VZCZCXRO1100
OO RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #0814/01 1391610
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191610Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8622
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EO 12958:N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS SR MW
SUBJECT: AFTER THE MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM: CALM 
BUT COMPLICATED - CORRECTED COPY 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000814  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Despite a blanket refusal by 
the GOS until now to discuss the practicalities 
of future inter-republic relations if 
Montenegrins vote for independence, several 
senior GOS and GOM officials have indicated they 
anticipate a calm, but complicated transition 
after the referendum.  Although we would see 
plenty of confusion in the event of a pro- 
independence vote, we do not expect significant 
disruption of the government or command of 
military forces.  Nonetheless, strong antipathy 
between both sides and their determination to 
promote their respective position regardless of 
the outcome could complicate next steps.  In case 
of a "grey zone" result, the GoM has sent signals 
it could pull out of the State Union structures, 
a boycott that would hamstring the already 
largely dysfunctional State Union. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a private conversation with the 
Ambassador on May 17, GOS Minister of Justice 
Stojkovic said that if the pro-independence vote 
prevails, the Serbian Parliament would have to 
pass amendments (with the force of 
"constitutional laws") to the Law on Serbian 
Government ministries creating at least two extra 
ministries ? defense and foreign affairs ? even 
before the new Constitution is adopted in Serbia. 
The three member SaM Supreme Defense Council 
which is the collective Commander-and-Chief of 
the SaM armed forces consisting of members from 
both republics would also have to be 
restructured.  The GoS has not been willing to 
pronounce itself on how it will handle either 
outcome.  It has refused our offer to discuss 
clarifying a stable post-referendum process while 
privately reassuring us that everything will 
remain calm and there will be no significant 
problems.  The prime minister and president's 
office, the justice minister and our contacts in 
the MFA have all to some degree assured us that 
there will be no dramatic showdowns. 
 
¶3.  (U) Earlier this week, EU Foreign Ministers 
called on Belgrade and Podgorica to begin a 
dialogue on their future relations immediately 
following the referendum, regardless of the 
outcome.  Brussels also publicly acknowledged for 
the first time that independence would not hinder 
or slow Montenegro's drive for EU membership, 
undercutting a critical key argument of the pro- 
Union bloc. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) If it wins the referendum, the GOM has 
indicated that it will move forward on 
independence as quickly as possible, but will be 
patient and pragmatic in order to assist a smooth 
transition.  It has communicated to the USG and 
other internationals that it is ready to adopt an 
international persona immediately.  Nonetheless, 
it remains wary that Belgrade will attempt to 
stall secession negotiations, which the GoM sees 
as necessary only to deal with "formalities" and 
a few "unsolved issues."   The GoM will not wait 
long to declare independence -- certainly not 
past July 13 (Montenegro's historical 
independence day).  According to two close 
advisors to Serbian PM Kostunica advisor, 
Belgrade anticipates a protracted secession 
discussion with Podgorica in the event of 
independence, and that the GOS would not be in 
the mood to compromise.  Kostunica himself told 
the Ambassador that he would accept the outcome 
of the referendum and will be prepared to "re- 
model" the relationship between Montenegro and 
Serbia after the referendum. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The GoM leadership has repeatedly 
signaled that, while it predicts a clear victory 
for independence, it will not hesitate to 
capitalize on a "grey zone" result.  It is very 
likely that they will withdraw Montenegrin cadres 
from State Union institutions after a "grey zone" 
result, either shortly after the referendum or 
following a failed effort to negotiate a union of 
independent states with Serbia. 
 
¶6.  The SaM Foreign Ministry is largely a Serbian 
artifact already; although many SaM embassies 
would see their Montenegrin COMs depart.  We 
believe that neither republic would take 
 
BELGRADE 00000814  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
irresponsible steps endangering the defense 
forces, especially given that command of the 
military is already effectively divided between 
the republics.  The greatest impact would be on 
the SaM Council of Ministers and parliament. 
While assigned a generally marginal function, SAM 
institutions have passed a small number of  laws 
of interest to the international community and 
the USG (e.g., the PIFWC asset freeze), and they 
are currently needed to formally fill gaps in the 
leadership of the Defense and Foreign Affairs 
ministries and ratify international agreements. 
Essentially, the State Union could move from 
dysfunctional to nonfunctional, until either a 
new relationship between Belgrade and Podgorica 
could be agreed - or Belgrade abandons the State 
Union as well. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Comment:  In the case of independence, 
legal and political confusion and uncertainty 
will certainly ensue.  The US and other 
international actors (especially the EU) could 
play an important role in maintaining calm and 
responsible dialog between the republics as they 
sort out the myriad items they would have to 
address.   The need for international community 
intervention, especially from the EU, will be 
even more urgent in the case of a grey zone as 
the two republics move to re-define their 
relationship. 
 
POLT