VZCZCXRO7000
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0520/01 1281246
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081246Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5360
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0001
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0018
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0009
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0239
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0224
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0001
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000520 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, EB, INR 
PARAMARIBO FOR DCM MARY BETH LEONARD 
LIBREVILLE FOR GLENN FEDZER 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016 
TAGS: ECON EIND EPET ML PGOV PINS PREL SENV
SUBJECT: PROSPECTORS PREDICT MALIAN OIL BY 2008 
 
BAMAKO 00000520  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Rebecca Jovin, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy 
Bamako, for E.O. 12958, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: One and a half years after oil and gas 
exploration in northern Mali resumed, those searching for 
&black gold8 may be on the brink of success.  To date, the 
Malian government has opened approximately 700,000 square 
kilometers of land to oil prospecting.  Recent estimates by 
Australian-owned Baraka Petroleum, which leads the race for 
Malian oil, suggest that oil may be flowing by the barrel 
from Mali no later than 2008.  For landlocked and 
poverty-stricken Mali, oil reserves could mean a considerable 
economic boost.  With oil prospecting centered on Mali's 
politically fragile northern regions, many see a real 
opportunity for economic diversification, development and 
growth.  At the same time, however, some have serious doubts 
about the economic viability of extracting oil and gas from 
Mali's isolated North and further fear that the discovery of 
oil could upset the already delicate balance between Mali's 
central government and the Tuareg populations of the North. 
End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
A FRESH START FOR MALI'S OIL EXPLORATION EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (U) The Malian government has worked feverishly since 2004 
to revive oil exploration and join the club of West African 
oil producing nations.  The 2004 adoption of a new 
hydrocarbon code, the delineation of some 700,000 sq. 
kilometers of prospecting land throughout northern Mali, and 
the creation of a national oil research and exploration 
authority (AUREP) under the Ministry for Mines, Energy, and 
Water, have greatly accelerated exploration activities. 
Since its inception, AUREP has managed to attract five major 
oil investors, most notably Max de Vietri's Baraka Petroleum 
Limited.  Baraka has production-sharing agreements with the 
Malian government for five of the total 18 designated 
prospecting blocks.  De Vietri, Baraka's CEO and Managing 
Director, has more than 10 years of oil exploration 
experience in West Africa and is already successfully 
extracting oil in Mauritania's offshore area of Chinguetti. 
 
¶3. (U) The exploration blocks set by AUREP are concentrated 
in five major areas, the largest being the Taoudenni Basin, 
which is located north of Timbuktu and covers an area of 
several hundred thousand square kilometers across the 
Mauritanian-Malian border.  Additional blocks are situated in 
the Nara Trough, which extends north to south between 
Timbuktu and Segou; the Gao Graben in central Gao region; and 
the Tamesna and Iullemeden Basins, which together cover the 
eastern part of the Kidal and Gao regions and stretch across 
the Niger-Mali border.  To date, Mali has signed 
production-sharing agreements for 11 of the 18 blocks, with 
two Taoudenni blocks currently under application.  The vacant 
blocks include two additional blocks in the Taoudenni Basin, 
one in the Iullemeden Basin, and two in the Macina Delta at 
the southern-most extension of the Nara Trough. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AUSTRALIAN BARAKA LEADS THE WAY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Leading the race for Malian oil is de Vietri's Baraka 
Petroleum Limited.  The Australian company was the first to 
sign production-sharing agreements with the Malian government 
in the fall of 2004, resurrecting the quest for hydrocarbons 
in Taoudenni after some two decades of neglect.  Of the five 
oil companies currently conducting exploration activities in 
Mali, Baraka Petroleum's subsidiary, Baraka Mali Operations 
Limited, has the largest share of prospecting licenses.  Its 
five blocks (numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9) total 193,200 square 
kilometers of Mali's Taoudenni Basin.  Baraka is also 
conducting oil exploration in two blocks on the Mauritanian 
side of the Taoudenni basin, giving the company exploration 
and development rights over a total of 272,000 square 
kilometers.  During the initial four-year term of Baraka's 
prospecting licenses, the company will invest an estimated 
USD 51.7 million in exploration and drilling activities. 
According to the licenses, which outline the conditions for 
 
BAMAKO 00000520  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
recovery of costs and production-sharing between the Malian 
government and the license holder, a well must be established 
in each block within four years.  Two wells already exist in 
Baraka-owned blocks 2 and 3.  Wells also exist in blocks 14 
and 15 along the Niger border and in block 11 in the Gao 
region. 
 
