VZCZCXRO0105
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0087/01 1480948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 280948Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0358
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0377

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/28/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH YOUTH - ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED 
 
REF: (A) BASRAH 84  (B) BAGHDAD 1745 
 
BASRAH 00000087  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark F. Marrano, Deputy Regional Coordinator, 
Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  In a series of meetings with political, 
religious and youth leaders in Basrah over the past month, the 
Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) discussed the attitudes of the 
local youth towards the Coalition Forces (CF).  A combination of 
unemployment, dashed hopes, religious and militia influence all 
appear to be pushing the youth of Basrah to increasingly 
challenge and confront Coalition Forces with violence.  The 
recent clashes between local youth and the British military 
during the past month clearly show that local frustration has 
reached the boiling point. To improve the attitude of the youth 
of Basrah toward the CF, security must be restored to Basrah and 
economic opportunities that are readily attainable must be 
created to counteract the influence of hard line religious 
clerics and militia leaders. End Summary. 
 
Students 
---------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Issam Khadim, President of the Students Union at Shat Al 
Arab University, stated on May 16 that students are generally 
frustrated and angry with the Coalition Forces for not 
intervening enough in Basrah to "punish those causing the 
violence."  He expressed frustration with the Islamic groups 
that frequent the universities. Khadim mentioned that after the 
fall of Saddam, religious leaders from Sadr, Badr and Fadheela 
went to all the universities in Basrah to recruit and influence 
the students.   He added that these religious leaders tried to 
change the nature of the union to make it more political. 
 
¶3.  (C) Khadim stated that at Shat Al Arab University there are 
constantly people from different political parties handing out 
pamphlets.  He described the 2,000 students at his university as 
liberal, open minded and becoming increasingly frustrated with 
the current security situation and the Coalition Forces.  Khadim 
added that the students on the other larger main campus of 
Basrah University are a "lost cause" because different political 
and religious groups have heavily influenced them. 
Specifically, he mentioned that Iran has been using Badr in the 
universities as a way to spread its influence. 
 
¶4.  (C) Provincial Council member Dr. Hamid Al Thalmi of the 
Iraqi National Accord voiced the same opinion on April 24. He 
stated that the USG needs to focus on the students in the 
universities in order to counter the influence of the religious 
hard liners. Dr. Al Thalmi suggested that the USG not take a 
direct approach, but rather work through non-governmental 
organizations (NGO's) to quietly influence the students towards 
a more positive, open-minded approach with regards to the United 
States. When asked for more details, Dr. Al Thalmi said he did 
not know exactly how the USG could accomplish this only that it 
should be looked at more carefully by the USG. 
 
Street Kids 
------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Sayed Ghali, Provincial Council and Iraqi National 
Accord member, stated on April 27 that local youths between 
12-20 years old who are unemployed and without direction are the 
most susceptible to militia and religious leaders.  He pointed 
to Sayed Al Shuhada Movement, a well-known political party in 
Basrah with strong links to Iran, as one political group that 
concentrates their recruitment efforts on these youths. Ghali 
stressed that more work needs to be done with getting the kids 
off the streets and into sports programs. 
 
¶6.  (C) Also on April 27, the Assistant to the Governor of 
Basrah, Rajeh Al Musawi, highlighted the dashed hopes of the 
average kid in the street.  He stated that the youth of Basrah 
had very high expectations with regards to the Coalition Forces. 
 According to Al Musawi, the arrival of the Coalition Forces in 
Basrah signaled for the local youth a new era of economic 
opportunity and higher standard of living.  However, three years 
later, they do not consider their lives are any better, nor do 
they see any good prospects for the future.  Al Musawi stressed 
that it would be easy to change their negative opinion of the 
Coalition Forces by reaching out with more reconstruction 
projects, even small scale ones.  He added that some projects 
done by the British 60 years ago still have a lingering good 
effect on the older generation in Basrah.  On the other hand, 
Said Youssef, the Head of Thar'allah in Basrah, stated on May 14 
that something "big" needs to happen to calm the anger of the 
youth. He suggested that the removal of the Governor by the 
British military or by the Provincial Council through the voting 
 
BASRAH 00000087  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
process would help to alleviate some anger. 
 
¶7.  (C) Provincial Council member and Shiite cleric, Sayed Bahaa 
Jama al Deen, echoed the same sentiments on May 23. He stated 
that many local youth are extremely frustrated with being unable 
to find a job and the lack of basic services.  Sayed Bahaa added 
that some political groups and militias are taking advantage of 
this frustration by channeling it towards the Coalition Forces. 
The Chief of Police, Hasan al Swaidi, stated on April 25 that 
the frustration has reached such levels that the only way to 
control it is for the British military to increase their 
visibility with more patrols.  He opined that this was the only 
way to dampen the desire of the local youth to make trouble. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment:  Clearly there are local leaders willing to 
take advantage of the poor security situation for their own 
respective agendas.  It may be too late to radically change 
local youth opinion at this point since it appears that the 
religious and political groups have been allowed the time and 
freedom to exert their respective influences. Perhaps the best 
approach now would be to focus on restoring security to Basrah 
to dissipate come of the current anger and frustration felt by 
the youth and create an environment conducive to the development 
of new economic opportunities (see refs A and B)  End Comment. 
MARRANO