VZCZCXRO9937
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0085/01 1470738
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270738Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0354
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0373

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000085 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH PC MEMBER ON OPTIONS TO OUSTING THE GOVERNOR 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 65, B) BASRAH 59, C) BASRAH 58 
 
BASRAH 00000085  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO 
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On May 25, the Basrah Deputy Regional 
Coordinator (DRC) and Poloff met with Munathil Abd Khanjar, 
Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) member.  He described a number 
of options the BPC was considering as alternatives to removing 
the Governor. The BPC's efforts to brainstorm up alternative 
solutions to Basrah's governance crisis are commendable, but in 
the end, the BPC will most likely wait for the provincial 
election to solve their problems for them.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  In a meeting with the Basrah DRC and PolOff, BPC member 
Munathil, head of the Economic Committee and a prominent member 
of the Basrah Islamic List (BIL) coalition of independent Shia 
politicians, described efforts to oust Governor Mohammed Al 
Wahili.  With 18 out of 41 members on the BPC, the BIL has been 
in the forefront of trying to muster the 28 votes necessary to 
vote Governor Mohammed out of office (see Reftels). 
 
¶3.  (C) The DRC said that news of the Governor's imminent 
removal from office had been circulating for quite some time, 
with no result.  The BPC needed to move forward and resolve the 
issue of the Governor so it could address local governance 
issues.  The DRC said he had been disappointed to hear that the 
weekly Wednesday BPC meeting had not taken place on May 24 
(Comment: The May 24 meeting was to have finally brought the 
issue of removing the governor to vote.  Fadillah party members 
were absent from the meeting, as was the BPC Chairman Obadi of 
the Da'awa Party.  End Comment). 
 
¶4.  (C) Munathil agreed, but said that the 28 votes needed to 
remove the Governor from office did not exist.  While all 18 BIL 
members were in agreement to vote against the governor, Munathil 
said that he did not believe the other party members would 
follow through on their promises to vote against the governor. 
There was a high level of distrust between the BIL and other BPC 
members, and the BIL had no confidence that the other members 
would vote against the Governor. 
 
¶5.  (C) Another sticking point was that there was no consensus 
on who would replace the governor, Munathil said.  Some BPC 
members supported the approach of allowing the Fadillah party to 
replace Governor Mohammed with another of its party members. 
Others said that anyone should be allowed to be considered for 
the governorship as long as all BPC members agreed on this 
person.  Munathil said, interestingly, that although there were 
qualified independents on the BPC who would do a good job as 
governor, they were out of consideration because they had no 
supporting militia.  With no consensus on how to replace the 
governor, the discussion was going nowhere. 
 
A Range of Other Options 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Munathil said that other options were being discussed if 
the Governor could not be voted out.  One idea was to create an 
oversight committee formed of representatives from each of the 
five major parties on the BPC (Fadillah, SCIRI, BIL, Iraq Future 
Gathering, and Iraqi National Accord).  These five members would 
monitor the governor's performance and make recommendations to 
the rest of the BPC.  The political parties would be influenced 
by the recommendations of their representative on this 
committee, and this in turn would affect the governor's 
behavior. 
 
¶7.  (C) Another option involved allowing the governor to retain 
his position, but replacing both the Deputy Governor and the BPC 
Chairman.  This would provide a better balance of power between 
the political parties and remove much of the Governor's 
influence over the BPC.  Munathil said his name had been 
submitted as a possible replacement for one of these two 
positions. 
 
¶8.  (C) A third option under discussion was simply to wait for 
the provincial election.  Some BPC members were unwilling to 
waste effort on replacing the governor when the election would 
take place shortly and resolve the problem peacefully.  When 
asked when he thought the election would take place, Munathil 
replied that he thought it would be in August or September 2006 
(Comment: This early time frame seems overly optimistic to us. 
End Comment). 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  It is becoming increasingly clear that the BPC 
does not have the political will to vote out the governor, and 
it was refreshing to hear a range of options that the BPC was 
considering in order to address the problem of Governor 
 
BASRAH 00000085  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Mohammed's abuse of office. While the third option of replacing 
both the Chairman and the Deputy Governor would probably provide 
the best mitigating effect on the Governor, we suspect that it 
would be as difficult for the BPC to agree on alternative 
candidates for these two positions as it has been on a 
replacement for the governor.  An oversight committee is not a 
bad idea, but it will take a long time to form and its influence 
over the governor is far from clear.  In the end, the provincial 
election will decide who stays and who goes in the BPC, and the 
sooner the better.   End comment. 
MARRANO