VZCZCXYZ0024
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBW #0861/01 1510639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 310639Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8689
INFO RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 3475

S E C R E T BELGRADE 000861 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2031 
TAGS: PINR PBTS PGOV PNAT PREL YI SR
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO STATE 80071: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS 
DECISION (C-RE6-00623) 
 
REF: A. (1) BELGRADE 856 
 
     ¶B. (2) BELGRADE 786 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶A.  (U)  POLITICAL/LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES 
 
1)  (S)  DO KOSTUNICA AND/OR TADIC THINK KOSOVO'S 
INDEPENDENCE CAN BE PREVENTED? 
 
(S) No.  Kostunica thinks he can postpone the decision and in 
the meantime lead the final result away from independence. 
He continues to tell us emphatically that he will never 
accept an independent Kosovo.  Tadic thinks he can wait out 
the result and survive politically, especially if the 
democratic forces close ranks before a settlement.   Both men 
have certainly heard loud and clear the private messages from 
USG and other members of the CG with regards to our belief 
that independence will be the outcome.  Both men will attempt 
to either protect themselves from the expected backlash from 
the Serbian electorate (or in the case of Kostunica, draw on 
international law and regional neighbors to either forestall 
independence or complicate its imposition).  We also note 
recent polls suggesting a backlash will not be so intense. 
Kostunica continues to tell us about his private 
conversations with leaders (Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
perhaps Macedonia) and cites some western European leaders as 
offering concern that the process is rushing too fast towards 
independence.  Kostunica might use this perceived discord 
among the international community in the hope of delaying or 
derailing the independence process.  Tadic is not so 
creative.  We do not rule out Kostunica resigning, or calling 
for a referendum, in the event of Kosovo independence. 
 
(S) DO THEY BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE WILL BACK 
SERBIA'S POSITION ON KOSOVO IF BELGRADE PUTS FORTH A GOOD 
FAITH EFFORT DURING THE FINAL STATUS TALKS? 
 
(S) This is a tactical decision not yet resolved.  Kostunica 
frequently refers to, and tries to exploit, perceived 
divisions within the Contact Group.  The GOS would bank on 
getting Russia (and China) to back a compromise solution if 
they manage to deadlock the proceedings (e.g. delayed UN 
seat, no Kosovo army, possibly even partition). 
 
(S) WOULD THEY BE PREPARED TO BUY OFF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE 
SUPPORT, AND IF SO, WHAT PRICE ARE THEY WILLING TO PAY? 
 
(S) The GOS would be prepared to offer solidarity with 
Russian and Chinese positions on minorities (Georgia, 
Moldova, Abkhazia, Tibet, Taiwan, etc.) But, in fact, Serbia 
does not have the means to  buy, such Russian or Chinese 
support. 
 
2)  (S) WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE KOSOVO ISSUE COULD 
FORGE BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN TADIC AND KOSTUNICA AS THEY 
UNITE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE? 
 
(S) Slim to none.  They are wary of each other personally 
while understanding that they benefit politically from being 
close politically for now.  Tadic is convinced that the next 
government will be a DS-led DS/DSS coalition and he has said 
that Kostunica can be won over by a promise to retain his 
premiership, even if the DSS is the minority partner. 
Kostunica is likely much more Machiavellian and more likely 
to succeed in exploiting the DS for his own purposes. 
Kostunica is most likely also hoping to build a &national 
bloc8 of like-minded parties that would rival the DS. 
 
(S) ARE THEY LINKED AT THE HIP ON KOSOVO? 
 
(S) There are not significant differences on policy between 
the two on Kosovo.  However, Tadic will be more inclined to 
be constructive after a settlement if the democratic forces 
have succeeded in forging a strong coalition. 
 
(S) WILL THEY BOTH SUFFER POLITICALLY IF KOSOVO IS GRANTED 
INDEPENDENCE? 
 
(S) They would both disassociate themselves from the result, 
and go back to the electorate with the victimization rhetoric 
that has been employed in the past.  Tadic will focus on the 
need for the GOS to be committed to its European future. 
Kostunica is more likely to stress nationalist themes.  Polls 
do not necessarily indicate a major change in voting 
preferences, but a sharp rise in democratic voter apathy 
would benefit the SRS. 
 
3)  (S) WOULD KOSTUNICA AND/OR TADIC WITHDRAW FROM FINAL 
STATUS DELIBERATIONS BEFORE THE TALKS ARE FULLY COMPLETED? 
 
