This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 001725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/FO (JGASTRIGHT); SCA/CEN (JMUDGE); DRL/PHD 
(CKUCHTA-HELBLING) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016 
TAGS: POLITICAL
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER'S MEETING WITH GALYMZHAN ZHAKIYANOV, 
OPPOSITION POLITICAL ACTIVIST, MAY 6, 2006 
 
Classified By: DCM Mark Asquino for 1.4 reasons (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On May 6, 2006, Assistant Secretary for 
South and Central Asia Richard  Boucher and NSC Senior 
Director Elisabeth Millard met at the Ambassador's residence 
in Almaty with opposition political activist Galymzhan 
Zhakiyanov.  The meeting followed the government of 
Kazakhstan's refusal to allow Zhakiyanov, who is on parole, 
to travel to Astana for an opposition roundtable with Vice 
President Cheney earlier that day.  Zhakiyanov discussed the 
situation of the opposition. He also spoke about government 
restrictions on freedom of the press in Kazakhstan. 
Zhakiyanov said he saw free broadcast media as essential to 
strengthening civil society and bringing political reform to 
Kazakhstan. Zhakiyanov also said corruption was inhibiting 
Kazakhstan's economic growth.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Meeting Participants:  SCA A/S Richard Boucher, 
NSC Senior Director Elisabeth Millard, U.S. Ambassador John 
Ordway, DCM Mark Asquino (notetaker), Galymzhan Zhakiyanov. 
 
Zhakiyanov: Grounded in Almaty 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Mr. Zhakiyanov, founder of the Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan opposition movement (DVK), who subsequently served 
half of a seven year prison term for alleged corruption, 
thanked A/S Boucher and the NSC's Millard for the Almaty 
meeting.  He said he regretted that "circumstances beyond his 
control" had prevented earlier in the day from traveling to 
Astana to attend an opposition leader roundtable in Astana 
with Vice President Cheney. 
 
¶4. (C) A/S Boucher asked Zhakiyanov why Kazakhstani 
authorities had refused him permission to travel to Astana. 
Zhakiyanov said the reason was clearly a political one.  He 
had made five private trips since his release from prison in 
January.  These included overseas travel; he had recently 
been to the United States where he visited his son who is a 
student at the University of Texas in Austin.  However, on 
April 24 he had been turned away at Almaty International 
Airport when he attempted to board a plane to fly to 
Brussels. He had been invited to meet with European Union 
officials there to discuss the political situation in 
Kazakhstan.  Zhakiyanov  had appealed the Border Guard's 
refusal to let him leave the country on that occasion, but 
the courts had refused to hear his case.  Now, he had been 
denied permission to travel within Kazakhstan itself to share 
his political views with Vice President Cheney. 
 
Court Reverses Parole Conditions 
-------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Zhakiyanov said the Pavlodar court's written order 
releasing him on parole in January stipulated only that he 
"notify" authorities of any intended travel.  However, on 
April 28, the court reconvened at the request of Kazakhstani 
law enforcement officials and claimed there was a 
"typographic error" in the parole document: "notify" should 
have been "seek permission" to travel. Zhakiyanov's lawyers 
had told him said there was no legal precedent for such a 
change. In his view, the court was selectively 
re-interpreting the terms of his parole due to a political 
decision, in an effort to justify retroactively the April 24 
decision not to allow him to travel to Brussels.   He added 
that the government's decision had portrayed Kazakhstan in a 
negative fashion with the international community -- first 
with the European Union and now the U.S. government. 
 
Zhakiyanov Travel Raised with Government of Kazakhstan 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Boucher said that both he and Ambassador Ordway 
had raised the issue of Zhakiyanov's travel with the Minister 
of Internal Affairs prior to the Vice President's arrival. 
The Minister had been unyielding, arguing that the government 
had the right to supervise the travel of its parolees, adding 
that in any case, this was something for the courts to 
decide.  The Ambassador noted that he had spoken about 
allowing Zhakiyanov to attend the opposition-Cheney 
roundtable with Foreign Minister Tokayev, Ambassador 
Saudabayev, Presidential Administration Head Dzhakhsybekov, 
and Presidential Administration advisors Tazhin and 
Utemuratov.  All had been evasive, and none had been 
effective on the issue, although there had been some initial 
signals that the order would be changed. The Ambassador said 
that GOK interlocutors maintained there had been a mistake in 
the original order.  They claimed that Zhakiyanov's legal 
appeal  on the Border Guard's refusal to allow him to travel 
to Brussels had slowed down the process of finding a solution 
to the broader travel issue. 
 
¶7. (C) Zhakiyanov noted that the courts received many appeals 
in cases against opposition leaders.  While he had no 
statistics on the actual number of cases, he said that in the 
past three to four years, the courts had consistently turned 
down the appeals or ruled against the opposition.  This had 
happened in cases involving individuals, political parties 
and independent media.  Members of the opposition had become 
desperate, and often said it was futile to turn to the 
courts.  Zhakiyanov noted, though, that he always replied 
that giving up on the legal system would play into the hands 
of the authorities.  By filing court cases,  opposition 
members were able to make their situation known to the 
public.  He also thought that in the process those within the 
system, including judges and prosecutors, were exposed to the 
Government,s biased legal treatment of the opposition. 
 
