VZCZCXRO5083
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0066/01 1251000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 051000Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0324
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0343

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BASRAH 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/5/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER PREF SMIG SOCI EAID KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MODM BASRAH OFFICIAL ON IDP CAMP FOR DISPLACED SHIA 
ESTABLISHED IN ZUBAIR 
 
REF: BASRAH 51 
 
BASRAH 00000066  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
State Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On April 30, the Basrah Regional Coordinator 
(RC) and PolOffs met with Abdul Kareen Salman, Director of Human 
Affairs from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) 
for the Southern Region to discuss the issue of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in southern Iraq.  Abdul Kareem 
reported that the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) had formed a 
joint committee made with the MoDM and the Iraqi Red Crescent to 
deal with the issue of IDPs, and that the Zubair municipal 
council had decided to establish an IDP camp in the town of 
Zubair at the Youth and Sports facility, a public building owned 
by the Ministry of Youth that Abdul Kareem described as 
abandoned and unused.  Committee members had been reluctant to 
establish the camp, Abdul Kareem said, but they saw no other way 
to provide basic needs to displaced families living in the 
streets.  USAID/OFDA has deployed assessment teams to the South 
but has not yet assessed IDP assistance needs in the region. 
REO believes that existing organizations in Basrah are providing 
adequate assistance to the displaced families and there is no 
IDP crisis in the region, although new families continue to 
arrive on a daily basis.  The camp is not being touted as a 
solution to the problem of displacement due to sectarian 
violence.  Local officials indicate that displaced families 
should return to their places of habitual residence when the 
security situation permits and say that this is the desired 
outcome of the families themselves.  Establishment of a 
predominantly Shia camp in an area of Basrah known for its large 
Sunni population could exacerbate sectarian tensions.   Although 
the IDPs populations in Zubair is not yet sufficient to affect 
demographics, the influence of Sunnis on local politics could be 
diluted if enough new IDPs continue to arrive.  End Summary. 
 
IDP Camp Established in Zubair 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On April 30, the Basrah RC and PolOffs met with Abdul 
Kareem Salman, Director of Human Affairs from the MoDM for the 
Southern Region, to discuss the issue of IDPs in southern Iraq. 
Abdul Kareem's office covers the provinces of Basrah, Maysan, 
and Dhi Qar.   Migration of Shia from other Iraqi provinces into 
Basrah began shortly after the fall of Saddam's regime, Abdul 
Kareem said, but they came in numbers "small enough to count on 
your fingers."  In the period since the February 22 attack on 
the Samarra mosque, Abdul Kareem stated that 735 mainly-Shia 
families moved into Basrah province, mostly from predominantly 
Sunni areas.  Abdul Kareem stated that most of the IDPs found 
shelter with friends and relatives, but that there were also a 
substantial number of families who had no support and were 
camping out in front of the MoDM office in Basrah.  He 
characterized displacement into Basrah as growing-- "new 
families come in every day"-- although the rate of migration 
into the area had decreased since the massive influx that 
occurred immediately after the February 22 Samarra mosque 
attack. 
 
¶3.  (C) About two weeks ago, the BPC formed a joint committee 
with representatives from the MoDM, the Zubair mayor and city 
council, the local police, and representatives from the local 
branches of the Ministries of Health and Human Rights to deal 
with IDP issues.  Members of the BPC on the committee include: 
Seyid Baha Jamal Al Deen (Da'awa), Sheikh Fadil Abdul Mahdi 
(Islamic independent), and Sheikh Salah Al Batat (Islamic 
independent).  The joint committee held a conference for about 
400 displaced families in the area, asking them what their major 
concerns were.  The families reported that employment and 
education were their biggest concerns, and they requested to 
remain at the Youth and Sports facility in Zubair, a town 
located about 30 miles southeast of Basrah, where many of them 
had already taken up informal residence. 
 
¶4.  (C) Last week, the Zubair Municipal Council held a session 
in which it decided to grant the wish of the displaced families 
and allow them to remain officially at the Youth and Sports 
Facility, as well as to provide tent accommodations for several 
hundred more families.  The Youth and Sports facility in Zubair 
is a public building belonging to the Ministry of Youth, 
described by Abdul Kareem as abandoned and not in use.  He said 
that 50 displaced families were already living in the building, 
and that the camp would accommodate an additional 200-300 
families in tents. 
 
