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Viewing cable 06BELGRADE860, MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM: STEPS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BELGRADE860 2006-05-31 06:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Belgrade
VZCZCXRO2386
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #0860/01 1510638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310638Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8686
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000860 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MW SR
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM: STEPS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 
 
BELGRADE 00000860  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY 
 
Ref: A) Belgrade 825 B) 05 Belgrade 2185 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: One week after the vote, the positions of 
the Governments of Montenegro and Serbia are converging 
around the inevitability of a divorce.  While neither 
government has presented a concrete and definitive plan, 
both have indicated to us they anticipate swift dissolution 
of the State Union.  Once the results are final (by June 
1), the GOM specifically plans to obtain parliamentary 
approval and have the Montenegrin MFA issue letters 
requesting recognition immediately after the approval, 
perhaps as soon as June 2. The Montenegrin opposition did 
not concede, and filed over 200 complaints in an effort to 
change the May 21 pro-independence outcome; the effort has 
little chance to succeed, however, especially following 
Solana's conclusion that the referendum had succeeded. 
Pro-Union bloc leader Predrag Bulatovic said May 29 he will 
abide by Solana's verdict that independence has won.  The 
GOS has told us that there are no obstacles to rapid 
recognition of Montenegro and that it would not pre- 
condition recognition on resolution of financial and other 
issues.  President Tadic's visit to Podgorica on 5/27 sent 
a strong signal of Serbia's willingness to work closely 
with an independent Montenegro.  End summary. 
 
Montenegro Seeking to Move Quickly 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The GOM appears to be moving on a fast track 
toward recognition. While the process is still in flux and 
the GoM is hesitant to commit to a definitive timeline, 
this is the GOM's (most) optimistic plan, as confirmed by 
Ivan Lekovic, Chief of Staff to Montenegrin President 
Vujanovic, and Aleksandar Bogdanovic, Economic adviser to 
Vujanovic: 
 
By June 1: The Republic Referendum Commission (RRC) and RRC 
Chair Lipka (Slovakia) will issue the final results on the 
referendum.  The opposition made some 240 complaints, but 
200 were dismissed by the RRC by late on May 29.  The RRC 
stated that most complaints dealt with issues beyond its 
competency, e.g., inaccuracies in the voters' lists, which 
closed nine days before the referendum, on May 12. COMMENT: 
We expect the RRC and Lipka to accept the preliminary 
result as final, bearing in mind the strong bill of health 
given to the referendum process by the OSCE and USG 
observers among others. End comment. 
 
June 2: Speaker convenes Parliament to accept the RRC 
report and pass a Declaration of Independence. COMMENT: It 
appears that the main opposition party, the Socialist 
People's Party (SNP), will concur in the results once the 
RRC completes its processes and after the EU acknowledges 
the final results.  The Serbian People's Party (SNS) has 
however peremptorily rejected the results, and the 
remainder of the opposition is straddling the fence. If 
enough of the opposition decide to boycott, the GOM will 
likely rely on the 2002 Constitutional Court decision (Ref 
B) regarding the binding nature of referendums to negate 
the need for opposition cooperation. 
 
June 5: GOM MFA sends out letters requesting recognition of 
Montenegro's status as an independent nation, attaching 
copies of the parliamentary action. 
 
GOM: Talking with Serbia 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Lekovic and Bogdanovic told consulate officers on 
May 24 that the GoM hoped that Serbia would be the first to 
recognize Montenegro. Bogdanovic stated that the MFA's top 
priority was to work with GOS on mutual issues, such as the 
free flow of people and border control. Both interlocutors 
believed that GOS was sending positive signals and would 
ultimately be cooperative. Lekovic stated that if all went 
according to plan, Montenegro would declare May 21 as its 
official Independence Day, while July 13 would remain as 
Montenegro's Republic Day. He added that the MFA and the 
Ministry of Culture would probably move to Cetinje, but 
most of the GOM would remain in Podgorica. 
 
New Constitution.  New Prime Minister? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Lekovic hoped that a new constitution would be 
adopted before national elections in October. Both seemed 
confident that Djukanovic would continue in politics and 
claimed that after a referendum win, this is what the 
 
BELGRADE 00000860  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
people of Montenegro will want. When asked who could 
succeed Djukanovic if he were to leave politics, both 
interlocutors were at a loss for names, but did offer that 
Marovic might be a leading candidate.  Biographic note: 
These two young (late 20s), sharp, intelligent men were 
very impressive and could represent the future of 
Montenegrin politics. They were extremely knowledgeable on 
a variety of topics and had an excellent command of 
English. They opined that they would like to stay in 
Montenegro to work to build a better nation--unlike their 
peers who have already left--and they hoped that perhaps 
some of the young people who left Montenegro would now come 
back to help build an independent state. End note. 
 