¶5. (U) In 2005, two other Australian firms, Trans Ocean 
Securities and Sphere Investments, joined the list of oil 
prospectors operating in Mali.  Mali Oil Development, which 
is the majority owned by Trans Ocean Securities, acquired 
block 11 in Gao and intends to spend USD 10.4 million in 
exploration activities over four years.  Mali Petroleum, 95% 
owned by Sphere Investments, acquired exploration rights for 
block 8 in Taoudenni and block 10 in Gao.  Mali Petroleum 
intends to spend USD 24.4 million in research and drilling. 
In late 2005, the South African company Energem acquired 
exploration rights for USD 23.7 million worth of research and 
drilling in blocks 12 and 13 in the Nara Trough south of 
Timbuktu.  Another South African firm, Energetic Petroleum, 
intends to spend USD 12.5 million for exploration in block 14 
in the Tamesna Basin near the border with Niger. 
 
¶6. (U) According to company and press reports, Baraka's 
geological and seismic studies in Taoudenni have yielded 
encouraging results.  These studies mark the first 
comprehensive reviews of the Taoudenni Basin.  Baraka is now 
conducting a USD 3.7 million airborne survey of its blocks 
through the New Zealand-based company Kiwi Air.  The survey 
is currently scheduled for completion in August 2006, 
followed by what will likely be another month of data 
analysis.  Though the research has not yet reached the end 
stage, Baraka is optimistic about the prospects for oil and 
gas discovery in the region.  In a March 2006 report, the 
company announced that it had identified &large hydrocarbon 
prospective trends" in the Basin.  According to Baraka 
officials, the preliminary results suggest similarities 
between Taoudenni's features and those of the Ahnet and 
Illizi Basins in neighboring Algeria.  The Ahnet and Illizi 
Basins currently produce approximately 1.23 million barrels 
of crude oil and 445,000 barrels of condensate per day. 
Baraka has identified a total of 40 oil and gas leads 
requiring further analysis in the surveyed area.  Estimates 
suggest that Mali could be looking at roughly 900 million 
barrels in oil reserves to be extracted over a period of 25 
years from the Taoudenni basin. 
 
¶7. (C) In the race for Malian oil, Baraka maintains a 
considerable lead over its competitors who are all still in 
the early research stages.  In a recent meeting with PolOff, 
AUREP Director Mamadou Simpara expressed dissatisfaction with 
the work of the South African owned Energem group and 
indicated the possible termination of Energem's 
production-sharing agreement.  (COMMENT: Thus far, we have 
received no indication that the Energem licenses have been 
revoked. END COMMENT) Simpara would not comment on Energetic 
Petroleum's performance, stating that it remains too early to 
determine how successful the company will be.  Simpara noted 
the absence of American investors and stressed the need for 
Mali to work with &credible8 oil exploration companies. 
According to Simpara, American-owned Vanco Energy initially 
expressed interest in several exploration blocks but withdrew 
after learning that the blocks had already been acquired by 
other competitors.  Simpara also raised the possibility of 
holding an investors, conference in the United States on 
Mali's oil exploration prospects, though a date for the 
conference has not yet been set. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
MALIAN AND BARAKA OFFICIALS INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶8. (C) While it is still too early to celebrate, the Malian 
government and its oil investors have become increasingly 
public with their confidence in the imminent discovery of 
Malian oil reserves.  At an October 2005 conference to mark 
the signing of the first production-sharing agreement between 
Baraka and the AUREP, conference participants called Mali an 
&opportunity that has only just been discovered by the 
world.8  In late April 2006, Baraka CEO de Vietri met with 
 
