This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR FPS (HUS0) 
NSC FOR MORROW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM TH HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THE POLICE SEARCH FOR 
SYNCHRONICITY 
 
REF: A. A) BANGKOK 03179 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SENIOR THAI 
        OFFICIALS BRIEF EAP DAS JOHN) 
     ¶B. B) BANGKOK 03192 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: MAY 17-18 
        VISIT TO FAR SOUTH) 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE.  REASON 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  While the Royal Thai Army has moved to 
reassert its traditional role of managing security in the 
restive South, the Royal Thai "provincial" police remain the 
foundation for investigating, arresting and prosecuting 
militants.  Over the past two years, senior Thai officials 
have moved from denial to admitting that there is a serious 
problem in the South.  As reported in refs, they are 
beginning to admit that RTG efforts in the South are 
hamstrung by a lack of coordination, poor skills in some 
units, and a lack of efforts to win the support of the local 
public.  Police officials in the South, however, believe that 
they are making headway through better intelligence derived 
from jailed suspects, improved cooperation with the Army and 
nascent efforts to win the population's "hearts and minds." 
This cable takes a more in-depth look at the role of the 
local police, their cooperation with other parts of the RTG, 
some recent successes, and their internal shortcomings. End 
Summary. 
 
THE FORCES ON THE GROUND 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) The RTG has not been shy about committing resources to 
the South.  Nearly 45,000 soldiers and police are operating 
in a region approximately the size of Connecticut.  Military 
forces totaling approximately 35,000 troops fall under the 
command of the 4th Army, headquartered in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat.  The 5th Infantry Division (five regiments) and 
the 15th Development Division (three regiments) totaling 
approximately 20,000 troops are the main units of the 4th 
Army.  About 15,000 other military forces are assigned to the 
South, including three Marine Battalions, Special Forces 
units detailed from the Special Warfare Command at Lopburi 
(Task Force 90), and additional forces redirected from the 
Third Army Area in the Northwest.  Each province has at least 
one regiment of Rangers--irregular paramilitary forces 
recruited from the local population. 
 
¶3. (C) The Royal Thai Police (RTP) provide the backbone of 
law and order in the South.  Often referred to as the 
"provincial police," these are the local cops charged with 
administering speeding tickets, investigating petty crimes 
and the other quotidian acts of day-to-day law enforcement. 
The provincial police are also the cornerstone of 
anti-separatist efforts.  They are often the first on the 
scene and the only law enforcement agency with a full time 
presence in all three provinces 
 
¶4. (C) The three southernmost provinces are grouped into 
police Region IX.  There are about 2,300 provincial police in 
Yala, 2,500 in Pattani, and 3,500 in Narathiwat.  These 
police are augmented by the Royal Thai Border Patrol police, 
almost 1,500 provincial police from other provinces, and 
officers from the Bangkok-based RTP Special Branch (SB) and 
RTP Criminal Suppression Division (CSD).  Additionally, the 
Ministry of Justice's relatively new Department of Special 
Investigations (DSI), also based in the capital, has been 
active in several specific cases in the South, but does not 
have a full-time presence in the area. 
 
¶5. (C) The Region IX forward operating command in Yala is 
charged with overseeing all police activities in the three 
southern provinces and draws upon other police units for 
expertise.  The head of the command's special raid unit is a 
Colonel from CSD, and the chief of the RTP's forensic lab in 
Bangkok routinely travels to Yala to assist in 
investigations.  Police stations are often collocated with 
the local administrative headquarters at the provincial, 
district and sub-district levels.  Forensic labs in each of 
the three provinces support field operations, though 
complicated work such as DNA analysis must be done at the 
central police forensic lab in Bangkok. 
 
COORDINATION IS THE COMPLICATION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Military and police forces are coordinated under the 
Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPC), 
which is led by the Supreme Commander of the 4th Army Region, 
GEN Ongkorn Tongprasom.  The SBPPC was established in April 
2004 and charged with coordinating all security, civil 
affairs and administrative work in the three restive 
provinces.  This was not the first such coordinating body in 
the South; the RTG established the Southern Border 
Administrative Center (SBAC) in the 1980's to counter the 
separatist movement.  The SBAC served as the preeminent 
governing body in the South, with the ability to remove 
corrupt officials and determine local budgets.  It was not, 
however, a strictly security-focused organization.  The SBAC 
worked hand in hand with Civil Military Police Task Force 43 
(CMP 43), which served as the focal point for security 
forces.  SBAC and CMP 43 were dissolved by Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra in May 2002. 
 
¶7. (C) Following the upsurge in violence in 2004, the SBPPC 
was established in the hope of capturing the magic of SBAC 
and CMP 43.  According to Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
officials in Yala who served under both systems, however, the 
SBPPC is almost entirely focused on security affairs--like 
the old CMP 43--to the detriment of civil, political and 
administrative issues.  Moreover, the SBPPC does not have the 
clear lines of authority, coordination and bureaucratic 
support to optimize operations in the South.  (Note. As 
reported in ref A, Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai appears to 
understand this problem and plans to establish a joint center 
for administering a campaign to win "hearts and minds." End 
Note.) 
 
