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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 008836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC PLEASE PASS WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS CH TW KN JP
SUBJECT: PACOM COMMANDER ADMIRAL FALLON'S DIALOGUE WITH 
CHINESE ACADEMICS ON REGIONAL SECURITY 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields. 
Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Pacific Command Commander Admiral Fallon stressed 
the importance of transparency and engagement between 
militaries in the Asia-Pacific region during a May 10 
discussion with Chinese academics hosted by the Ambassador. 
Admiral Fallon reviewed U.S. commitments and 
responsibilities in the area and the challenges facing the 
region.  Chinese scholars asked about U.S. views on Taiwan 
and about the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  The Admiral 
responded that he has a legislative responsibility under 
the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend itself. 
U.S.-Japan cooperation benefits the region, including the 
PRC.  Chinese participants asked whether the reorientation 
of U.S. forces to the Pacific is focused on China.  Admiral 
Fallon, pointing out the significant reduction of U.S. 
forces worldwide since the end of the Cold War, reviewed 
the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region and the 
challenges to regional security.  Turning to the U.S.-China 
mil-mil relationship, Admiral Fallon stressed the need for 
greater transparency and military cooperation, contrasting 
the lack of regular communication between him and PLA 
leaders to the frequent discussions he holds with other 
regional military leaders.  Ambassador Randt noted that 
President Bush and President Hu agreed to contacts between 
U.S. Strategic Command and PLA Second Artillery as well as 
between the NASA Administrator and Chinese counterparts. 
End Summary. 
 
Taiwan 
------ 
 
¶2.  (C) During a May 10 lunch hosted by the Ambassador, 
PACOM Commander Admiral Fallon met with a group of PRC 
academics to discuss regional security issues.  The 
academics stressed the PRC's continuing emphasis on Taiwan. 
Zhang Tuosheng from the China Foundation for International 
Strategic Studies (CFISS, a PLA-affiliated think tank) 
asked if the USG supports peaceful reunification of Taiwan 
with the Mainland.  Cui Liru, President of the China 
Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, 
a Ministry of State Security-affiliated think tank), asked 
if the USG sees Taiwan as a strategic asset.  Admiral 
Fallon reviewed the USG's "one-China" policy and stressed 
our hope that people in the PRC and on Taiwan mutually 
accept seeking a peaceful way forward, building on already 
extensive interaction across the Strait.  As PACOM 
Commander, he added, he has a legislative responsibility 
under the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend 
itself.  As for whether the USG sees Taiwan as a strategic 
asset, Admiral Fallon said we see helping Taiwan defend 
itself as a strategic challenge. 
 
Japan 
----- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ruan Zongze of the China Institute for 
International Studies (CIIS, an MFA-affiliated think tank) 
raised PRC concern that Japan has mentioned Taiwan in the 
context of Japanese strategic objectives.  He asked about 
Japan's increasing overseas military deployments.  Admiral 
Fallon noted that the U.S. role in defending Japan since 
1945 had helped start the process of Japan's peaceful, 
democratic and non-militarized economic development path, 
which has benefited China.  Japan's overseas deployments 
are limited and closely scrutinized, he noted. 
 
Posture of the Pacific Command 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Several Chinese scholars raised concerns that the 
United States is reorienting its strategic forces towards 
the Pacific.  Cui Liru asked about changes in the forces, 
missions and contingency plans of U.S. Pacific forces. 
Gong Xianfu of the China Institute for International 
Strategic Studies (CIISS, a PLA-affiliated think tank) 
asked if the redeployment of U.S. forces toward the Pacific 
is focused on China.  Chu Shulong of Peking University 
asked about the shift to the Pacific of carrier and 
submarine forces outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR).  Jin Canrong of Renmin University asked about 
reports that China was excluded from a recent international 
 
BEIJING 00008836  002 OF 003 
 
 
anti-terrorism seminar hosted by the Defense Department. 
 
¶5.  (C) Admiral Fallon pointed out the significant 
reduction in U.S. forces worldwide since the end of the 
Cold War.  The strategic situation of the Cold War era 
required an approximate 50-50 division of U.S. forces 
between the Atlantic and Pacific regions.  That situation 
has changed.  The post-Cold War reduction in U.S. naval 
forces from about 580 to 283 ships drew down equally in the 
two regions.  U.S. forces in both Japan and Korea have been 
reduced.  In Europe and the Atlantic, threats have 
diminished.  The Pacific Command area of responsibility is 
huge, encompassing 60 percent of the world's population and 
50 percent of global GDP.  The Asia-Pacific and Indian 
Ocean areas face security challenges involving North Korea, 
the Taiwan Strait and terrorism.  Admiral Fallon, noting 
that forty-two of his own staff were killed in the 9/11 
attack on the Pentagon, stressed that terrorists take 
advantage of insecurity and instability to draw recruits. 
These conditions exist in Southeast Asia.  The Pacific 
Command tries to provide advice and resources to help 
counterpart militaries meet these challenges, he said. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Secretary of Defense, Admiral Fallon stated, is 
charged by Congress to review potential future problems 
through reports such as the QDR.  China's growing economy 
and large military cannot be overlooked.  The United States 
does not have sufficient dialogue and transparency with 
China.  The Admiral said he was unaware of the specific 
circumstances with regard to China's not being invited to 
the DOD anti-terrorism conference.  He stressed his desire 
for greater PRC participation in PACOM activities. 
 
