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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000483 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: THE FPI AFTER SIX YEARS IN POWER 
 
 
Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  President Gbagbo,s ruling FPI party is 
feeling defensive, with little to show after almost six years 
in power.  The party came into office in the flawed 2000 
elections with a sweeping agenda of socialist reform.  It has 
achieved few of them while failing to address the fundamental 
issues at the core of the Ivoirian crisis, including national 
identity, land ownership, and corruption and economic reform. 
 Instead, it has focused on maintaining power through 
intimidation and control of state institutions, promoting an 
ethnocentric, xenophobic ideology.  Party leaders have also 
used dubious legal arguments and feigned differences with 
President Gbagbo to allow the latter to plead innocence while 
the former undermine peace agreements Gbagbo has signed.  The 
current political crisis serves as an all-purpose pretext for 
poor governance and corruption.  The FPI remains the leading 
political force in Cote d'Ivoire by virtue of controlling the 
Presidency and the legislature but the FPI leadership is well 
aware that fair and free elections will change that 
equation,. at least as far as the legislature is concerned. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) After nearly six years in power, President Gbagbo,s 
Ivoirian People,s Front (FPI) finds itself on the defensive 
for primarily two reasons.  First, despite coming to power on 
an ambitious socialist agenda for reform, the FPI has 
accomplished very little during its time at the helm.  FPI 
stalwarts often try to hide behind the 2002 failed coup and 
subsequent division of the country as an excuse for their 
inaction.  In fact, however, Gbagbo and his party had almost 
two full years in which to launch initiatives to begin to 
address the thorniest issues fueling the current Ivoirian 
crisis:  voter registration, national identity, the concept 
of Ivoirite, land ownership, and corruption and economic 
reform.  The regime did little on the first four.  On the 
fifth, it did change the structures governing the production 
and sale of cocoa but this can hardly be termed as &reform8 
as the changes did nothing to increase transparency or reduce 
corruption or the exploitation of cocoa farmers by those in 
power.  The FPI has simply failed to follow any policy agenda 
beyond seeking to remain in power and continuing to skim 
money from state coffers.  At the same time, it has promoted 
an ethnocentric and xenophobic ideology. 
 
¶3.  (C) The second reason for the FPI,s defensiveness is its 
own perceived lack of legitimacy as a result of the flawed 
presidential and parliamentary elections of 2000.  The former 
disqualified Gbagbo,s two principal opposition rivals, 
former president Henri Bedie of the PDCI party, and RDR 
leader and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara.  As a 
result, voter participation was only a low 37.4 pct.  Gbagbo 
won 59.4 pct of these votes, meaning he received the support 
of only 22.2 pct of eligible voters, hardly a ringing 
endorsement.   After Ouattara was barred from running for 
president, the RDR foolishly boycotted the parliamentary 
elections, handing the FPI an effective majority in the 
National Assembly.  Since these unusual circumstances are 
unlikely to be repeated, the FPI leadership is rightly 
doubtful that it could defeat a united opposition in a free 
and fair election, thus losing control of the National 
Assembly. 
 
¶4.  (C) As a result of these concerns, the FPI is intent on 
maintaining control of the electoral process so that it can 
manipulate it to its advantage.  The other lever that the FPI 
relies on to maintain power is use of militias and street 
thugs to intimidate the opposition.  In fact, since the March 
2004 violence against opposition supporters, the opposition 
has withdrawn and Gbagbo,s thugs have been able to assert 
control over the streets whenever they are called upon to do 
so.  Relying on militias rather than legitimate security 
forces typifies the FPI,s continuing oppositionist mindset. 
After all those years of opposing Houphouet and then Bedie 
and Guei, Gbagbo and his cohorts have never made the 
transition to thinking like a ruling party using the 
legitimate tools of the state. 
 
¶5.  (C) The FPI also finds it useful to maintain a false 
distinction between the party,s views and those of President 
Gbagbo.  Party leaders like to aver that they have been 
excluded from peace negotiations and that they are not bound 
by agreements which they did not sign or commit to.  First 
Lady and FPI leader Simone Gbagbo, in particular, is known 
for her inflammatory statements.  For instance she has stated 
that the emergency decree allowing Ouattara to run for 
president would have applied only if the election had been 
held in 2005 and would no longer be valid in the future. 
Madame Gbagbo was also quoted as saying last month that those 
who insist on simultaneity of identification (a key rebel 
demand) with disarmament (a sine qua non for the FPI, at 
 
ABIDJAN 00000483  002 OF 002 
 
 
least as far as the rebels are concerned) are dreaming. 
Madame Gbagbo insists that disarmament happen first and she 
has been critical of the International Working Group. 
 
¶6.  (C) This false dichotomy allows President Gbagbo the 
excuse of insisting that he cannot compel his party to go 
along with him.  It is a tactic that fools no one, 
particularly since he too has on occasion made similar 
statements, e.g., when he insisted that disarmament begin 
before identification.  More recently, Gbagbo asserted in a 
speech to a traditional king and his followers that, as with 
chiefs and kings, ¬ just anyone can become president.8 
Gbagbo added that Houphouet had named Ouattara prime minister 
precisely because the latter could never become president 
just as a chief does not name as his closest advisers those 
who are eligible to succeed him. 
 
¶7.  (C) The FPI also likes to rely on narrow, and highly 
dubious, legalistic interpretations to advance its positions 
and attempt to preserve its control over the electoral 
process and key institutions.  In this it is helped by its 
control over the Supreme Court.  For example, the Court, 
ruled in favor of the FPI in overturning the initial election 
of the Board of the Independent Electoral Commission before 
the Ivoirian parties finally reached a compromise decision on 
the Board,s composition. 
 
¶8.  (C) Given its doubts about its capacity to win a free and 
fair election, the FPI will continue to try to manipulate the 
system to stay in power.  However, this is becoming more 
difficult with greater intervention by outside powers and a 
stronger mandate for Prime Minister Banny.  Failing this, 
calling on the militias or finding ways to postpone the 
electoral process while trying to assign the blame the rebels 
or the unarmed opposition, will be the preferred tactics.  In 
a sense, the September 2004 coup attempt and ensuing division 
of the country has served the FPI well,  both in terms of 
allowing it to exploit nationalist sentiment against the 
French and as a justification for poor governance and 
corruption.  In fact, judging from its first two years in 
office, the FPI would likely have governed just as badly and 
with as little transparency had there been no coup and the 
country remained united. 
Hooks