¶8. (C) The delineation of police and military 
responsibilities is not so clear on the ground.  According to 
Region IX police officials, the Army has the lead in rural 
portions of the South, with urban and major roads under 
police control.  This can lead to confusion when units 
respond to a bombing or attack. Although the Army has no role 
in investigating such attacks, Army units are sometimes the 
first on the scene.  According to Maj. Gen. Amporn 
Charuchinda, the deputy police commissioner for Region IX, 
the police have given Army units some training in evidence 
collection, but military units will often fail to share 
evidence with the police, instead presenting it to senior 
Army officials. 
 
SOME BETTER COORDINATION WITH ARMY... 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Region IX police point to at least one area of 
increased cooperation with the Army, however.  RTG officials 
have been frustrated by several incidents when, in an attempt 
by police to arrest suspects, local villagers either block 
security forces from entering the village, or take hostages 
to force the release of those suspects.  According to GEN 
Amporn, the police are increasingly working with the Army and 
MOI officials to try and prevent these incidents. Amporn said 
that when making an arrest in one of these "red zone" 
villages, a company size army unit will cordon off the 
surrounding area before a twelve-man tactical police team 
goes into the village to make the arrest. MOI officials are 
often used to coordinate raids with local village officials, 
and to act as translators, in areas where villagers refuse or 
are unable to speak Thai with security officials.  (Note: 
This coordination seems to have broken down during the 
botched May 19 arrest in Narathiwat when local villagers 
reacted to an arrest by holding two government teachers 
hostage before severely beating them. End Note).  Police 
units are also requesting Army blocking movements--in the 
form of concentric rings centered on crime scenes, one, three 
and seven kilometers in diameter--in the hopes of catching 
perpetrators on the run. 
 
...AND PROSECUTORS 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Police officials also have been frustrated by what 
they see as poor cooperation from local prosecutors.  Not a 
single militant has been successfully prosecuted yet. 
According to Amporn, the problem lies in the short duration 
of prosecutor assigments--prosecutors rotate into new 
positions every year.   That said, Amporn is hopeful that the 
recent visit of the chief prosecutor for the South to Yala 
will result in better cooperation. 
 
POLICE CONFIDENT THEY ARE IMPROVING 
----------------------------------- 
¶11. (C) GEN Amporn and his subordinates confidently assess 
that they are getting a handle on the separatist movement; 
"we know who they are now."  Amporn cited the lack of attacks 
on police sites in 2006 as evidence that the insurgents are 
not as bold anymore.  The authorities granted under the 
emergency decree (renewed every three months) allow the 
police to detain suspects much more easily.  Amporn said that 
the police now have the names of 500 suspected militants and 
have already arrested 200 suspects.  These suspects are now 
providing valuable information during interviews and through 
their "pocket litter" and other physical evidence.  These 
leads have given the police a better sense of the militants' 
tactics and organization.  According to Amporn, the militants 
prefer to set up a safe house within one kilometer of an 
attack site, and often stash an extra set of clothing along 
their escape route to change into while fleeing the scene. 
The police have found military uniforms cached in this 
manner.  Some suspects even dress as women so as to evade 
capture. 
 
¶12. (C) Some of Amporn's newfound information on the 
insurgency is a bit questionable.  In Amporn's view, the 
militants are growing "frustrated" and "bored" because their 
operations over the past two years have failed to produce 
results.  Amporn also believes that some militants cloak 
their activities under the cover of pick-up soccer games--the 
insurgents favor a six-man operational unit, and local soccer 
teams have seven players each.  According to Amporn, the 
leaders of the insurgency are Thai-Malay dual nationals who 
use different names on each side of the border so as to elude 
authorities. 
 
¶13. (C) Amporn was blunt in stating that his first priority 
is to improve basic police capabilities.  His forward command 
in Yala is also one of the three police training centers in 
the South and he has pushed to re-train almost 10,000 active 
police in basic skills already.  Amporn and his subordinates 
expressed interest in possible USG training assistance but 
cautioned that any training must be conducted outside of the 
South. 
 
BUT THEY HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) Local police in Thailand have spent decades 
perfecting a public persona that emphasizes their corruption 
and cruelty.  For the Region IX police, this has not helped 
in their efforts to develop informants and win the support of 
the public.  GEN Amporn seems to understand this, to a 
degree.  In a December 2005 meeting with PolOffs, Amporn 
emphasized the need to interrogate suspected separatists and 
capture the leaders of the movement who were 
hiding--according to him--in Malaysia.  In a meeting this 
month (ref B) Amporn instead emphasized the struggle to build 
local support for the police and Army.  "Winning people is 
key to winning the situation."  According to Amporn, his 
units are engaging in civil affairs projects, such as 
painting mosques, and Region IX officials have moved 
"trouble" officers to desk jobs.  Police officials are also 
trying to highlight the role and service of Muslim officers. 
Some ideas don't appear to be as effective in building public 
support, however.  Amporn is excited about the construction 
of a new "visitors' center" for the local jail, so that 
family members and friends of the growing number of arrested 
suspects may visit their loved ones in increased comfort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOYCE