VZCZCXRO2619
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0461/01 1011259
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111259Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5981
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0067

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/ES-S, EUR/SCE - ENGLISH, BELL 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP - JOSEPH WOOD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KAWC SIPDIS HR
SUBJECT: VPOTUS SCENESETTER: PUSHING CROATIA'S INTEGRATION 
AGENDA 
 
ZAGREB 00000461  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Vice President Cheney will visit 
Croatia at a time of political optimism following the opening 
of accession negotiations with the European Union in October 
2005, the arrest of war crimes suspect Ante Gotovina in 
December 2005, and the prospect of NATO membership growing 
ever larger on the horizon.  The right-of-center government 
of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader is aggressively promoting its 
international credibility, serving as a leader in fostering 
regional stability and actively lobbying within the European 
People's Party to generate political support for Croatia's 
Euro-Atlantic integration.  VP Cheney's meetings with PM 
Sanader and President Stjepan Mesic will provide a unique 
opportunity to acknowledge the government's political courage 
in contributing to the arrest of Gotovina, encourage 
Croatia's continued reforms in preparing for NATO membership, 
and push for further action on an Article 98 agreement.  A 
separate meeting with Adriatic Three (A-3) prime ministers 
will serve as a useful forum to support continued regional 
cooperation on the road to NATO membership.  END SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT. 
 
COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL STABILITY 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (U) PM Sanader and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
were elected in 2003 on a platform promising to bring Croatia 
into the EU and NATO.  The HDZ has proven it is no longer cut 
from the same cloth as the nationalist HDZ of late president 
Franjo Tudjman.  Not only did PM Sanader enter into coalition 
with the leading ethnic Serb and Muslim parties and begin 
serious implementation of programs to promote refugee 
returns, he has also made great strides in normalizing 
relations with Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, including high-level visits, visa-free travel, 
and free trade agreements. 
 
¶3. (C) The opening of EU accession negotiations last fall was 
a major victory both internationally and domestically for the 
Sanader government.  Croatia cleared a further political 
hurdle with the arrest of Ante Gotovina, a former Croatian 
general under indictment by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on charges of war 
crimes committed in the aftermath of the 1995 liberation of 
territory occupied by rebel Serbs.  The Gotovina arrest, 
applauded by the U.S. and the international community, was 
not popular domestically, as many Croats consider Gotovina a 
hero of their fight for independence.  At significant 
political cost, the Sanader government provided critical 
intelligence that led to Gotovina's arrest in Spain, then 
worked to keep the few post-arrest protests focused on 
"support for Gotovina" rather than opposition to the 
international community or the ICTY. 
 
¶4. (U) Demonstrating its credibility as an international 
partner, Croatia has gone from a recipient of UN peacekeeping 
assistance less than ten years ago to a contributor of 31 
troops to ten UN peace support operations (including command 
of UN forces in Kashmir) and more than 50 troops to NATO's 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. 
 
¶5. (U) OBJECTIVE: Thank Croatian leaders for their regional 
leadership, relatively significant contribution to 
international peace missions, and political courage in 
bringing Gotovina to justice. 
 
NATO: JUMPING TO JOIN, BUT ARE THEY READY? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (U) PM Sanader is pushing for a NATO membership invitation 
at the earliest opportunity, but while there is consensus 
among the political elite that Croatia belongs in the 
alliance, the government admits it must do more to educate a 
general public that is split roughly down the middle over the 
issue.  While the PM's people have a public relations program 
in the works, we have reminded them that Croatia needs to 
generate support not just for joining NATO but also for 
continuing to meet its alliance obligations throughout its 
membership. 
 
¶7. (U) Croatia's ambitious military reform program is 
designed to make the armed forces "NATO-ready" by 2007, a 
difficult task under the best circumstances thanks to a 
defense budget burdened by excess personnel and obligatory 
pension payments to war veterans.  The government has minimal 
resources for much-needed equipment procurement.  We support 
 
ZAGREB 00000461  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
Croatia's NATO ambitions, but have been very clear in our 
message that defense reform is an essential pre-condition for 
Croatia to demonstrate that it will become a net contributor 
to security through NATO operations. 
 
¶8. (U) Croatia has tried to play a leadership role in the 
A-3, hosting numerous summits and multilateral exercises.  In 
late April, MFA Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic will host a meeting 
of foreign ministers from the A-3 and the Baltic states (B-3) 
to share NATO accession advice and experience. 
 
¶9. (U) OBJECTIVE: Encourage Croatia to build public support 
for NATO membership and continue necessary defense reforms 
while working closely with its A-3 partners. 
 
ARTICLE 98: ROOM TO MANEUVER DESPITE PRESIDENT, EU? 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10. (C) Despite promises when he first took office, PM 
Sanader has been unable to deliver an Article 98 agreement, 
due primarily to EU pressure and domestic political 
opposition based on inaccurate comparisons between the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICTY.  As 
explained by President Mesic, the most outspoken opponent of 
an Article 98 agreement, it is difficult to justify to the 
public a pact not to turn U.S. citizens over to the ICC when 
the U.S. expects Croatians to turn their wartime leaders over 
to the ICTY. 
 
¶11. (C) Much to our frustration, Article 98 provides a clear 
picture of the political differences between PM Sanader on 
the right and President Mesic on the left.  In contrast to 
Sanader's unwavering focus on bringing Croatia into the EU 
and NATO, Mesic's unique brand of populism harkens back to 
the non-aligned movement of Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, 
focusing his foreign policy efforts on places like Libya, 
Syria, and Iran.  Despite limited constitutional powers, 
President Mesic serves as the moral tiller of the nation, 
often setting the political agenda for the general public. 
With PM Sanader's enthusiasm somewhat dampened by EU 
overtures against action under Article 98, President Mesic's 
support has become critical to a future agreement. 
 
¶12. (C) With Gotovina's arrest, however, we have reason to 
believe movement is possible on this issue.  Recently, a 
number of prominent Croatian politicians, including some 
members of PM Sanader's HDZ, have begun promoting the signing 
of an Article 98 agreement as a way to improve relations with 
the U.S.  Public reaction to these comments has remained 
muted.  President Mesic sent somewhat mixed messages in 
separate March meetings with U.S. Ambassador to NATO Victoria 
Nuland and Senator George Voinovich.  After telling 
Ambassador Nuland that Gotovina's arrest opened up room for 
"preparatory work" on the issue, he flatly told Senator 
Voinovich that Croatia could not consider an Article 98 
agreement until the ICTY completes its work in 2010. 
 
¶13. (U) OBJECTIVE: Reinforce the importance the USG attaches 
to an Article 98 agreement and push leaders to reopen the 
issue in light of the Gotovina arrest. 
FRANK