VZCZCXRO8705
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1284/01 1291739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091739Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0440
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001284 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: DSRSG ENNIFAR DISCUSSES UNMEE DOWNSIZING, 
ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN VIEWS OF DEMARCATION 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 419 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON.  REASON: 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  UNMEE's outgoing Force Commander now opposes 
downsizing the UNMEE to an observer mission with half its 
current force strength, reflecting either pessimism that 
Ethiopia and Eritrea will proceed with demarcation, or a 
desire to preserve the large presence of Indian troops who 
now comprise one-third of the mission's military personnel. 
UNMEE DSRSG Ennifar underscores that the composition and 
quality of troops is more significant than their number, 
citing UNMEE's lost of intelligence capacity following 
Eritrea's expulsion of U.S. and European MILOBs.  Ennifar 
reviewed recent meetings between UNMEE SRSG Legwaila and both 
President Isaias and Prime Minister Meles:  Isaias remains 
concerned about the specific role Gen. Fulford would play, 
while Meles continues to refer to Ethiopia's five-point peace 
plan.  DAS Yamamoto highlighted the critical need for 
normalization talks, and for parties to send political, 
rather than technical, representatives to the next EEBC 
meeting in April.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
OUTGOING FORCE COMMANDER FORSEES NEED TO REOPEN BORDER POSTS 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In March 30 and April 1 meetings with visiting AF DAS 
Amb. Donald Yamamoto, AF/E desk officer William Schofield, 
Charge, and poloff, United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (UNMEE) Deputy Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General (DSRSG) Amb. Azouz Ennifar reported that 
 
SIPDIS 
outgoing UNMEE Force Commander Major-General Rajender Singh 
had "changed his mind" and now no longer favored downsizing 
UNMEE to an observer mission of approximately 1,500 military 
personnel (i.e., option 3A outlined in UN SYG report 
S-2006-1).  According to Ennifar, MG Singh now asserted that 
cutting UNMEE's actual force strength by nearly one-half 
would not be feasible, as it would not allow UNMEE to monitor 
the Ethiopia-Eritrea border adequately or to support 
demarcation.  Ennifar explained that MG Singh sought 
additional UNMEE troops to ensure that no Eritrean troops 
violated the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ):  Eritrea 
continued to impose daily restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of 
movement within the TSZ, and UNMEE was only able to monitor 
"5 per cent" of the eastern part of the border, Ennifar said. 
 UNMEE could fulfill its mandate only if such restrictions 
were lifted, he said. 
 
¶3. (C) Ennifar explained that Singh sought to reopen many 
outposts previously closed by UNMEE (18 sites were closed in 
the TSZ following Eritrea's restriction on helicopter flights 
in October 2005).  In contrast, Ennifar said, UNMEE's chief 
administrative officer (a former Russian military veteran) 
believed that reopening such a large number of posts would be 
unnecessary, due to the goodwill that would exist were the 
parties to agree to demarcation.  Ennifar commented that MG 
Singh may have changed his position to protect the well-being 
of Indian troops.  Ennifar added that the new Force 
Commander, a Jordanian, may feel differently about downsizing 
UNMEE.  (NOTE: Contingents from India and Jordan each 
comprise nearly one-third of UNMEE's approximately 3,000 
total military personnel.  END NOTE.)  The Ethiopian military 
was "pro-UNMEE," Ennifar added, while Ethiopia's civilian 
leadership was less supportive of UNMEE's role. 
 
¶4. (C) DAS Yamamoto observed that the United States favored 
downsizing UNMEE to an observer mission of 1,500, but would 
likely defer a decision until mid-May.  Were the UNSC to 
endorse this option, downsizing would require approximately 
3-4 months, Ennifar said, in order to identify which troops 
would be cut.  A force structure of 1,500 military personnel 
would be comprised of 600-700 infantry, 300 military 
observers (MILOBs), demining, and medical personnel, he said. 
 Ennifar underscored that quality, not quantity, of troops 
mattered most, noting that UNMEE "lost its intelligence 
capacity" following Eritrea's December 2005 expulsion of 
U.S., European, and Russian staff, due to the departure of 
U.S. and European MILOBs. 
 
------------------------------- 
ERITREAN AND ETHIOPIAN CONCERNS 
------------------------------- 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001284  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Both Ethiopia and Eritrea understood the U.S. 
initiative represented a "last opportunity," Ennifar said, 
adding that neither the AU, UN, or Algeria could be expected 
to reprise the active role they previously played when 
Witnesses to the 2000 Algiers Accords.  Ennifar recommended 
waiting until after the April EEBC meeting to determine 
whether a visit by the EEBC commissioners to the region would 
be helpful, noting that Ethiopia considered EEBC chairman 
Lauterpacht "pro-Eritrean." 
 
