VZCZCXRO4388
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0065/01 1241632
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 041632Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0322
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0006
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0005
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0341

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/4/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HASSAN AL-RASHID ON SECURITY, THE BASRAH GOVERNMENT AND THE 
BOYCOTTS 
 
REF: (A) BASRAH 53; (B) BASRAH 58; (C) BASRAH 59; (D) BASRAH 60 
 
BASRAH 00000065  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a May 3 meeting with Badr Organization 
chief Hassan al-Rashid, the Regional Coordinator (RC) discussed 
the threats against the employees of the Regional Embassy Office 
(REO) in Basrah and suggested that splinter groups could be 
responsible.  Hassan believes that the Basrah Provincial Council 
(BPC) soon may vote to remove Governor Muhammad, but a sticking 
point is a legal question over whether 26 or 28 BPC members' 
votes are needed to do so.  Concerning the boycotts against the 
British and the Danes, Hassan said that they should be lifted in 
the very near future.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Hassan al-Rashid, the Basrah leader of Badr 
Organization and BPC member, met with the RC of the Basrah REO 
on May 3 and discussed the threats against the REO's local 
staff, a possible change in the governorship and the BPC's 
boycotts against the Danes and the British.  The Deputy RC and 
Poloff also attended the meeting. 
 
¶3.  (C) The RC began by describing the threats made against the 
REO's local staff and showing Hassan a copy of a leaflet 
distributed outside the compound's main gate on April 30 that 
promised death to people working for the coalition.  Hassan said 
he was aware of recent threats made against some of the REO's 
employees and sympathized with Post employees' plight.  He said 
he believed that the threats did not emanate from a particular 
ideological group of Shia or Sunni Arabs, but were from people 
wanting to churn up the political situation.  Many other groups 
and individuals have been threatened, according to Hassan, 
including Sheik Muhammad Falak, Ayatollah Sistani's 
representative in Zubair and a critic of Governor Muhammad, and 
BPC Chairman Obadi. 
 
¶4.  (C) When the RC asked him who was responsible for these 
threats, Hassan replied that he had received word that a former 
Badr member, Hayder Hassan Yusef, had been detained by the 
British military and had been complicit in some of these 
threats.  Approximately 60 members of the Serious Crimes Unit 
(SCU) of the Basrah police, according to Hassan, are known for 
participating in assassinations and may have some connections to 
the threats.  Hassan hastened to add that these groups do not 
direct their activities solely against the American and British 
forces, but act against anyone or any group that stands in their 
way.  These groups are not affiliated with any particular 
political party or structured organization, Hassan said, and 
countering them is a complex issue.  He was not more specific 
about the groups who could be responsible for the threats. 
 
¶5.  (C) Hassan al-Rashid agreed that the key to improving 
security in Basrah is having a responsible local government and 
said that there should be a change in the Basrah government. 
Alluding to a plan for BPC members to vote to oust Governor 
Muhammad (see Reftels), Hassan said that although he believes 
the required two-thirds of the BPC members would vote to unseat 
the governor, there is not complete agreement, and some BPC 
members are afraid to vote against the governor. 
 
¶6.  (C) Hassan also said there was uncertainty of the meaning of 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 71 - whether 
two-thirds of the total number of council members must vote to 
unseat the governor or whether the governor and deputy governor 
would not vote.  If the latter, 26 votes are necessary, but if 
the former, 28 votes would be required, according to Hassan.  He 
said that clarity is needed on this issue and asked that the 
United States Government offer its opinion since the order 
originally was written in English.  In any case, Hassan said 
that the security situation would improve if a new government 
were installed in Basrah.  (Note:  Section 2.5 of Order No. 71 
allows dismissal of Governors and Deputy Governors for cause 
upon a two-thirds vote of the Governorate Council.  Section 3.3 
states that Governors and Deputy Governors may attend the 
regular meetings of the Governorate Councils as non-voting 
members.  End Note.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Turning to the BPC's boycotts of the Danes and the 
British, Hassan said the BPC has decided to resolve them. 
However, Hassan emphasized, the boycotts must be ended in a way 
that explains to the average person why the boycotts began and 
what has occurred that permits the BPC to return to normal 
business with the Danes and the Brits.  For this, Hassan said, 
the BPC decided there must be a media event. 
 
 
BASRAH 00000065  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Hassan described the boycott against the Danes as being 
"semi-solved," and the British boycott would require one more 
BPC meeting.  The Deputy RC asked Hassan if any BPC members were 
against terminating the boycott, and he replied, "Yes," without 
providing much more information other than opaquely saying that 
the boycott started because a police officer associated with the 
Fadillah party was detained by the British military. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment:  Hassan put the threats against the REO's local 
staff in context by noting that unfortunately threats are common 
in Basrah against many different groups and individuals, 
including politically based threats against him personally. 
Hassan's solution, though never voiced clearly, is for the BPC 
to vote to remove the governor and install Hassan in the 
governor's chair.  A new Basrah government, possibly with some 
change in the powers of the BPC chairman and the governor, would 
be able to improve security in Basrah in Hassan's view.  He well 
may be correct - personal security has reached a nadir, and many 
people in Basrah hope that there will be a new administration to 
tackle the problem.  Hassan's information on the imminent end of 
the boycotts against the Brits and the Danes jives with what the 
REO has heard - the Danish mission was told by the BPC on April 
30 that the boycott is substantially over except for a media 
event to publicize it, and the UK consulate believes that the 
May 3 BPC meeting may set the stage for another meeting and 
media event on May 4 to lift the boycott against the British. 
End Comment. 
GROSS