(S) The current inclination for both men is to hope against 
 
hope and try as much as possible to stay in the game to 
achieve their objective of avoiding blame for losing Kosovo. 
Advisors on both sides have been crystal clear that 
notwithstanding reservations about negotiations they have no 
interest or intention to walk away from the table.  That 
said, when presented with Kosovo independence, they are 
likely to walk away. 
 
4) (S) IF THEY DID WITHDRAW EARLY WHAT MIGHT THE IMPETUS FOR 
SUCH A STRATEGY BE? 
 
(S) The public announcement of the impending independence 
decision.  If elections are called early, they would 
definitely stall the GOS, participation.  They could 
withdraw as the endgame approaches because of their desire to 
preserve political capital with the electorate during 
elections. 
 
(S) WOULD BOTH BE WILLING TO RESIGN FROM THEIR CURRENT 
POSITIONS?  WOULD BOTH FAVOR EARLY ELECTIONS? 
 
(S) While we do not rule it out, neither the PM or President 
is likely to resign as they would use their positions to go 
back to the voters (via elections or a referendum) and try to 
get a clearer mandate for their plan to proceed.  Tadic and 
the DS want early elections more than Kostunica and the DSS. 
Tadic, with a five year term lasting to 2009, is least likely 
to resign. 
 
(S) WOULD EITHER OF THEM BE INCLINED TO WITHDRAW FROM 
POLITICAL LIFE ALTOGETHER? 
 
(S) Not likely.  There was some speculation that Kostunica 
would retire and return to the University, but our contacts 
for the most part dismiss these rumors.  They say Kostunica 
is far more enamored of the power of the office and he will 
try to retain the position at all costs.  Tadic has told us 
that he might lie low and wait out a Radical government, but 
clearly he sees his future in politics. 
 
(S) WOULD EITHER BE PREPARED TO JOIN A COALITION WITH THE 
SOCIALISTS OR THE RADICALS TO REMAIN IN POWER IF EARLY 
ELECTIONS WERE HELD? 
 
(S) Normally, neither would ever join in government with 
extreme nationalists.  However, if Kostunica were left with 
no other options we could envision him constructing a 
coalition with (reform elements of) the Radicals and 
Socialists (as he has done since 2004).  Kostunica has always 
suggested his preference for a National Unity government as 
the most appropriate vehicle for resolving supranational 
questions like Kosovo.  Tadic has always maintained that he 
would never join with either Socialists or Radicals in 
government. 
 
5)  (S) WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS THAT BELGRADE COULD SEEK TO 
LOBBY OTHER GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED IN "FROZEN CONFLICT" AREAS 
SUCH AS GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST INDEPENDENCE 
FOR KOSOVO? 
 
(S) This is very likely to happen in the UN. 
 
(S) HOW DOES BELGRADE PLAN TO USE OTHER KEY UN MEMBER STATES 
AND ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, TO 
BLOCK KOSOVO'S INDEPENDENCE? 
 
(S) This is not likely to be used as a tool to block 
independence, rather to block UN membership.  They understand 
that once key states recognize Kosovo, their most productive 
course of action is blocking or at least delaying UN 
membership. 
 
6)  (S) UNDER WHAT SCENARIOS/CONDITIONS COULD BELGRADE AGREE 
TO KOSOVAR INDEPENDENCE?  WHAT SPECIFIC CONDITIONS, 
GUARANTEES FOR KOSOVO SERBS, MUST BE PROVIDED TO WIN 
BELGRADE'S BACKING? 
 
(S) They won,t agree in the foreseeable future, but there 
are conditions under which Belgrade might tolerate it (e.g. 
not employ a policy of actively undermining an independent 
Kosovo.)  The minimum requirement would be guarantees for 
local control for Serb communities in the areas that are 
defined under the enhanced competencies proposal and 
unhindered vertical links to Belgrade for Serbian communities 
in Kosovo.  Protection of Serbian Orthodox Church property 
and security for Kosovo Serbs are also sine qua nons. Leon 
Kojen (senior negotiator and advisor to Tadic) has made the 
distinction between constitutional/legal guarantees and 
administrative/political control.  For Belgrade, both are 
absolute requirements. 
 
(S) WHAT WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE TIMEFRAME FOR KOSOVO'S 
 
EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE FROM BELGRADE'S PERSPECTIVE? 
 
(S) There is no acceptable timeframe for Kosovo,s eventual 
independence.  Belgrade would prefer the question of 
Kosovo,s independence to be subsumed under the EU 
integration process that would allow them the freedom to 
ignore the question, at least for many more years. 
 
