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FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000660 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL PREF PBTS PNAT AJ GG RU MD
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL REP SEMNEBY ON EU SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY 
 
 
Classified By: acting DCM Joan A. Polaschik, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  EUR Senior Advisor Steven Mann met with EU 
Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby 
(Sweden) on April 22.  Semneby provided a readout of his 
recent conversation with Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister 
Azimov, outlined the EU process for committing peacekeepers, 
and advocated close coordination and a strong line on the 
Georgian separatist conflicts.  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING INSIGHTS FROM AZIMOV 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (S) Semneby gave a readout of his April 21 meeting with 
Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, who shared 
several ideas about the composition of a potential 
peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K):  it should not 
include Russians, preferably be UN-led (to ensure an 
Azerbaijani voice), and roughly resemble the provincial 
reconstruction teams crrently active in Afghanistan.  Azimov 
told Semnby he would like to see peacekeepers assist in the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons. 
Conceding that a military force would be required initially, 
Azimov reportedly envisioned a drawdown to a police force as 
N-K evolved into a semi-autonomous region of Azerbaijan with 
self-government capacities similar to those of the 
Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan.  More generally, Azimov 
told Semneby that the G-8 might be a realistic target for 
working out an N-K deal, but he complained that proposed 
working groups on the modalities of a referendum on the final 
status of N-K could not delay progr 
ess on other measures. 
 
------------------------------------ 
N-K PEACEKEEPING: THE EU PERSPECTIVE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) Semneby said he had contacted the chief EU military 
planner the previous week to request a report on peacekeeping 
options by the end of May.  He planned to involve the 
national intelligence services of EU member states in the 
planning phase, as well.  He said he would report to the EU 
on peacekeeping options by the end of May in an effort to 
sensitize member states to the issue and ensure they will be 
able to make a decision when the time comes.  From the 
signing of a peace agreement, Semneby said the EU would 
require six weeks of "pre-planning," an undetermined length 
of time for member states to reach a political decision, and 
two additional months to get boots on the ground.  If an N-K 
peacekeeping force were to be EU-led, Semneby said it would 
be led out of one of the EU's four international command 
centers: in Germany, the UK, France, or Greece. 
 
¶4. (S) Semneby returned to the peacekeeping issue at the end 
of the meeting with a plea for as much detail as possible on 
peacekeeping in any agreement between Presidents Aliyev and 
Kocharian.  He said the EU will require a formal trigger to 
start the planning process and that the two sides will need 
to state exactly what they want.  He asked specifically if a 
law-enforcement component was envisioned.  Mann outlined a 
vision of a 5000-man force for approximately three years that 
would ultimately be drawn down to a monitoring force.  He 
told Semneby that any successful peacekeeping force in N-K 
and the occupied territories would need to be asymmetric 
(i.e. deployed in greater numbers in the most politically 
sensitive areas) and might able to rely on remote sensor 
technologies to enhance monitoring efforts. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
GEORGIAN SEPARATIST CONFLICTS: MORE VISIBILITY NEEDED 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶5. (C) On Georgia, Semneby said he believes Abkhazia is 
closer to annexation than South Ossetia but that both 
conflicts need to be raised "at the highest levels all the 
time."  He plans a trip in the next few weeks to South 
Ossetia with Georgia OSCE Head of Mission Roy Reeve.  Semneby 
is keen on getting international media attention on the 
Georgia conflicts: "people need to see it," he said.  Having 
worked at the OSCE mission in Tbilisi in 1992-93, Semneby 
called it an "outrage" that no progress has been made on the 
conflicts in the last thirteen years.  Tangentially, he 
called for closer coordination with EU Special Representative 
for the Transnistria conflict, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged. 
 
BAKU 00000660  002 OF 002 
 
 
More centrally, he bemoaned the fact that the EU continues to 
have a problem reaching consensus on its Russia policy. 
 
¶6. (C) Semneby said he spoke recently to Georgian President 
Mikheil Saakashvili, who advocated renegotiating the Sochi 
Agreement in order to transform negotiations on South Ossetia 
into "a real dynamic process."  Semneby reportedly argued for 
patience on this point, urging Saakashvili not to act too 
quickly and jeopardize the upcoming South Ossetia donors' 
conference.  Semneby was focused on the benefits of the South 
Ossetia needs assessment survey and impending donors 
conference, arguing that they would ensure an international 
presence in the region and lead to a change in format with 
financial contributors leading the charge to resolve the 
conflict. 
 
¶7. (U) Ambassador Mann has cleared this cable. 
HYLAND