Gaps in the Mil-Mil Relationship 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Admiral Fallon stated that the biggest lesson he 
has learned as PACOM Commander is that the people of the 
region understand the importance of security and stability. 
Engagement between regional militaries builds local 
capacity to solve security problems and gives people 
confidence about the future, although the Asian cultural 
and historical setting presents challenges for multilateral 
approaches.  Opportunities exist for the United States and 
China to work together, said the Admiral, despite different 
backgrounds and past baggage. 
 
¶8.  (C) Admiral Fallon expressed concern that the United 
States and China do not have the degree of communication 
and transparency between their militaries that they should. 
For example, the growth of Chinese military forces makes 
likely more encounters on the high seas between American 
and Chinese ships and aircraft.  The two militaries should 
have an agreed understanding on how to react.  Talks under 
the existing U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative 
Agreement (MMCA) have been frustrating, according to 
Admiral Fallon, because they have not been able to reach 
agreements. 
 
¶9.  (C) The lack of high-level communication with the PLA, 
Admiral Fallon continued, is in stark contrast to U.S. 
relations with other militaries.  He recounted that the 
uniformed defense chiefs of Australia, East Timor and Nepal 
recently called him to discuss security challenges in their 
regions.  Such calls are frequent due to well-established 
working relationships between military leaders, exemplified 
in the annual Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) forums, 
which China has not attended.  The lack of such a 
relationship with PLA leaders is a serious problem, Admiral 
Fallon said.  Some Chinese academics responded that the 
presence of Taiwan at regional military gatherings 
precluded PRC participation.  Admiral Fallon countered that 
Taiwan representatives did not attend these events.  He 
intended to invite PLA leaders to participate in the next 
CHOD forum during his meetings at the Ministry of National 
Defense, the Admiral said. 
 
Meeting of President Bush, President Hu 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Ambassador Randt noted the very good conversations 
between President Bush and President Hu during their April 
20 meeting at which they agreed to contacts between the 
U.S. Strategic Command and PLA Second Artillery (strategic 
nuclear forces) and between the NASA Administrator and PRC 
counterparts. 
 
BEIJING 00008836  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Ding Kuisong of the China Reform Forum remarked 
that the Six-Party Talks appeared stalled and that the 
North Koreans feel unable to move forward on the nuclear 
issue while being pressed by the United States on other 
issues.  The United States, the Admiral stated, could not 
turn a blind eye to DPRK counterfeiting of U.S. currency to 
compensate for North Korea's own economic failures.  The 
PRC, given its friendly relations with the North Korean 
regime, can play a useful role in convincing the DPRK that 
the United States is not planning to invade and that the 
DPRK should return to the Six-Party Talks, said Admiral 
Fallon. 
 
¶12. (U) The delegation cleared this message. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
 
¶13. (U) 
 
U.S. Participants: 
 
Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, United States Pacific 
Command 
Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. 
Ravic Huso, Political Advisor, Department of State, United 
States Pacific Command 
Brig. Gen. Ralph Jodice, Defense Attache 
COL Bob Brown, Executive Assistant, United States Pacific 
Command 
CAPT Kevin Ketchmark, Navy Attache 
MAJ Roger Cavazos, China desk officer, United States 
Pacific Command 
Notetaker 
 
Chinese Participants: 
 
Chu Shulong, Director, Institute of Strategic Studies, 
Tsinghua University 
 
SIPDIS 
Cui Liru, President, China Institutes for Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR) 
Ding Kuisong, Vice Chairman, China Reform Forum (CRF) 
MG (retired) Gong Xianfu, Vice Chairman, China Institute 
for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) 
Jin Canrong, Professor of International Relations and 
Deputy Director of U.S. Studies, Renmin University 
Ruan Zongze, Vice President, China Institute of 
International Studies (CIIS) 
Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies, 
Peking University 
Zhang Tuosheng, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, China 
Foundation for International Strategic Studies (CFISS) 
RANDT