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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR U/S BURNS, A/S FRIED, DAS DICARLO, SE WISNER AND SE 
AHTISAARI FROM AMBASSADOR POLT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNMIK YI SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE PRESENTS NEGOTIATING PLATFORM 
 
REF: BELGRADE 817 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) Summary and Recommendation: As expected, on May 30 
senior negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan Samardzic 
presented the GOS' "Platform on the Future Status of Kosovo 
and Metohija" to COM/DCMs of the Contact Group missions in 
Belgrade.  The platform defines the GOS' position on status 
of "more than autonomy, less than independence" for Kosovo. 
The GOS proposal reflects no change in the Serbian position 
since the delivery of the private messages.  It is 
essentially a plan for Kosovo autonomy within Serbia, with 
Belgrade retaining control over foreign, customs and monetary 
policy, etc.  Kojen said that he would deliver the plan to SE 
Ahtisaari on May 31. 
 
¶2. (C) This document was as predictable as it is unrealistic. 
 As with the GOS' previous proposal for restructuring talks 
(reftel), I again propose that we let Ahtisaari speak for us. 
 In fact, I see no real need for the Contact Group to respond 
formally to this plan.  That said, as the occasion arises, 
Ahtisaari and members of the Contact Group can acknowledge 
having received the Belgrade proposal, give them our honest 
assessment of its chances of success, and note that Belgrade 
will have an opportunity to propose its plan to the Kosovo 
Albanians. End Summary and Recommendation. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On May 30 senior negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan 
Samardzic presented the GOS' "Platform on the Future Status 
of Kosovo and Metohija" to COM/DCMs of the Contact Group 
missions in Belgrade.  Kojen and Samardzic called the 
platform a "compromise" which they expect will be "attacked 
from both extremes" for either giving too much or not enough. 
 This document, which the negotiators described as a 
condensed version of the GOS position adopted in January 2006 
has the support of both PM Kostunica and President Tadic. 
The GOS is concurrently releasing the same document during a 
press conference, also on May 30.  In response to our 
question as to if and how UNOSEK would receive this document, 
Kojen responded that if UNOSEK had a local representative in 
Belgrade, that person would also have been invited to receive 
the proposal. Kojen said that he would deliver the document 
to SE Ahtisaari on May 31 when he attends the talks on 
Economic Issues in Vienna. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The platform summarizes the GOS' position of "more 
than autonomy, less than independence" for Kosovo.  The GOS 
maintains it represents more than autonomy because (1) 
Kosovo's status would be guaranteed by the international 
community (unlike other autonomous regions), (2) Kosovo would 
be demilitarized (which the GOS considers a concession as it 
involves Serbian as well as possible Albanian forces), and 
(3) there would be no requirement for any Kosovo 
representation in GOS or GOSaM bodies.  According to the GOS, 
the plan offers less than independence because the GOS would 
retain sovereignty in a number of areas ("foreign policy, 
control of borders, monetary policy, customs policy, special 
customs inspections and control, final legal recourse in the 
protection of human rights, and the protection of Serbian 
religious and cultural heritage"). Asked about the 20 year 
effect for the status proposal, Kojen confirmed that deferred 
independence for Kosovo is not mentioned in the platform but 
offered his personal assessment that in the future when "the 
whole region is closer to EU integration and current 
political tensions have eased", the agreement could be 
amended to discuss such issues. 
 
¶5. (U) Begin text of GOS Platform: 
Platform on the Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija(endnote 
1) 
Introduction: The Serbian negotiating team is firmly 
committed to the view that the future status of Kosovo and 
Metohija must be the result of an agreement between the 
legitimate representatives of Serbia and Montenegro (endnote 
2) on the one hand, and those of the Kosovo Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government, on the other hand. The 
representatives of the international community plays very 
important role in the process; their mediation should 
contribute toward finding a peaceful, comprehensive and 
lasting solution. 
A negotiated solution to the future status of Kosovo and 
 