 
BASRAH 00000066  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Abdul Kareem said that he personally felt sad that a 
camp had to be established in Zubair for the displaced families. 
 He said that the building had electricity, but it was not up to 
living standards.  However, he also said that there was no room 
for a camp in the city of Basrah itself, where most of the 
displaced currently are living on the streets.  The city council 
of Zubair proposed allowing the families to stay in the Youth 
and Sports facility and enlarging camp facilities, as this was 
where the families themselves had elected to reside.  PolOff 
countered that camps were not considered to be a good solution 
to the problem of displacement because they entailed substantial 
administrative, security, and sanitary support.  In addition, 
camps attracted even more families and had a tendency to become 
permanent establishments.  PolOff mentioned that at an April 6 
Humanitarian Sector Working Group meeting (Reftel), local Iraqi 
officials and humanitarian organizations all agreed that they 
did not wish to establish an IDP camp in Basrah for these 
reasons.  Abdul Kareem said that he agreed with all of these 
assessments, but that the situation had become untenable for the 
displaced families in Basrah.  The local government could not 
turn their backs on the needs of the displaced and leave them 
living in the streets. 
 
¶6.  (C) Abdul Kareem stated that local Iraqi police are 
providing security for the IDP camp in Zubair.  These police had 
been provided on request of the displaced families living in the 
Sports and Youth facility after the camp was attacked by a group 
of men about ten days ago, he said.  The attackers were pushed 
off by youths in the camp, and no further attacks had occurred 
since then.  Abdul Kareem said he did not know who had attacked 
the camp or if the perpetrators had been caught. 
 
¶7.  (C) When PolOff asked if the displaced Shia families were 
concerned for their security in Zubair since the town was known 
to have a large Sunni population, Abdul Kareem stated that 
security was not a problem because the Sunni residents of Zubair 
were peaceful, unlike the "Sunni terrorists" in the north. 
PolOff pushed back, disputing the charge that all Sunnis in the 
North were terrorists, and when pressed, Abdul Kareem admitted 
that he had no hard facts about the activities of the Sunnis in 
the north.  Sunnis comprised only about 50 percent of Zubair's 
population, Abdul Kareem stated, and were not a majority there 
as some people believed.  (Comment: We have heard estimates that 
the Sunni population in Zubair ranges from 10 to 80 percent. 
There are no reliable figures, although we believe Sunnis to 
comprise roughly ten percent of the population of Basrah 
province, concentrated mostly in Basrah and Zubair.  End 
Comment).  Abdul Kareem asserted that Sunnis in Zubair took an 
active role in protecting the IDP camp.  He said that the vast 
majority of those moving into Basrah were Shia, but asserted 
that some Sunni families also moved into Basrah after having run 
into problems with multi-national forces elsewhere in the 
country. 
 
¶8.  (C) When asked if he thought the camp would solve the 
problems caused by the displacement, Abdul Kareem answered 
firmly that it would not.  The long-term solution would be for 
the families to return to their homes when it was secure enough 
for them to do so.  The displaced families indicated that they 
wished to go home as soon as possible and did not intend to 
remain in Basrah any longer than they had to.  When asked if he 
would permit us to visit the camp, Abdul Kareem said that this 
would not be a problem and that we were welcome to do so. 
 
MODM Basrah: Needs for the Displaced Being Met 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Abdul Kareem depicted the problem of displacement of 
families into Basrah as significant, but our current assessment 
is that the situation is not unmanageable.  A number of sources 
of assistance for the displaced exist in Basrah and are actively 
dispersing aid.   The central government has sent boxes of food 
to the local ministries' offices in Basrah for distribution. 
Many private organizations and businesses have donated food and 
clothing to the families as well.  Abdul Kareem said that Sheikh 
Mansour, a long-time REO Basrah contact, had donated food, 
clothing, water tanks, and air conditioning units to the Sports 
and Youth facilities families in Zubair.  He noted that the Red 
Crescent, World Food Program, and the Shia Endowment had all 
contributed significant assistance to the families.   PolOff 
stressed the U.S. government concern for the wellbeing of all 
those displaced from their homes and in need of assistance and 
said that our policy was to channel further aid through existing 
organizations.   Abdul Kareem thanked us for our concern and 
said he would keep us informed about developments. 
 