¶B.  (U) STABILITY AND SECURITY ISSUES 
 
(S) (Note:  Our assessments of stability issues in particular 
assume a continued moderate, democratic government.  A SRS 
government would force a significant recalibration of our 
views. End note.) 
 
1)  (S) WOULD KOSTUNICA/TADIC SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE 
OR OTHERWISE DEFEND SERB INTERESTS IN OTHER AREAS, MOST 
NOTABLY MONTENEGRO, BOSNIA (REPUBLIKA SRSPKA), CROATIA, AND 
SOUTHERN SERBIA, AS RETALIATION FOR GRANTING KOSOVO 
INDEPENDENCE? 
 
(S) Nothing here suggests that the GOS has any kind of plan 
or intention to use minority issues in neighboring states as 
a way of promoting their position on Kosovo.  More likely the 
difficulty will be north of the Ibar River where Belgrade is 
likely to do very little to keep nationalist elements there 
in check.  The Radicals would be far more irredentist in 
power. 
 
2)  (S) DOES BELGRADE HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DESTABILIZE THESE 
AND OTHER REGIONS?  IF SO, WHAT ARE SOME OF THE TACTICS AND 
WHO ARE SOME OF THE PLAYERS THEY WILL SEEK TO USE TO 
IMPLEMENT THEIR AGENDA? 
 
(S) Belgrade will preserve the relatively good relations it 
has with states in the region.  Again, it is not likely they 
would deploy any kind of grand destabilization plan.  The 
leadership in north Mitrovica and among the Serb communities 
in the area north of the Ibar is already quite radical and 
has the capacity to create a lot of practical problems for an 
independent Kosovo.  Belgrade will be careful no to do 
anything overtly in this effort but could plausibly deny 
having enough influence to keep things in order. 
 
3)  (S) HOW DETERMINED WOULD BELGRADE BE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL 
OF NORTHERN KOSOVO IF KOSOVO WERE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE? WOULD 
BELGRADE ALLOW NORTHERN KOSOVO SERBS TO PURSUE THEIR OWN 
AGENDA?  WOULD BELGRADE BACK CALLS FOR SECESSION? 
 
(S) Much would depend on the nature of the settlement and 
arrangements for northern Kosovo.  A special regime (e.g. 
like UNTAES or Brcko) firmly backed by the international 
community would make it difficult for Serbia to actively 
cause problems.  There is sufficient local leadership in 
northern Kosovo for Belgrade to remain informed without 
controlling the situation on the ground.  Belgrade would 
probably not go so far as to incorporate northern Kosovo into 
Serbia but they might make special consultative arrangements 
given the historically close ties.  An attempt by the Kosovar 
army to impose rule north of the Ibar presents a potential 
flashpoint for violence. 
 
(S) WOULD BELGRADE BE WILLING TO OFFER FINANCIAL, LOGISTICAL, 
AND/OR RESOURCE SUPPORT TO SUSTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NORTHERN 
KOSOVO? 
 
(S) Belgrade would likely maintain its current support for 
Serbian communities in northern Kosovo, as well as to other 
Serb majority municipalities. 
 
(S) IS THERE A SCENARIO UNDER WHICH BELGRADE WOULD SIMPLY 
RETREAT FROM NORTHERN KOSOVO, THUS WITHDRAWING ITS 
SIGNIFICANT POLICE, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY APPARATUS? 
 
(S) We do not see this as a likely scenario.  Again, an 
interim regime under international community supervision for 
northern Kosovo could make it more difficult for Serbia to 
retain this apparatus. 
 
¶C.  (U) BELGRADE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
 
1)  (S) WHAT WOULD BELGRADE'S REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
OUTLOOK BE SHOULD KOSOVO GAIN INDEPENDENCE UNDER A GOVERNMENT 
HEADED BY DSS?  RADICALS? SOCIALISTS? DS?  HOW WOULD ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES BE IMPACTED?  WOULD 
BELGRADE BE LESS INCLINED TO PURSUE EURO-ATLANTIC 
INTEGRATION, NAMELY EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP? 
 
(S) Our feeling is that no government in Serbia (SRS or 
otherwise) would be foolish enough to engage in overt 
military or paramilitary action with regards to Kosovo.  More 
 
likely, we envision a range of positions from benign 
tolerance for an independent Kosovo to outright rejection a 
la China-Taiwan.  The SRS has already indicated it would 
declare Kosovo &occupied territory8 and it would not 
recognize an independent Kosovo.  What would be different 
would be the position of Belgrade with regards to EU 
integration and ultimate membership in EU and NATO.  More 
enlightened minds in the DS and DSS could imagine a Serbia 
that does not accept an independent Kosovo but could still be 
a part of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way Cyprus 
has done without resolving the situation in the north.  On 
the democratic side of the house (DS or DSS) Belgrade will 
seek to maintain the strongest possible ties with its 
neighbors and try and balance its unhappiness with an 
independent Kosovo with its greater state interests.  The 
Radicals or Socialists will not be as balanced. 
 