¶6. (C) Amb. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, who would depart April 
30 after five years as UNMEE SRSG, had paid a farewell call 
on Eritrean President Isaias on March 31, their first meeting 
in nearly three years,  Ennifar said.  According to Ennifar, 
Legwaila reported that the meeting was very positive: Isaias 
had "absolved" the UN, including UNMEE and UN SYG Annan, of 
any wrongdoing, but was "upset" at the United States.  While 
reportedly "happy" with the Secretary's letter sent to him 
immediately before the March 10 meeting of the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), Isaias had 
sought further information on the EEBC's terms of reference 
for General Carlton Fulford, comparing Fulford unfavorably 
with former UN special envoy Lloyd Axworthy.  Isaias also 
indicated that Eritrea would lift restrictions on UNMEE's 
freedom of movement only if it were clear that demarcation 
would occur, Ennifar said.  Ennifar added that Isaias, who 
has been in Massawa since January, had also met with 
Norwegian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Raymond 
Johansen (previously Norway's charge d'affaires in Asmara) 
and with a Chinese business delegation. 
 
¶7. (C) Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin and Minister 
of State Tekeda Alemu were "very hard-line" on the border 
issue, and less open than Prime Minister Meles, Ennifar said. 
 Seyoum needed to be convinced that Ethiopia would not be 
pushed to accept a decision.  Ennifar noted that Meles had 
referred to Ethiopia's five-point peace plan in his March 28 
address to Parliament, prompting opposition MPs to assert 
they accepted the EEBC decision.  (NOTE: Full text of Meles' 
address was forwarded March 28 to AF/E.  END NOTE.)  Ennifar 
observed that an internal survey conducted by UNMEE had 
concluded that fewer Eritreans would be effected by 
demarcation than Ethiopians.  The port of Assab "was made for 
Ethiopia by Ethiopians" and could not be used effectively by 
Eritrea; the Netherlands was ready to assist in Assab's 
revitalization, Ennifar said.  He noted that Ethiopia had not 
yet identified liaison officers to work with the EEBC, nor 
submitted a security plan for demarcators, although Eritrea 
had already done so two year ago. 
 
¶8. (C) DAS Yamamoto observed that in a three-hour meeting 
with the USG delegation, Meles had displayed detailed 
knowledge of the border and geographic reference points. 
While the EEBC could not change the line of delimitation, the 
parties could address its impact, Yamamoto said, noting that 
an additional 50,000 residents could be potentially 
displaced.  The United States had declared in 1999 that the 
parties much address land and water rights, he added  The 
property rights of some 80,000 Eritreans expelled from 
Ethiopia had not yet been addressed.  The next EEBC meeting 
needed to address political, not merely technical issues, 
Yamamoto said; attendance by only legal representatives was 
not enough.  Sanctions, for failure to observe UNSCR 1640, 
could not be ruled out.  The United States would call another 
meeting of the Witnesses to the 2000 Algiers Accords, or help 
issue a Witnesses' statement addressing normalization talks, 
he said.  To avoid having the beginning of demarcation "plant 
the seeds of war," both parties needed to discuss the root 
causes of war and commit firmly to confidence-building 
measures.  Isaias had agreed to normalization talks two years 
ago but had since recanted; it was unclear what his current 
position was. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
SURVEYS, DEMINING, MUST PRECEDE DEMARCATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Ennifar noted that if political will exists to proceed 
with demarcation, it would not be completed for at least 
another year.  He said that according to recent consultations 
with UNMEE's Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC), a 
minimum of three to six months would be needed prior to 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001284  003 OF 003 
 
 
demarcation in order to conduct surveys; demarcation itself 
(to include necessary removal of landmines from pillar sites 
and access roads, and then planting pillars) would require an 
additional nine to twelve months.  AF/E Schofield observed 
that an assessment/field survey for the east had been 
conducted, but not for either the central or western portions 
of the border.  Ethiopia wanted to begin demarcation in the 
east; Eritrea did not, he added.  AF/E Schofield agreed that 
a security plan was needed, even for the east; evacuation in 
extremis was a possible contingency, he added.  DAS Yamamoto 
observed that once the east was demarcated, Eritrean troops 
in the TSZ needed to be disarmed and repatriated, not move to 
the central sector.  Charge Huddleston highlighted the need 
to sensitize and involve village elders, to enable 
demarcation. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: With the imminent departure of SRSG 
Legwaila, DSRSG Ennifar will become acting head of the UN 
mission until Legwaila's successor arrives.  SRSG Legwaila 
has previously asserted, on several separate occasions, that 
a downsized UNMEE observer mission would be not only viable 
but also capable of supporting demarcation, so long as 
Eritrea removed its restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of 
movement within the TSZ, including allowing the use of 
helicopter assets.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11. (U) DAS Yamamoto cleared this cable. 
HUDDLESTON