VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #2904/01 1430548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 230548Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5764
INFO RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 1050
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0869
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0709
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5422
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3031
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 7209
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0391
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0547
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 4992
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA//
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE//SA/SACEUR//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002904 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2026 
TAGS: KTIA MOPS EWWT XH ZJ TU
SUBJECT: MONTREUX CONVENTION: MILITARY LIMITS ON THE 
TURKISH STRAITS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1958 
     ¶B. STATE 79658 
 
Classified By: Political Military Counselor Timothy A. Betts for reason 
s 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Montreux Convention (MC) obligates 
Turkey to keep the Dardanelles and the Bosporus open to 
commercial shipping and to limit naval passage into and out 
of the Black Sea.  In addition, non-littoral navies face 
limits on both tonnage and duration of stay in the Black Sea. 
 Civilian owned but military commanded vessels are subject to 
these restrictions as well.  Although the MC limits Turkey's 
ability to control fast-growing commercial traffic through 
the Straits and the environmental hazards this entails for 
the 17 million residents of Istanbul, the historical 
importance of the MC to Turkey, Turkish fears of 
relinquishing a share of control over the Straits, and 
Ankara's desire to maintain naval leadership in the Black Sea 
mean Turkey will not support an effort to renegotiate the 
Convention.  Despite the restrictions, US Navy vessels can 
and do pass through the Straits and call on Black Sea ports. 
Transparency and inclusion of Turkey in US activities in the 
region should build Turkish support for USN, and eve NATO's, 
engagement in the Black Sea.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) The 1936 Montreux Convention transferred to Turkey 
control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus that the 
International Commission had exercised since its creation in 
1923 by an agreement negotiated in conjunction with the 
Treaty of Lausanne.  This, in effect, restored Turkish 
sovereignty over the Straits and completed the creation of 
modern Turkey.  The importance of the MC and the Treaty of 
Lausanne as founding documents of the Republic is taught in 
Turkish elementary schools.  It was not signed by the US, but 
by the UK, Australia, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the USSR and Turkey. 
 
¶3. (U) The MC enshrines the principle of freedom of transit 
through the straits for commercial shipping, limited only for 
reasons of safety of navigation and public health.  Over the 
past decade, Turkey has successfully imposed safety-based 
limits on passage of large tankers, but in so doing faced 
strong opposition and criticism from Russia.  The risks 
presented by tankers are multiplied by an explosion in the 
number of unregulated smaller vessels in the Straits, which 
present risks to other shipping (including large tankers) as 
well as to residents on shore.  As Black Sea and Central 
Asian oil and gas exports grow, the GOT would like to impose 
further limitations on traffic through the Straits in favor 
of "bypass" pipelines, but its legal ability to do so under 
the MC is ambiguous.  Naval vessels, however, are subject to 
several explicit restrictions regarding passage through the 
Straits and presence in the Black Sea: 
 
 
TRANSIT 
 
-- All naval vessels must be notified to the GOT in advance 
(at least eight days in advance for littoral powers; 15 days 
for non-littorals who must also specify destination and the 
date of their planned return passage); 
 
-- All naval vessels must transit the straits during daylight 
hours; 
 
-- Non-littoral countries' submarines may not transit; and, 
 
-- An individual nation's daily passage of "war ships" 
(including auxiliaries except oilers) may not exceed the 
lesser of 15,000 tons or nine vessels, although littoral 
states' ships of greater than 15,000 tons may pass with a 
two-destroyer escort. 
 
 
 
PRESENCE IN THE BLACK SEA 
 
-- The total tonnage of non-littoral naval vessels (except 
oilers) in the Black Sea at any one time is 45,000 tons; 
 
-- The total tonnage that any one non-littoral navy may have 
in the Black Sea at one time is 30,000 tons; and, 
 
-- Non-littoral naval vessels may remain in the Black Sea no 
longer than 21 days and must then transit south through the 
Dardanelles. 
 
 
None of the restrictions apply to foreign naval vessels 
visiting ports in the Straits (e.g., Istanbul) provided they 
leave the way they came, thereby avoiding a complete passage 
through the Straits. 
 
