VZCZCXRO5709
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #1417/01 1251554
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051554Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3379
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001417 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
STATE FOR L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2016 
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  UNIIIC CHIEF BRAMMERTZ CITES PROGRESS, 
SEEKS EXTENSION 
 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b). 
 
¶1.  (U)  This message contains an action request.  See para 
16 below. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz said his team is now 
well-established, has considerable momentum, and is pursuing 
several fruitful lines of inquiry.  In a meeting that took 
place before the GOL's official decision to ask for an 
extension, he confirmed that he has recommended that the 
UNIIIC be extended for a year.  Brammertz' chief of 
investigations, Peter Nicholson, was confident this extension 
would allow his investigators a good chance of "cracking the 
case," at least in terms of how it was done, and which 
individuals bore primary responsibility.  Brammertz indicated 
the complex assassination operation involved not only 
security officials, but perhaps an "outside proxy" 
organization.  Several hypotheses were still be tested with 
the now-indexed body of evidence and eliminated one by one. 
Although UNIIIC is only authorized to provide technical 
assistance to Lebanese investigators concerning other acts of 
political violence, it is using this access to acquire 
additional evidence that can be used to supplement and 
validate the Hariri evidence.  Brammertz' June 15 report to 
the UN Security Council will once again focus on 
administrative and compliance issues, but will contain enough 
findings to show progress is being made, without alerting 
those guilty to the investigation's lines of inquiry.  For 
now, Brammertz said he has little basis for judging the 
senior Syrians as "not cooperating" with the investigation, 
but he emphasized that this view applies only to the present, 
and could change on the basis of future developments.  At 
this time, he does not intend to recommend that UNSCR 1636 
authority be applied to designate certain individuals as 
"non-cooperative, and therefore eligible for the application 
of UNSC-authorized sanctions against them.  Commissioner 
Brammertz will be in New York for consultations with the 
UNSYG on May 9-10 and asked if he could meet with appropriate 
Department of Justice representatives regarding assistance 
with a witness protection program.  End summary. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz met the 
Ambassador and poloff at the Commission's headquarters in 
Monteverde, east of Beirut on May 3.  UNIIIC Chief of 
Investigations Peter Nicholson joined the meeting.  Brammertz 
received from the Ambassador supporting data (and explanatory 
notes) which the commissioner had previously requested.  He 
said his investigators would most likely have additional 
requests in the next few weeks.  Brammertz indicated he was 
also receiving forensic support from the Danish government. 
 
INVESTIGATION GATHERS MOMENTUM 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  Brammertz expressed satisfaction with the current 
progress of his investigative team.  He believes he now has a 
strong team in place, they have collated and indexed a large 
amount of previously collected evidence, they are continuing 
to collect new evidence and subject it to analysis, and 
finally, they are pursuing a number of fruitful lines of 
inquiry.  The commissioner implied that their most promising 
hypothesis points to a very complex operation that involved 
not only security officials, but may also have involved an 
"outside proxy" organization. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Brammertz, as he has in earlier meetings with 
Embassy officials, expressed concern about the quality of the 
evidence that was used to recommend the arrest of four 
Lebanese senior security officials, but he stressed that this 
opinion did not mean these suspects were not involved in the 
crime.  Brammertz indicated that Lebanese General Prosecutor 
Said Mirza is growing increasingly uncomfortable with the 
extended incarceration of the officials and has hinted to 
Brammertz that he (Mirza) would like further guidance from 
the Commission.  Brammertz said he had told Mirza the UNIIIC 
could only make recommendations and it was the responsibility 
of Lebanon's judicial system to determine whether there were 
sufficient grounds for arrest and detention.  Brammertz 
confided to the Ambassador that although the available 
evidence did not yet support "a strong case" against the 
generals, he would not reverse the recommendation of his 
predecessor, Detlev Mehlis.  
 
¶6.  (C)  Brammertz was noticeably keen to exploit the 
opportunities afforded by the expansion of UNIIIC's authority 
to provide technical assistance to Lebanese investigators who 
were looking into other acts of political violence since 
October 2004:  bombings, assassinations, and attempted 
assassinations.  He believed that additional evidence 
gathered from these investigations could help answer some of 
the outstanding issues of the Hariri assassination.  The 
Commissioner was especially interested in the explosives used 
in several of the bombings and revealed that he has received 
forensic assistance from the Danish government. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Although Brammertz recognized that truly 
professional assassins would try to eliminate commonalties 
between multiple crimes, he also said that his experience 
indicated the more numerous the attempts committed by one 
group, the more likely they would "slip up" at some point and 
provide investigators with hard evidence.  He lamented the 
"pitiful" state of Lebanon's forensic abilities and crime 
scene evidence management skills, but he felt quite confident 
his team was getting close. 
 