Limited Freedom of the Press in Kazakhstan 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to the issue of freedom of the press in 
Kazakhstan, Zhakiyanov noted that there was really no 
independent broadcast media in the country.  There were some 
newspapers and websites that presented opposition views.  The 
Ambassador said that weekly newspaper "Vremya" ("Time") had 
been surprisingly bold in recently running photos of slain 
opposition leader Sarsenbaiuly's relatives and associates 
being beaten by police during a peaceful public observance in 
his memory.  Zhakiyanov replied that Vremya was less 
independent than it had been before its ownership changed 
last Fall.  Its original editorial staff had remained at the 
weekly only on the condition that they be allowed a modicum 
of freedom.  Zhakiyanov thought it was only a matter of time 
before the new, pro-government owners forced the newspaper to 
stop taking such an independent editorial line.  The 
Ambassador allowed that this might very well be the case, but 
nevertheless, Vremya was still one of the country's most 
balanced and objective newspapers. 
 
¶9. (C) A/S Boucher observed that during the roundtable with 
the opposition earlier that day, Vice President Cheney had 
asked participants for their views on political reform. 
Opposition leaders noted that access to the media had not 
been fair during the December Presidential elections. 
Boucher said, however, that during his meeting with Central 
Election Commission (CEC) Chairman Zhumabekov the latter had 
stressed that all parties, including the opposition, had been 
given equal television time during the presidential election 
campaign.  Boucher asked Zhakiyanov if there was a disconnect 
between the opposition's view of media access and what the 
Central Election Commission claimed was equitable treatment. 
 
10 (C) Zhakiyanov said that in fact all presidential 
candidates, including President Nazarbayev, had been allotted 
just 15 minutes of free broadcast media time to address the 
electorate directly.  Coverage of the candidates during news 
programs was also supposed to be balanced.  However, even 
when there was "equal time" allotted, the portrayal of 
President Nazarbayev in news coverage was usually positive 
while time allotted to the opposition candidates portrayed 
them in a selective, negative fashion.  The Ambassador added 
that this had been especially true of the media's coverage of 
President Nazarbayev and his principal opponent, For a Just 
Kazakhstan's Zharmarkhan Tuyakbay. 
 
Who Owns the Media? 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Responding to a question from A/S Boucher, Zhakiyanov 
said that much of the problem of bias against the opposition 
was due to state or pro-government media ownership.  There 
were four national television networks.  "Kazakhstan 1" was 
state-owned and operated.  Private television network 
"Khabar" was widely believed to be controlled by President 
Nazarbayev's daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva.  The third 
network, "KTK" was also private and owned by Dariga's 
husband, Rakhat Aliyev.  Private Channel 31 was rumored to be 
owned by a presidential insider.  The Ambassador noted that 
of the four, Channel 31 had a degree of independence lacking 
with the others. 
 
¶12. (SBU) In Zhakiyanov's view, Ch. 31 was better only to a 
limited degree. He underscored that it too did not allow 
opposition leaders to present their views in its broadcasts. 
In addition to Kazakhstan's four national networks, 
Zhakiyanov noted there were two additional  "Russian" outlets 
(Evrasia and El Arna).  However, they were Russian in name 
only.  Owned by Kazakhstanis, the stations re-broadcast 
Russian media programming including newscasts.  A/S Boucher 
asked if the two Russian stations broadcast any local news. 
Zhakiyanov said their programming carried very little local 
reporting.  On the few occasions when Russian media ran 
negative stories about Kazakhstan, these reports were edited 
out of the newscasts broadcast here.  Ambassador Ordway added 
that a popular Russian interview program had been completely 
pulled from the Russian channels' line-up because it was 
focusing on Kazakhstani subjects. 
 
"Television, television, television." 
--------------------------------------- 
¶13. (C) A/S Boucher then asked Zhakiyanov what he regarded as 
the top three or four things that would most help the country 
achieve political reform. How about changes to the 
government's Democratization Commission or addressing the 
problem of a lack of independent media?  Zhakiyanov said what 
was needed was "television, television, television."  Free 
broadcast media would provide citizens with the information 
they needed to have informed views.  This, in turn, would 
strengthen civil society.  A stronger civil society would 
change the country. 
 
¶14. (C) In addition, Zhakiyanov said that limiting 
presidential power and allowing for the direct election of 
local governors were also important.  Changes in the 
composition of the Central Election Commission were also 
needed.  However, such steps were not enough to bring about 
real reform because the problem was one of changing the 
Kazakhstanis' mentality. A/S Boucher asked if the mentality 
was "Soviet" and if so, was it shared by the country's youth? 
 Zhakiyanov said that the older generation was certainly 
guided by Soviet thinking. There was hope for the younger 
generations, but 20 years was too long to wait for 
generational change.  He noted that Ukraine was a country 
that had been much like Kazakhstan, but open access to 
information had transformed how the Ukranians viewed 
government.  The latter was the key to success rather than 
economic development.  Better to be poor and free than rich 
and autocratic.  A/S Boucher added that the best of all 
worlds was "rich and free." 
 