BELGRADE 00000856  002 OF 004 
 
 
Metohija is in every respect preferable to any kind of 
imposed solution. Only a negotiated solution creates the 
preconditions and provides an opportunity for peaceful 
coexistence between Serbs and Albanians (as well as the other 
ethnic communities in the province), makes economic and 
social recovery possible, and contributes to the historical 
reconciliation necessary to establish a common European 
perspective for all. A negotiated solution also has the 
advantage of being situated between two unacceptable 
extremes-the status Kosovo and Metohija had in the period 
1989-1999, and independence, i.e., the creation of a new 
Albanian state. 
The Serbian negotiating team holds that a realistic proposal 
for such a negotiated solution can be achieved through direct 
negotiations, as suggested in the 18 May 2006 letter of the 
President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, 
who are also the co-chairmen of the Serbian negotiating team, 
to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Contact Group 
countries, to Mr. Xavier Solana, the High Representative for 
the CSDP of the European Union, and to Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, 
the Special Envoy of the UNSG for the Future Status of 
Kosovo. 
The position of the Serbian negotiating team is that the 
future status of Kosovo and Metohija must be defined as 
substantial autonomy within Serbia and the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro. This document lays out the key 
elements of such a solution. 
 
The Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija in International Law 
International guarantees of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Serbia and Montenegro. The future status of 
Kosovo and Metohija, conceived as a broad autonomy with 
international guarantees, must be fully compatible with 
international law and the fundamental principles of the 
international order. This implies that the future status of 
Kosovo and Metohija must not infringe the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro as an 
internationally recognized state, a member-state of the 
United Nations, and a member of other international 
organizations. 
The future status of Kosovo and Metohija should fully conform 
to the fundamental principles and norms of the international 
community, as well as to the specific documents of the 
international community that affirm the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro (endnote 3). 
Any settlement of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija 
that would go against the existing international law, 
infringing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Serbia and Montenegro, could only represent an imposed 
solution, and as such would have to be declared illegitimate, 
illegal, and invalid by the relevant institutions of Serbia 
and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
General Agreement on the Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija: 
The political talks on the future status should be concluded 
by a general agreement which would be considered an 
international legal document. This Agreement would spell out 
all the essential features of the future status of Kosovo and 
Metohija, including both general principles and concrete 
provisions. The General Agreement would also specify the 
constitutional guarantees that would provide for the security 
of the Serbian and other non-Albanian communities (through 
decentralization as well as other institutional and legal 
guarantees). All parties to the Agreement would be bound to 
respect strictly its provisions. 
The General Agreement should be in effect for a period of 20 
years, with the possibility of extending its duration. 
Amendments to the Agreement could also be discussed at an 
earlier date with the consent of all interested parties. 
The implementation of the future status defined by the 
General Agreement would be under international supervision. 
The security sector would be administered by an international 
force that would be given a new mandate. 
(1) Participants, signatories and guarantors of the 
Agreement. The parties to the Agreement are Serbia and 
Montenegro, the PISG in the province, and the international 
community, i.e., the United Nations, whose representatives 
operate within a mandate granted by the Security Council. The 
Agreement must be accepted in its entirety by all three 
parties prior to its formal adoption. As subjects of 
international law, the signatories to the Agreement are 
Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand, and the United 
 
BELGRADE 00000856  003 OF 004 
 
 
Nations, on the other. The signatories to the Agreement are 
at the same time its guarantors. 
(2) The obligations of the UN under the Agreement. In 
addition to its role as a guarantor of the Agreement, the 
United Nations would have specific duties and 
responsibilities, primarily in the security sector. The UN 
would maintain its military presence, and to some extent also 
its police presence in the province. The military presence of 
the UN presupposes the complete internal demilitarization of 
Kosovo and Metohija. The UN police would have a general 
supervisory role with respect to internal security. 
(3) Other features of the General Agreement. After the 
General Agreement is signed, the Security Council of the UN 
would adopt a new Resolution on Kosovo and Metohija. This 
Resolution would replace Resolution 1244 and confirm the 
status affirmed in the Agreement. Annual reports to the UN 
Security Council on status implementation would be 
instituted, with the possibility of modifying the modalities 
of the UN military and police presence (the number of 
soldiers and policemen, their rules of engagement, etc.) 
 
The Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija: Constitutional 
Framework 
General Solution. The General Agreement contains both general 
principles and concrete provisions that need to be enshrined 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the new 
Constitution of Kosovo and Metohija. The new constitution of 
the province would thus be based on the General Agreement, 
reaffirming the obligations it contains, particularly those 
concerning the rights of the Serbian and other non-Albanian 
communities, including decentralization and other relevant 
institutional guarantees. 
Substantial Autonomy. The Constitution of the Republic of 
Serbia would contain the following provisions defining the 
substantial autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija: 
(a) Division of Competencies 
- The province would exercise all competencies except those 
reserved for Serbia or the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
- The following competencies are reserved for either Serbia 
or the State Union, depending on the constitutional division 
of competencies between them: foreign policy, control of 
borders, monetary policy, customs policy, special customs 
inspections and control, final legal recourse in the 
protection of human rights, and the protection of Serbian 
religious and cultural heritage. 
- Kosovo and Metohija would have full financial autonomy in 
the sense that the province would conduct its own public 
finances (taxation, public revenues and expenditures, 
including investment). The province could accordingly receive 
loans from international financial institutions and secure 
foreign direct investment. 
- Certain forms of cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo and 
Metohija relating to the free movement of people, goods, 
capital and services would be constitutionally specified. 
Additional forms of cooperation would be established in 
sectors such as banking, the harmonization of fiscal policy, 
infrastructure, communications, etc. Such cooperation would 
contribute substantially to economic development and the 
process of European integration. 
- Given the proposed division of competencies, the effective 
functioning of either the central or the provincial 
government does not require Kosovo and Metohija to be 
politically represented in the representative bodies of 
Serbia and the State Union (endnote 4). 
- In the field of competencies reserved for Serbia or the 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the Kosovo and Metohija 
authorities would have the right to give recommendations to 
the relevant institutions of central government. 
 
(b) Institutions of Kosovo and Metohija 
 
- The constitutional powers of Kosovo and Metohija would be 
exercised through legislative, executive and judicial 
institutions. 
The Kosovo and Metohija parliament would be directly elected. 
A certain number of seats in the parliament would be reserved 
for the representatives of Serbs and other non-Albanian 
communities. When the parliament is considering matters that 
are of vital interest to the Serb community, including 
provincial legislation, no decision would be considered valid 
unless a majority of Serb representatives votes in its 
 
BELGRADE 00000856  004 OF 004 
 
 
favour. 
- The Government of Kosovo and Metohija, democratically 
elected in the provincial parliament, would exercise 
executive power. 
- The judicial power in the province would be exercised by 
municipal courts, district courts, and the Supreme Court of 
Kosovo and Metohija. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo and 
Metohija would be entrusted with constitutional oversight. 
The Constitutional Court of Serbia is the court of final 
recourse in the domain of human rights. In the judicial cases 
involving the rights of Serbs or other non-Albanians, the 
composition of the judicial body should be ethnically 
diverse; international judges should also continue to sit in 
such cases for the foreseeable future. 
 
(c) International Relations 
Kosovo and Metohija would have the right to maintain 
relations with states, provinces, regional and international 
organizations, provided that this does not require the status 
of a sovereign international subject. Such international 
cooperation must not be against the national interests of 
Serbia and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Any 
international agreement resulting from such cooperation 
cannot be signed unless the Government of Serbia or the 
Council of Ministers of the State Union are properly 
consulted. 
-  The province could have direct access to international 
financial institutions, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia that would make 
this possible. This access would assume prompt and regular 
reporting to the relevant central institutions in Serbia, and 
it would involve a measure of control by the National Bank of 
Serbia. 
 
Endnotes: 
(1) This is a condensed version of Parts II and III of the 
Platform adopted by the Serbian negotiating team on 5 January 
¶2006. 
(2) All references to the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro should be understood as applying to the Republic 
of Serbia after the formal dissolution of the state union 
takes place (see article 60 of the Constitutional Charter). 
(3) This refers in the first instance to the UN Charter and 
the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (now the OSCE) of 1975. On the basis of 
these and other binding documents, the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro (then the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) is reaffirmed by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999), UNSC Resolutions 
1160, 1199, 1203 (all from 1998), and UNSC Resolution 1239 
(1999). In addition to the principal sources of international 
law, the borders and territorial integrity of the states that 
emerged from the breakup of the Socialist Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia are further guaranteed by specific 
international documents and agreements. These include the 
Opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia (Opinion no. 3 of 11 January 1992) and the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Dayton-Paris Agreement). 
(4) The more common solution, i.e., participation of the 
province in the representative bodies of the central 
government, presupposes the usual, much more limited 
conception of autonomy, with fewer autonomous and exclusive 
competencies reserved for the province, as opposed to the 
conception of substantial, very broad autonomy, envisaged 
here. 
End text. 
POLT