Montenegrin Opposition: Hard Hit and Hitting Back 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (SBU) Over the past week, the Montenegrin opposition has 
predictably taken an uncooperative stance on the referendum 
results. Five minutes before the deadline, the pro-union 
bloc filed approximately 240 complaints with the RRC and 
Lipka. The complaints, by law, must be resolved quickly and 
a final result is expected to be announced by June 1. The 
pro-Union bloc has said it will not appeal the RRC 
decisions to the Constitutional Court, which they view as 
under Djukanovic's sway. The three main leaders of the 
opposition, Predrag Bulatovic (SNP), Predrag Popovic (NS), 
and Andrija Mandic (SNS), offered harsh criticisms of the 
referendum voting, in contrast to the strongly positive 
assessment of international observers, and in the face of 
strong urging from EU Envoy Lajcak (Slovakia) to accept the 
results and move on.  Bulatovic is already heading in that 
direction, announcing May 29 that he will acquiesce in 
Javier Solana's judgment that the referendum results are 
valid.  Mandic has called on all pro-union voters not to 
accept the results, a potentially destabilizing albeit 
rhetorical move. 
 
GOS: Frustrated, but Accepting 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) The GOS has no real timeline for dissolution, but 
there are two separate processes at work that should be 
viewed as separate, but related. First is the formal 
process of dissolution. Representatives of the GOS and the 
ruling Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) said that Prime 
Minister Kostunica will recognize the results of the 
referendum once the EU releases the official tally.  Two 
key advisors to Kostunica informed us of the same. 
Nonetheless, Milos Aligrudic, head of the DSS parliamentary 
group, told poloff that Premier Kostunica believes that 
Prime Minister Djukanovic stole the election, although said 
that they will accept the EU's final ruling.  He added that 
the opposition had accepted these same conditions and, as a 
result, had to abide by Lipka's decision.  Aligrudic does 
not anticipate any further disputes after the final results 
are released.  To this end, he said that the GOS has no 
objections to Podgorica declaring independence as soon as 
possible. Kostunica's adviser Slobodan Samardzic told DCM 
May 30 that he sees no reason why Serbia would not 
recognize quickly and that resolution of bilateral issues 
will not be a precondition for recognition. 
 
7.  (SBU) The second aspect of the State Union dissolution 
is secession negotiations, which will address future 
Serbian and Montenegrin relations on a variety of topics 
from defense to health care.  For this, Vladeta Jankovic, 
foreign policy advisor to Kostunica, told poloff that the 
GOS has no interest in pursuing these talks quickly.  His 
deputy, Gordana Jaksic, even said that the GOS had 
considered starting a dialogue at the end of 2006. Many of 
the inter-republic issues are largely decided with only a 
handful of complicated issues remaining (for example, cross 
border education and health care, dividing up properties, 
settling Montenegro's debt to the State Union, etc). The 
timeline for discussions could last a year a more, though. 
The GOS recognizes that it has limited expertise and 
manpower to carry out secession negotiations and an 
extensive internal overhaul (see below). Many of their top 
people are already focused on Kosovo final status talks and 
SAA negotiations. The GOS will be hard pressed to find 
enough talent and resources to adequately and expediently 
address the post-referendum issues. One other advisor close 
to Kostunica told us on 5/26, however, that these issues 
were generally non-controversial and could be resolved "in 
a day." 
 
GOS Restructuring 
----------------- 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000860  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
8. (SBU) Second, there are a number of internal legal 
changes that Serbia will need to make.  GOS will need to 
fold the Ministry of Defense and MFA into its current 
governing structure.  Interlocutors told poloff that the 
GOS will also absorb the Ministry for Minorities and Human 
Rights.  The GOS will have to adopt laws that currently 
only exist on the State Union level; most notably the law 
on extradition of Serbian citizens, which is essential to 
cooperation with ICTY.  All of these changes will have 
significant political ramifications--the GOS has already 
begin discussions on a cabinet reshuffle--which will 
exponentially complicate the process.  The Socialist Party 
of Serbia, whose support is critical to the survival of 
Kostunica's government, has already staked out its firm 
opposition to many of potential candidates for this re- 
shuffle. 
 
GOS: Dissolution is Just the Beginning of the Struggle 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
9. (SBU) While emphasizing that the GOS will accept the 
referendum's results and behave in a responsible manner, 
Aligrudic said that the current state of affairs is "not 
final."  First, he outlined the developing GOS strategy to 
oppose Djukanovic.  The DSS expects him to launch a 
campaign to win over pro-Union voters by baiting the GOS 
into overreaction on various issues.  Aligrudic promised 
that Belgrade will response calmly and rationally to any 
such provocations.  He also said that the GOS will continue 
to work with Montenegrin opposition to defeat Djukanovic in 
the upcoming parliamentary election and plans to force 
Djukanovic to campaign on key issues instead of simply the 
referendum victory.  Lastly, Aligrudic said that Serbia 
will try to reunite with Montenegro in the future, even if 
it takes 30-50 years. 
POLT