Democracy and Economic Growth 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) A/S Boucher said during his Astana visit, Vice 
President Cheney had stressed the link between democracy and 
economic progress. While large oil companies might not be 
affected by a lack of democracy, the rest of the economy 
would.  Freedom and a fair judicial system were essential for 
small and medium business to prosper and develop the sort of 
creativity needed for economic diversity. 
 
¶16. (C) Zhakiyanov said that even oil sector investors 
companies were being negatively affected by business 
conditions in Kazakhstan.  Large oil companies were 
successful here due to preferential government treatment 
rather than fair competition.  This in turn discouraged 
medium-size U.S. oil companies from investing in Kazakhstan. 
 At the same time, propped up by oil revenues, Kazakhstan's 
government was not doing enough to encourage investment in 
other economic sectors.  The government performed poorly in 
its collection of taxes.  Kazakhstan's Gross Domestic Product 
was three or four times greater than the government's tax 
collection.  Official corruption was rampant.  Due to the 
latter, businessmen saw that it was more beneficial to bribe 
officials than allow for honest inspections and audits. 
There was no value in being an honest businessman in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
¶17. (C) A/S Boucher and the Ambassador replied that U.S. 
investors were prohibited by U.S. law from offering bribes. 
Those who broke the law went to jail.  Zhakiyanov said that 
he was aware of this.  When he had been regional governor of 
Pavlodar he had worked closely with American energy 
distribution company AES, which he regarded as an excellent 
investor.  However, he said that AES's refusal to pay bribes 
to government officials had created major problems for the 
company's business operations.  The Ambassador agreed, but 
noted that AES had persevered in doing business in Kazakhstan 
despite these problems.  Its operations were now on a solid 
footing.  President Nazarbayev had recently spoken positively 
about the company.  The Ambassador added that AES was 
actively involved in working to provide electric power lines 
to China, a project that Zhakiyanov had advocated as governor. 
 
Kazakhstan and Singapore 
------------------------ 
 
¶18. (C) A/S Boucher noted that Singapore's former president 
Lee Kwan Yew had built his country through clean government 
and strong organizational skills.  Although Kazakhstan and 
Singapore were certainly different from each other, it was 
odd that neither Lee nor Nazarbayev was willing to complete 
in a fair election despite their great popularity.  Clearly, 
both were strong enough to be fairly elected.   Why then was 
it that Nazarbayev, like Lee, preferred to govern through a 
controlled system rather than one in which he could be fairly 
elected? 
 
¶19. (C) Zhakiyanov said he had often asked himself the same 
question.  At one time he had been very close to President 
Nazarbayev, and their wives had been good friends.   What 
Zhakiyanov had concluded was that Nazarbayev had no 
experience with democracy, and that he did not want to live 
in such a system.   The only model for a political party 
model that he understood was based on the Communist party. 
In addition, this was a very difficult time for Nazarbayev. 
There had been public charges that members of his family had 
been involved in political opposition leader Altynbek 
Sarsenbaiuly's murder.  He was engaged in an open, political 
dispute with his daughter Dariga, whom he feared as a 
competitor.  If there had been a time when Nazarbayev might 
have turned toward democracy, that moment had passed. 
 
Kazakhstan's Political Future 
------------------------------ 
¶20. (C) A/S Boucher asked if Kazakhstan was following 
Russia's political lead.  Zhakiyanov said he didn't think so. 
 Russia had long existed as an independent state whereas 
Kazakhstan had not been one until 1991.  At first Kazakhstan 
was euphoric about its independence.  Nazarbayev followed 
Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's lead, because he saw them as more 
experienced leaders who were role models.  However, their 
mistakes had led Nazarbayev to move in a different direction. 
 Kazakhstan's economic success under Nazarbayev's leadership 
had resulted in his viewing himself as something of a role 
model for Putin, who was the younger and less experienced of 
the two.  Zhakiyanov thought that Russia in turn had followed 
Kazakhstan's lead in passing laws on parliament, NGOs, 
foreign investment and the media. 
 
¶21. (C) However, Zhakiyanov added that Kazakhstan's stability 
had been achieved at the price of the freedom of its people. 
In contrast, Ukraine's people and society had been ready to 
oppose authoritarianism and assume power.  Kyrgyzstan, 
though, had shown that its people and society were not ready 
to do this.  For this reason, Zhakiyanov thought that it was 
essential to prepare now for the post-Nazarbayev period.  He 
concluded that the only way to build civil society here was 
providing citizens with unfettered information.  If this 
happened, the people of Kazakhstan, like those in Ukraine, 
would be prepared to make independent decisions about their 
future. 
 
¶22. (U) A/S Boucher concluded the meeting by saying that he 
would convey Zhakyianov's regards and a summary of their 
meeting to the Vice President. 
 
¶23. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Boucher. 
 
 
 
ORDWAY