(S) WOULD SERBIA LIKELY BECOME MORE ISOLATIONIST IN ITS 
THINKING?  WOULD BELGRADE HAVE A STRONG BACKLASH AGAINST THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS WAS THE CASE DURING THE NATO 
BOMBINGS IN 1999? 
 
(S) There will not be a strong backlash a la 1999.  Although 
many in the pro-Western bloc are already (privately) resigned 
to an independent Kosovo, it will still stall Euro-Atlantic 
integration and deepen frustration levels in the general 
public.  The radicals will pounce to exploit the issue and 
could succeed for time to enhance xenophobia, isolationism, 
apathy or all of those as a result of many Serbs continuing 
to lose confidence that democracy and integration with Europe 
can deliver a better life for them.  To date, the DS or DSS 
have shown themselves incapable of mounting an effective 
counter-offensive to solidify public opinion on a 
pro-integration stance. 
 
2)  (S) WHAT WOULD BELGRADE'S STRATEGY BE TOWARDS KOSOVO IF 
KOSOVO WAS NOT AWARDED INDEPENDENCE BECAUSE OF A RUSSIAN OR 
CHINESE VETO? 
 
(S) The thinking here is that independence will only be 
avoided if Belgrade can &convince8 the Contact Group. 
Belgrade may believe that China or Russia can block UN 
membership but they are not counting on those states to block 
independence.  However, if this does come to pass we assume 
Belgrade would assure the international community of its 
intent to adhere to its commitments of autonomy and 
protection of minority rights. 
 
(S) HOW WOULD IT SEEK TO MANAGE KOSOVO UNDER A SYSTEM WHEREBY 
KOSOVO HAS ALMOST UNLIMITED AUTONOMY?  WHAT WOULD BE AN 
ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT FOR BELGRADE? 
 
(S) Belgrade presented their official platform on May 30, 
which was as predictable as it was unrealistic (reftel 1). 
Any success in getting to their enlarged autonomy outcome 
would probably be implemented in a rather pro forma way. 
That said, Belgrade could be expected to deepen its support 
for Serbian minority communities in Kosovo.  It would be 
acceptable to Belgrade if Kosovo had an international 
identity without national sovereignty (e.g. representation in 
IFIs and other technical multilateral international 
organizations).  As they have said, Kosovo would have 
complete internal independence but would be tied however 
loosely to Serbia.  The Serbs are assuming a need for 
continued IC presence but they envision a post-UNMIK 
international presence along the lines of a Bosnian HighRep 
heading an EU mission. 
 
¶D.  (U) REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
 
1)  (S) IS BELGRADE PREPARING FOR A POSSIBLE INFLUX OF KOSOVO 
SERBS SHOULD KOSOVO BE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE? 
 
(S) No. They are not preparing but we believe they are 
expecting it.  USAID is initiating a new program that will 
include such preparations as one component of a broader 
project. 
 
(S) HOW DOES BELGRADE PLAN TO STEM THE TIDE OF POSSIBLE LARGE 
REFUGEE FLOWS INTO SERBIA? 
 
(S) If Kosovo is independent, there is strong evidence that 
Belgrade will not seek to stem the tide of refugee flows. 
Likely they believe Serbs north of the Ibar will stay put and 
seek partition while Serbs south of the Ibar will move into 
Serbia proper.  If history serves, the GOS may declare 
&defeat8 and call Serbs in Kosovo to come home. 
 
(S) IS THERE A PLAN TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE ACCOMMODATIONS OR 
WOULD BELGRADE ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REFUGEE CAMPS ON 
ITS TERRITORY? 
 
 
(S) The GOS has thus far been unwilling to talk about any 
contingency plans including refugee camps other than to warn 
of an exodus of Serbs from Kosovo and implicate the 
international community as partially responsible.  The GOS is 
correct in its assessment that the Radicals would exploit 
this exodus for political gain, but it is uses the refugee 
issue in the same way ) only as a dramatic threat and stops 
short of disclosing real contingency plans, if there are any. 
 