BAMAKO 00000520  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Prime Minister Ousmane Issoufi Maiga to discuss progress on 
the oil exploration front.  De Vietri later reiterated his 
confidence in Mali's oil potential on national television. 
Kiwi Air has privately echoed Baraka's conviction in 
discussions with Embassy officials.  Confidence levels at 
Baraka appear so high that de Vietri invited the Malian 
Minister for Mines, Energy, and Water, Ahmed Diane Semega, to 
travel to the North to survey the situation personally. 
According to press reports, the Minster returned from the 
Tamasna and Taoudenni Basins on April 26 with great optimism 
and enthusiasm.  Though no official numbers have been 
released, reports suggest that the Ministry is convinced of a 
considerable presence of oil and gas reserves.  De Vietri has 
repeatedly said that he expects oil to be flowing from fields 
in northern Mali by 2008. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The discovery of oil and gas reserves undoubtedly has 
the potential to transform the Malian economy.  The country 
spends hundreds of millions of dollars on oil imports each 
year, amounting to approximately 20 percent of all imports. 
In meetings with Embassy officials, AUREP Director Simpara 
and government representatives in the North have been quick 
to note the potential benefits of oil exploitation, in 
particular for Mali's poverty-stricken northern population. 
Many northerners see oil discovery not only as a potential 
boost for Mali's national economy, but as a chance to 
generate local employment and infrastructure development. 
 
¶10. (C) However, not everyone is as optimistic.  According to 
a senior official at TOTAL Mali, the economic viability of 
extracting oil and gas from the geographically isolated areas 
of Mali's North is questionable at best.  Many consider 
Mali's investment climate to be inhospitable.  Furthermore, 
at an estimated USD 4 million per kilometer of pipeline, it 
will be difficult for the GOM to attract investors willing to 
absorb the high costs associated with the construction and 
securing of pipelines stretching all the way to the 
Mauritanian or Algerian coasts.  Regional political 
instability and terrorist activities in neighboring countries 
are also significant impediments to extracting and 
transporting oil from what is already one of the most 
inhospitable climates on earth.  There is also the risk that 
a change in government could mean the expropriation, in whole 
or in part, of a company's assets or an entire industry.  Any 
profitable venture therefore hinges heavily on the discovery 
of significant reserves, continued high oil prices, and 
positive investor assessments of the risks associated with 
investment in a historically unstable neighborhood.  Under 
these circumstances, it is plausible that Mali, at the end of 
the day, may end up with merely a comprehensive geological 
study to add to the new AUREP archives rather than the hoped 
for cash cow. 
 
¶11. (C) Having followed the history of oil discoveries in 
Africa, Malians are well aware of the dangers associated with 
oil production.  In the politically fragile regions of 
northern Mali, the discovery of oil has the potential to 
either help resolve long-standing inequalities or further 
exacerbate them.  Due to widespread unemployment, poverty, 
and poor infrastructure, many northerners regard the GOM's 
commitment to the people of northern Mali with skepticism. 
In recent weeks, references to increased &autonomy8 for 
northern Mali have resurfaced.  Most believe that these 
references are likely inspired, at least in part, by the 
increased pace of oil prospecting in the region (septel). 
 
¶12. (C) Oil exploration and the future development of 
northern Mali are inextricably linked.  Absent tangible 
social and economic benefits, few in the North are likely to 
embrace the expanded presence of security forces that would 
invariably accompany the exploitation of reserves from oil 
fields in the north.  Recent posturing regarding greater 
northern autonomy suggests that, even though no oil is 
expected to flow until 2008 at the earliest, the GOM may need 
to begin taking steps now to convince Tuaregs of its 
commitment to northern development and the transparent 
 
BAMAKO 00000520  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
distribution of oil money. 
McCulley