¶4. (C) The MC obliges Turkey to enforce these limits.  During 
the Cold War, the restrictions prevented the Soviet Navy from 
surging into the Mediterranean.  However, they also impact 
the US Navy's operations.  In June, for the USS Apache to 
complete its planned mission of over 21 days, it will need to 
exit the Black Sea, passing through the Dardanelles and then 
go through the Straits again.  Similarly, another USN ship 
recently had its passage through the Straits delayed because 
its presence in the Black Sea would have exceeded the 45,000 
ton aggregate limit on non-littoral naval vessels; it passed 
several days later after a German naval vessel exited the 
Black Sea.  MFA officials are transparent with us when these 
situations arise, and offer workarounds or alternatives 
within the limit of the Convention.  However, the MC requires 
that Turkey notify the other signatories of the movement of 
non-littoral navies through the Straits and into the Black 
Sea.  If it appears that Turkey is breaking the rules, it 
would have to answer to the other signatories; Russia in 
particular uses these notifications to monitor USN traffic. 
 
¶5. (C) Over the past several months we have explored 
informally with MFA whether there is flexibility in the 
application of these limits, particularly concerning civilian 
owned vessels chartered to the USN.  This month we were told 
that GOT legal experts view long-term leased ships under the 
command of the Maritime Sealift Command as auxiliaries under 
the MC and, therefore, subject to restrictions.  However, 
short-term, time-chartered vessels not normally employed on 
fleet duties, hired to move military cargo are not considered 
auxiliaries and are therefore not subject to the tonnage and 
duration of stay restrictions of the MC, even when military 
personnel are on board provided they have no formal authority 
over the ship's master.  This interpretation was how military 
hardware could be shipped through the Straits from Romania to 
Iraq prior to the Iraq War.  Pointing to this precedent, an 
MFA official told us that he was confident a ship hired to 
carry humanitarian relief equipment and supplies next year as 
part of EUCOM's SEA BREEZE 07 exercise would normally be 
approved. 
 
¶6. (C) The Turkish military's extreme sense of sovereignty 
and profession pride forbids foreign forces from exercising 
visible force protection measures, according to our MFA 
contact.  This combination of pride and nationalism 
manifested itself during a March visit to Marmaris of the USS 
Theodore Roosevelt.  When the TR wanted to fly a helicopter 
as it was coming into port as a force protection measure, the 
Turkish General Staff balked; flying it for other purposes 
was less of a problem.  Similarly, although the cargo ships 
carrying war materiel for the Iraq War carried US armed 
forces personnel assigned to protect the cargo, they were 
kept out of sight during the passage through the Straits at 
the GOT's request.  Future passages of like vessels would 
 
have to do the same.  MFA tells us, however, a request for 
Turkish military or coast guard escorts for the passage would 
be granted. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  Although the restrictions on non-littoral 
naval passage through the Turkish Straits and presence in the 
Black Sea constrain possible USN operations in the region, 
the importance of the MC to Turks' definition of their 
country predisposes Ankara to oppose any revision.  Besides 
the emotional reaction and the arguments for changes in the 
Convention that would permit greater regulation of commercial 
traffic, the GOT would fear Russia and/or others would try to 
exert more control over management of the waterway or dilute 
Turkey's authority to regulate traffic.  We defer to Embassy 
Moscow, but imagine Russia would welcome an opportunity to 
wrestle some control over the Straits from our NATO Ally. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment (cont.): Turkish defense and enforcement of 
the Montreux Convention should not be mistaken as GOT 
opposition to US engagement in the Black Sea region.  Turkey 
has welcomed US and NATO involvement in the littorals, 
strongly backing PfP participation and the membership of 
Romania and Bulgaria.  Turkey's concerns about the Black Sea 
are narrowly focused on naval activities.  Turkey sees itself 
as the naval leader in the region and believes NATO 
operations in the Black Sea might provoke the Russians to 
withdraw from Black Sea maritime security cooperation.  It 
therefore takes a cautious view on NATO (and US) naval 
activities in the region.  After discussions here in April 
(ref a) and between Turkish Navy and the Pentagon earlier 
that previewed ref b points on the Black Sea, Ankara now 
appears less concerned by USN and even limited NATO naval 
engagement there, as evidenced by completing TUN-USN 
exercises in the eastern Black Sea earlier this year, 
accepting the visit of the USS Porter to the Black Sea port 
of Samsun last month, and scheduling Turkish Navy 
participation in the Romania-hosted NATO exercise BREEZE next 
month.  Remaining transparent and including Turkey where 
appropriate in our Black Sea activities should further put 
Ankara at ease and build Turkish support for our own 
engagement in the region. End comment. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON