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Viewing cable 06VIENTIANE386, DAS ERIC JOHN VISIT: PREDICTABLY, LAO MFA DENIES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06VIENTIANE386 2006-04-27 10:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Vientiane
VZCZCXRO6406
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0386/01 1171003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271003Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9843
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6520
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2629
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2089
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1748
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0858
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0652
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0174
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0347
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0536
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0078
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL TH LA
SUBJECT: DAS ERIC JOHN VISIT: PREDICTABLY, LAO MFA DENIES 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS 
 
REF: A. VIENTIANE 321 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. VIENTIANE 360 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (C) During his April 25-26 visit to Vientiane for 
ASEAN-related meetings, DAS Eric John met with Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad, who 
categorically denied Laos faced any human rights problems in 
the areas of religious freedom or treatment of the ethnic 
Hmong minority. Somsavat said the Lao had "heard about" 
Thailand's expulsion of 27 Hmong people to Laos, but the Thai 
government had still not handed over information Laos needed 
to complete its search for the missing group. DAS John also 
met with the UNDP ResRep, Australian and French Ambassadors, 
and EU and Swedish Charges, who generally agreed that, for 
the moment, the diplomatic dance between Laos and Thailand 
over the 27 Hmong should be given time to play out. 
Unfortunately, many in this group wish to give the Lao the 
benefit of the doubt on human rights problems rather than 
holding the GoL accountable for its actions.  We are much 
less inclined to see the silver lining, but we do support an 
expanded dialogue with the Lao as the best way to make 
progress on issues of interest to us. End summary. 
 
Somsavat meeting 
---------------- 
2. (C) DAS John used his visit to Vientiane for the 
ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Cooperation meetings to meet with FM 
Somsavat and with members of the international community to 
discuss the Lao human rights picture. Accompanied by 
Ambassador, he met with FM Somsavat Lengsavad April 26 and 
raised several key human rights concerns that have plagued 
the relationship. 
 
3. (C) DAS John told the FM that the two countries shared 
many interests, especially in the economic field, and worked 
closely in a number of areas of mutual interest, such as 
finding the remains of Americans lost in the Vietnam War and 
fighting narcotics.  Moreover, Laos and the U.S. now had a 
Bilateral Trade Agreement and Normal Trade Relations which 
over time could stimulate investment and trade, as had 
happened between the U.S. and Vietnam. As in any 
relationship, however, there were issues of concern.  Most 
prominent was the fate of 27 Hmong people, 26 of whom were 
minors, deported from Thailand to Laos last December and now 
being detained, incommunicado, by Lao authorities (ref A). 
The international community's interest in this case wasn't to 
embarrass the Lao government, but to see the children 
reunited with their families. By the same token there were 
many people in the U.S. concerned about the plight of Laos' 
"remote people," ethnic Hmong living deep in the forests who 
according to some reports were under intense attack by Lao 
military forces. 
 
4. (C) Somsavat broke in to say it was important in any 
relationship to resolve problems through quiet discussion 
rather than public blame.  For example, Laos respected 
religious freedom but Christians who broke the law and who 
were arrested often claimed their arrest was for their 
religious beliefs, inciting outsiders to unfairly criticize 
Laos.  He also claimed churches sometimes inflamed local 
communities by saying other religious beliefs, like Buddhism, 
were "wrong."  From religious freedom, Somsavat moved on to 
the Hmong, uncharacteristically referring to that ethnic 
group by name.  He stated categorically that all reports of 
the Lao government mistreating the Hmong were "lies" 
concocted by Vang Pao, and should not be believed.  He told 
DAS John said Laos' Hmong were thriving under the GoL's 
leadership. 
 
5. (C) Somsavat then addressed the 27 missing Hmong. He told 
DAS John that the week before, the Thai Ambassador had seen 
the Deputy FM and had informed the GoL that Thailand had 
indeed expelled the children to Laos last December. 
Unfortunately, the Thai Ambassador had not provided details 
of the time and place of the expulsion, with the result the 
 
VIENTIANE 00000386  002 OF 003 
 
 
Lao were unable to complete their "search" for the children. 
Since Lao people were free and could move about the country 
at will, the children could be anywhere. The government would 
continue to look for them, but would need more information 
from the Thai before it could proceed in earnest. However, he 
added, if his government could not find the children, 
Thailand rather than Laos should be blamed for their 
disappearance. 
 
Meeting with Embassies and UN 
----------------------------- 
6. (C) In addition to his meeting with the FM, DAS John met 
with the UNDP Resrep and several diplomats who closely follow 
Lao human rights. UNDP ResRep Finn Reske-Nielsen described 
the previous day's meeting of UN agencies and interested 
embassies on the children, telling DAS John the group had 
agreed that there appeared to be ongoing discussions between 
the Lao and the Thai on the return of the children and this 
process should be given time to work itself out. There would 
be other occasions to raise the issue with the Lao over the 
next few weeks, such as the FM's upcoming visit to Sweden and 
the EU Ambassador's scheduled visit to Vientiane in early 
May. These meetings would serve to remind the GoL that the 
issue would not disappear.  Reske-Nielsen said that if after 
several weeks there had been no movement on the children, the 
"like minded group" had agreed it would be time to take more 
forceful measures, such as a joint demarche to the GoL. 
Resek-Nielsen also said that he had been instructed by the 
Political Directorate at the UN to raise with the Lao recent 
reports of killings of Hmong civilians by Lao security forces 
(ref B). 
 
7. (C) In a separate meeting organized by the Ambassador, DAS 
John heard from the French and Australian Ambassadors and 
Swedish and EU Charges on the human rights situation in Laos. 
 The four painted a generally positive picture of Lao human 
rights, saying they believed there had been some improvements 
 in recent years.  They felt the Lao could not be pushed on 
human rights, but rather had to be encouraged through quiet 
dialogue and diplomacy.  However, all four acknowledged that 
this tactic had so far produced meager results and it 
remained difficult to have any sort of dialogue with the 
government on sensitive human rights topics.  The EU and 
Sweden had both established human rights dialogues with the 
GoL, and the Australians would follow suit later this year. 
These dialogues were a potentially helpful mechanism for 
addressing human rights concerns. 
 
8. (C) The group thought that the Lao wanted better relations 
with the U.S.  The French Ambassador pointed out that younger 
Lao leaders had a more nuanced understanding of foreign 
policy than the old generation and sought balance in Laos' 
foreign relations.  To the younger generation, the U.S. was a 
welcome counterweight to offset Laos' atavistic fears of 
Chinese and Vietnamese hegemony. Turning to the Hmong 
children, the French Ambassador and EU Charge both felt the 
Lao had been backed into a corner and would not release the 
children unless they felt confident the release would not 
embarrass them. The French Ambassador described the essence 
of the problem as one of "face": the Lao could not back down 
if there was any chance they would be blamed for the 
children's detention.  Reassuring the Lao that a quiet 
solution would remain quiet would be crucial.  All the 
participants in the meeting believed that the best outcome 
would be that the Lao would release the children directly to 
the Thai, with no recriminations following. 
 
Comment 
------- 
9. (C) Securing the release of the Hmong children is our key 
concern at present, and DAS John's conversations with the 
international like-minded group were useful for identifying 
advantages and pitfalls of various strategies for reaching a 
solution.  The consensus is that for the moment the process 
initiated by visiting UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner 
Chamberlin in March should be allowed to play itself out. 
With luck, the Lao and Thai will come to an accommodation to 
return the children to Petchaboon.  That said, we worry that 
the poor treatment the boys, in particular, have been subject 
 
VIENTIANE 00000386  003 OF 003 
 
 
to will make it hard for the Lao to release them under any 
circumstances. 
 
10. (C) On the overall human rights picture, however, we 
believe our "like-minded group" isn't so like-minded after 
all. With the exception of the Australians, our colleagues 
continue to hold a patronizing attitude toward the Lao which 
exonerates them for any blame for their actions and sees 
"progress" in the feeblest gestures.  The Lao government is 
masterful at playing the international community's 
sympathies, making the most serious human rights charges go 
away though a policy of concerted and coordinated denial, 
such as that displayed by the Foreign Minster in his meeting 
with DAS John. The Lao are serial human rights abusers, 
especially toward the remaining Hmong groups still in the 
forest. The last of these groups are dying daily in penny 
packets or sometimes (as the massacre of April 6 
demonstrates) in larger groups.  Most of those dying are 
women and children. Yet tragically this story is being 
ignored by even those here in Vientiane's diplomatic 
community who should be paying attention, and the Lao 
government is once again getting off scott-free for its 
egregious conduct. 
11. (C) While we have our differences with our like-minded 
colleagues, we share the view that we need more dialogue with 
the Lao. The GoL's mistrust and misunderstanding of us could 
hardly be deeper. Expanding our dialogue with the government 
on many levels will, we believe, help allay some of their 
fears of us and in the longer term give us more leverage in 
moving the Lao in the right direction, in human rights as 
well as in other areas. End comment. 
 
12. (U) DAS John did not clear this cable. 
 
HASLACH