¶8.  (C)  UNIIIC's Chief of Investigations Peter Nicholson 
added that the large amount of preparatory work completed 
over the previous three months was starting to pay off in 
terms of efficiently pursuing lines of inquiry.  When asked 
if he was confident his team would "crack the case," he 
paused and said he was "70/30 confident" that before the end 
of the year, they would know how the crime was executed and 
who were its principal perpetrators.  Due to the clear 
sophistication of the crime, Nicholson admitted it would be 
difficult to know every detail, but he did project quiet 
confidence regarding a successful investigation. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Concerning the senior Syrians' cooperation with the 
investigation, Commissioner Brammertz said their present 
behavior was acceptable.  In response to the Ambassador's 
question, he stated that he does not intend to use his 
authority under UNSCR 1636 to recommend that certain persons 
be designated as "non-cooperative" with the UNIIIC, and 
therefore subject to sanctions.  Brammertz emphasized, 
however, that he was withholding overall judgment on the 
question of UNSCR 1636 cooperation until the inviestigation 
progressed further.  He implied that as the investigation 
zeroed in on those responsible, the real test regarding 
cooperation would be reached. 
 
BRAMMERTZ SUPPORTS AN EXTENSION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Commissioner Brammertz said he strongly supports a 
12-month extension of the UNIIIC mandate and indicated that 
as long as his position with the International Criminal Court 
was protected he would stay at least through the end of the 
year.  He said his team was now well organized, operating at 
high efficiency, and progressively attacking each challenge. 
Brammertz said he was still hiring the last few members of 
the team and remarked that process would be very difficult if 
he could offer the necessary professionals only a month or 
two of employment.  (Note:  This meeting with Brammertz took 
place before the Lebanese cabinet voted unanimously to back a 
GOL request to the UN asking that the UNIIIC be extended for 
one year.) 
 
¶11.  (C)  He said the extension proposal was already being 
discussed by the UN Secretariat and he would be speaking with 
UNSYG Annan next week in New York about his wish to remain 
with the commission for at least another six months. 
Brammertz said he was still concerned about his prolonged 
absence from the ICC and inquired as to whether the USG could 
discuss this matter with the principal sponsors of that 
organization, specifically the Governments of Britain, 
France, and Germany, to facilitate the approval process. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL SHOULD 
PROCEED, BUT NOT YET REPLACE UNIIIC 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Commissioner Brammertz said he recently spoke with 
Minister of Justice Charles Rizk and came away concerned that 
the GOL is underestimating the task of establishing the 
International Tribunal for Lebanon.  Noting that UNIIIC's 
present expiry is only six weeks away, Brammertz indicated 
that Minister Rizk does not appreciate the responsibilities 
of the proposed tribunal.  According to Brammertz, Minister 
Rizk is proposing to establish the Office of the Special 
Prosecutor for the Tribunal in advance of the court's other 
structures.  Brammertz sees serious complications with this 
approach, particularly relating to custody of evidence, 
unnecessary competition for staff, and crossed wires in the 
investigation itself. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Rather than rushing to establish the tribunal, the 
Commissioner recommended that the UN and GOL take the time to 
do it right.  He maintained that if the UNIIIC is authorized 
at least a six-month (and preferably 12-month) extension, it 
would be able to complete its investigation and transfer its 
findings and evidence in a more organized and comprehensive 
manner.  He suggested that the Ministry of Justice may face 
serious challenges if it rushes headlong into the tribunal 
process.  Brammertz acknowledged the political necessity to 
show momentum on creating the tribunal, but he looked to fill 
the current gap with motion (visits by Nicolas Michel, etc.) 
rather than actually trying to accelerate the court's 
establishment. 
 
INTERVIEW WITH BASHAR ASAD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Concerning his interviews last week with Syrian 
President Bashar al-Asad and Vice President Farouq al-Sharaa, 
he characterized the two leaders as businesslike and 
relatively cooperative.  But he also emphasized the 
interviews were not investigative interrogations.  Although 
Brammertz said he covered a number of issues pertinent to the 
investigation, he indicated that he was not yet ready to 
confront the Syrian leaders with specific evidence-directed 
questioning -- that would have to wait for a later date. 
Brammertz described the Syrian president as surprisingly 
talkative, speaking in fairly good English, without notes and 
only one advisor.  Sharaa, befitting his reputation, was more 
taciturn, but again, was attempting to appear cooperative. 
The Commissioner said he spoke with Asad for approximately 90 
minutes, while Sharaa's interview was completed in an hour. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Brammertz indicated he was satisfied that with last 
week's interviews, especially in that a procedural barrier 
had been broken, and that when he was ready to confront 
Syrian leadership with evidence-based questions, the Syrians 
would be hard-pressed to refuse. 
 
REQUEST FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16.  (C)  Action Requested:  Commissioner Brammertz inquired 
as to whether he would be able to meet with representatives 
from the U.S. Department of Justice when he is in New York 
next week.  He indicated he wished to discuss issues 
pertaining to a witness protection program and perhaps 
additional requests for information the USG may be able to 
provide.  He will be in New York at least from May 9-10, and 
possibly a few days longer.  Embassy Beirut requests the 
Office of the Legal Advisor or other bureaus to determine if 
this meeting would be possible. 
FELTMAN