¶10.  (C) While the pressing day-to-day problems of food and 
 
BASRAH 00000066  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
clothing for the displaced families were under control, Abdul 
Kareem said that the MoDM was also working on the thornier 
issues of food ration delivery, education, and employment.  The 
MoDM was working through ministerial channels to arrange 
delivery of Public Distribution System food rations to the 
displaced families.  The MoDM had also worked with the Ministry 
of Education to allow school children to take their final exams 
in Basrah in order not to disrupt their studies.  The issue of 
employment was proving to be the biggest challenge.  The MoDM 
was requesting that the Ministries of Oil, Industry, and 
Minerals employ those displaced to Basrah who had appropriate 
backgrounds in these fields.  (Note: Giving scarce jobs to IDPs 
will not likely, in the end, turn out to promote community, let 
alone sectarian, harmony.   Although anyone qualified should get 
a job - provided there is a need/vacant position -- and MODM's 
push for other ministries to employ IDPs seems noble at first 
glance, the actual effect may be padding payrolls for political 
purposes.) 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Abdul Kareem admitted that Sunni families were leaving 
Basrah.  He said he believed that most of these Sunnis were 
leaving Iraq for Syria and the United Arab Emirates, although he 
admitted that he had no hard facts about their destinations.  He 
said he was aware that some Sunnis were also leaving Basrah for 
Anbar province, but that he believed this was a much smaller 
number than those going abroad.  (Note: The April 2 IOM report 
on displacement in Iraq due to sectarian violence lists that 372 
Sunni families have left Basrah for Anbar province and 279 Sunni 
families have left Basrah and Dhi Qar provinces for Salah Al Din 
province. End Note.)  He said that those leaving for other 
provinces in Iraq most likely had relatives in the area that 
they were staying with and that it was his opinion that these 
relatives were likely engaged in terrorist activities.  Why 
else, he questioned, would a family move into such violent 
areas, unless they themselves were somehow connected to the 
violence?  Again, when pushed, Abdul Kareem stated that he had 
no hard evidence of Sunni links to terrorism, and clarified that 
this was just his personal opinion. 
 
Other Southern Provinces 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) According to MODM figures, a total of 440 Shia families 
have moved into Dhi Qar since the February 22 attack, settling 
in the Suk As Shuyk and Al Shatra areas, and the Al Fajr camp. 
The Al Fajr camp in Dhi Qar province is the only other IDP camp 
in the southern region of Iraq.  Located about 100 miles north 
of Nassiriyah near the provincial border with Wasit, Al Fajr 
houses about 150 Shia families.  MODM does not yet have figures 
for displacement in Dhi Qar.  The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) estimates a total of 440 Shia families have 
moved into Maysan province following the February 22 attack.  No 
MoDM IDP camps have been established in Maysan; most of the 
displaced in Maysan have moved in with relatives in rural areas. 
 Abdul Kareem assessed the issue of displacement to be of 
greatest concern in Basrah due to numbers of the displaced, and 
that Dhi Qar and Maysan were less critical cases. 
 
Comment 
-------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Comment:  Displacement into the southern provinces of 
Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan has reached a significant enough 
level for the local branch of MoDM and the BPC to determine that 
tent camps for displaced families in Basrah and Dhi Qar are 
essential, despite the pitfalls and limitations of camps. 
USAID/OFDA has only just received funding for additional 
assistance to IDPs in Iraq and is in the process of deploying 
reconnaissance teams to determine IDP assistance needs in the 
South.  At this time, USAID/OFDA is not able to comment on the 
accuracy of assessments by ICRS, MODM-Basrah, and the local 
governments.  REO Basrah believes that displacement has not yet 
reached a crisis stage, and that existing organizations appear 
able to adequately address the needs of the displaced.  The 
preferred long-term solution is agreed by all stakeholders to be 
the return of the IDPs to their place of habitual residence. 
 
¶14.  (C) Comment continued:  REO Basrah is concerned, however, 
that the establishment of a predominantly Shia IDP camp in an 
area of Basrah with a large Sunni population could spark further 
sectarian tension.  We have heard Abdul Kareem's assumption that 
Sunnis who leave Basrah must be terrorists echoed by Seyid 
Hassanein Al Safi, the BPC Humanitarian Sector Chair, local 
media, as well as many of our other Shia contacts in Basrah. 
The BPC is made up entirely of Shia; no Sunnis are represented 
on the council.   The current numbers of Shia moving in and 
 
BASRAH 00000066  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Sunnis moving out are not yet substantial enough to alter 
demographics and dilute the influence of Sunnis on local 
politics.  However, the potential of the IDP camp in Zubair to 
further exacerbate sectarian violence in the period leading up 
to provincial elections warrants close monitoring.  We will 
continue to dialogue with our Sunni contacts on the issue, as 
well as maintain relations with the joint committee on IDPs.  If 
security conditions permit, we intend to take up Abdul Kareem's 
offer to visit the Zubair camp in order to more fully assess the 
scope of the IDP situation in Basrah.  End comment. 
GROSS