 
 
 
avoiding a civil war in Iraq.  Polenz lamented that the U.S. 
offer of talks with Iran regarding the security situation in 
Iraq had not come to fruition.  On Afghanistan, Polenz 
assessed Iran as playing a positive role.  He added that the 
Iranians are concerned about Afghan-based drug trafficking 
and would like more European support in addressing the 
problem. 
 
------------------- 
Human Rights Issues 
------------------- 
 
10. (U) Polenz reported that he raised several human rights 
cases with the Iranians.  One involves the case of German 
citizen Donald Klein who is serving an 18-month sentence in 
Iran for allegedly illegally entering Iranian territorial 
waters.  The others are cases being tracked by Amnesty 
International, two of which involve members of Iran's Arab 
minority and one of which relates to Iran's subjection of 
minors to the death penalty.  Regarding the latter point, 
Polenz said that the Iranian Parliament is discussing raising 
the age at which someone could be sentenced to death in Iran. 
 Beck said that the delegation's ability to meet with Iranian 
civil society representatives, reformers, and human rights 
activists was constrained by the fact that such Iranians were 
hesitant to meet them.  She described this as a notable shift 
in the Iranian domestic political atmosphere in comparison 
with past experience. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) Polenz is frequently quoted in the German media on 
foreign policy issues.  He acknowledged that he initially had 
questioned whether it made sense to travel to Iran at this 
time, given the hard line taken by the Iranian government and 
Ahmadinejad's inflammatory comments.  In the wake of his 
trip, he said that he had concluded that it indeed was 
worthwhile and important to maintain such dialogue with 
Iranian contacts.  Polenz' comments reflect disagreement 
within his committee regarding the advisability of the trip. 
It is worth noting that only one other committee member, 
Marieluise Beck (Greens), joined Polenz on the trip.  In 
fact, in a private conversation last week, Deputy Foreign 
Affairs Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose (SPD) told us 
that he had declined to join Polenz on the trip, arguing that 
the time was inappropriate for such a visit.  We have seen a 
similar debate within the German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs ("Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik"), a 
German government-sponsored, independent NGO that plans its 
own visit to Tehran May 5-10.  While the Director of the 
Institute, Volker Perthes (a Middle East expert), supports 
the trip, members of his staff working on nonproliferation 
affairs are critical of the idea, and at least one prominent 
member of the staff has declined to participate. 
CLOUD