(S) International agencies and international NGOs, led by 
UNHCR, have prepared contingency plans in case of a 
population outflow.   They expect population flows within 
Kosovo (to enclaves) and out of Kosovo following the 
determination of its status, but are hoping that they will be 
gradual enough not to require a massive relief effort, which 
would be difficult to fund.   UNHCR has kept a fairly tight 
hold on its contingency plans for fear of politicizing the 
situation.   (The Serbian government is aware of these plans 
but has not participated in them.)  Much will depend on the 
kinds of security assurances given the minority communities, 
both by the international community (including Serbia) and 
the PISG, and the extent to which shadowy elements on both 
sides can steer the outcome to their own political or 
personal ends. 
 
(S) ARE THEIR KEY FACILITIES/INDUSTRIES IN NORTHERN KOSOVO 
THAT BELGRADE WOULD NOT WANT TO LOSE CONTROL OF?  IF SO, WHAT 
ARE THEY? WHERE ARE THEY LOCATED? 
 
(S) Northern Kosovo includes both a substantial portion of 
the rich coal reserves located in Kosovo, as well as all or 
part of the Trepca lead mines.   It is remotely possible they 
would seek to block development or exploitation of these 
resources pending resolution of what the Serbs see as key 
issues.   Serbia also has worked to retain the ability to 
provide both power and telecommunications services to 
Serb-populated areas of Kosovo.  Telekom Srbije, in 
particular, is quite active in Kosovo. 
 
¶E.  (U) MINORITY RIGHTS AND KOSOVO SERB ISSUES 
 
1)  (S) HOW WOULD A FUTURE BELGRADE GOVERNMENT SEEK TO 
PROTECT ETHNIC SERB INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE BALKANS IF 
KOSOVO AND MONTENEGRO BECOME INDEPENDENT? 
 
(S) We believe Belgrade,s response to an independent Kosovo 
will be confined to Kosovo.  As with the other questions 
related to larger plans for destabilization, we do not see 
any indication that this is in the cards.  Nevertheless, 
Tadic himself believes that an independent Kosovo will 
naturally destabilize the situation in Macedonia and in 
Bosnia. 
 
¶F.  (U) BELGRADE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX 
CHURCH (SPC) 
 
1)  (S) WHAT COORDINATION IS OCCURRING BETWEEN BELGRADE AND 
THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH TO PROTECT KOSOVO SERBIAN 
INSTITUTIONS IN KOSOVO? 
 
(S) The position of the church is complicated by internal 
infighting. There is a moderate wing (Fr. Irinej Dobrijevic, 
Bishops Teodosije and Grigorije) which has attempted to 
develop an apolitical position that would respond to the 
SPC,s specific interests in Kosovo (property and religious 
mission).  There are harder-line elements which believe that 
the SPC is a quasi-political institution as well as a 
religious authority.  We would caution, however, against 
simplistic right/left distinctions among the bishops.  This 
is a confusing and Byzantine organization with a great number 
of cross-cutting interests. 
 
(S) Certainly there are those in the SPC who maintain a close 
dialogue with senior GOS officials (e.g. Amfilohije is the 
uncle of Kostunica,s wife and Bishop Irinej of Backa is 
known to be an active participant in internal government 
discussions on nationalist issues). 
 
(S) In general, we have reported moderate elements of the SPC 
complaining to us of pressure from the PM directly on the SPC 
leadership to work in lockstep with the GOS throughout the 
status negotiations.  The PM views SPC deviation from GOS 
policy as a potential &Trojan horse8 for Kosovo 
independence and overall weakness in Serbia,s case (reftel 
2). 
 
2)  (S) HOW ARE VARIOUS SERBIAN POLITICAL PARTIES ATTEMPTING 
TO INFLUENCE THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, AND VICE VERSA, TO 
HELP BUILD A CASE FOR OR AGAINST A KOSOVO SETTLEMENT? 
 
(S) The PM is seized with maintaining an SPC that is in line 
with his nationalist philosophy and will intervene as 
 
necessary to keep the SPC leadership predisposed to 
supporting him. The SPC leadership wants to keep the PM and 
the DSS in power ) they see the Radicals as extremely 
unhelpful to them and although SPC leaders have made 
overtures to the DS, they have found Tadic to be less 
receptive than the PM to their current hardline stance. 
Meanwhile, the DS is working closely with moderate elements 
in the SPC to try and reinforce efforts to forge a 
constructive SPC position.  There are also reports that 
Tadic,s people are working closely with certain bishops and 
financiers to try and influence who will be the next 
Patriarch. 
POLT