VZCZCXRO8613
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0889/01 1181901
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281901Z APR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8864
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0615
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0339
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0827
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1066
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0642
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0237
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0819
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0163
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0613
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0815
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8780
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0934

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016 
TAGS: CD NI PGOV PREL SU UNSC ZF KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: CONGO FEELS NO SENSE OF URGENCY ON 
DARFUR 
 
REF: USUN NEW YORK 00734 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000889  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. April 26 United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) consultations witnessed a veritable face-off 
on Darfur.  In one corner was Congolese Permanent 
Representative (PR) and representative of the African Union 
(AU) Chairmanship Ikouebe, who, under obvious pressure from 
Paris and Khartoum, told Members that while he was sensitive 
to the situation in Darfur, there were other equally pressing 
concerns in Africa, namely Cote D'Ivoire.  Ikouebe made a bid 
for a troop increase to the UN peacekeeping mission there and 
declared that the Council should wait on planning for a UN 
mission to Darfur.  In the other corner was Ghanaian PR 
Effah-Apenteng, who began a call echoed by the majority of 
other Members for divining the root causes of Khartoum's 
opposition to a UN presence in Darfur and for the UN to 
proceed with its contingency planning.  Ambassador Bolton 
stressed that the negative signal from the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) could not be underestimated, especially 
as it was impeding attempts to protect the population of 
Darfur. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONTD. This polarization of views 
revealed not only the reach of Khartoum's influence, but also 
the breadth of France's position with regard to Sudan, as 
well as the AU's susceptibility to external pressures. 
Secretary-General (SYG) Annan, Department of Peacekeeping 
 
SIPDIS 
Operations (DPKO) Under-SYG Guehenno and DPKO Assistant-SYG 
Annabi all described the continuation of Darfur violence and 
the GNU's obstructionism, in the face of which the UN was 
persisting in its efforts to get an 'indispensable' 
assessment team on the ground so that a formal Council 
decision could be made on getting UN forces into Darfur.  The 
effort to secure this sequencing could be irreparably harmed 
by vacillation by the country at the helm of the AU and that 
country's effectively joining the ranks of Council spoilers 
to the process.  It may be necessary for other parties to 
assume the mantle of leadership in place of Congo in the UNSC 
setting; both Ghana and Tanzania have demonstrated a 
readiness to do just that.  Similarly, we have only just 
begun to see the obstruction to come from France on AMIS 
transition, especially as the realities of potential price 
tags and force levels (and their impact on competing French 
priority issues) come to pass.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
UN STILL ENGAGED ON AMIS TRANSITION . . . 
----------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) SYG Annan, DPKO U/SYG Guehenno and DPKO A/SYG Annabi 
were all on hand for April 26 UNSC consultations to update on 
the status of contingency planning, as mandated by OP 4 of 
UNSCR 1663 (2006).  Annabi reported there had been no 
improvement in Darfur security and that escalating violence, 
banditry and militia movements were resulting in large-scale 
displacements and worsening humanitarian consequences.  He 
acknowledged the complicating factor of Chad in undermining 
efforts to end the Darfur crisis and urged Members to push 
N'djamena and Khartoum to implement the Tripoli Agreement. 
On the Abuja Talks, Annabi reported a 'measure of progress,' 
with a complete package delivered to the parties April 25 for 
an envisaged April 30 adoption.  U/SYG Guehenno spoke to the 
need for the UN to increase its engagement in Abuja, since 
the package would likely include provisions for AMIS 
transition (NOTE. At first reading, the proposed Abuja 
Agreement makes mention only of strengthening AMIS, not of 
re-hatting it. END NOTE). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Guehenno and Annabi addressed continued GNU 
opposition to the UN's technical assessment mission, which 
both called 'indispensable' to the Secretariat's ability to 
make recommendations to the Council for its determination of 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000889  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
a mandate for the eventual Darfur force.  SYG Annan added 
that AU forces on the ground were not a substitute for the 
work the UN needed to do there, but he acceded that the 
mission could be a joint AU-UN undertaking.  Despite Annabi's 
assurances during his visit to Sudan that the GNU would be 
involved every step of the way on transition contingency 
planning, President Bashir had declared that neither the GNU 
nor the Parliament could agree to such preparation or to the 
planned assessment mission, suggesting instead that once an 
Abuja agreement was reached, planning could proceed, per the 
Naivasha Agreement model. 
 
¶5. (SBU) DPKO's planning was proceeding regardless, according 
to Annabi, based on the principles of establishing lasting 
peace and stability and of protecting civilians.  He outlined 
(per reftel) the two broad options DPKO had developed, noting 
that the ultimate scale of the operation would be determined 
by the degree of parties' compliance with any Abuja 
agreement.  In the absence of an agreement, Annabi warned, an 
organization other than the UN (the SYG suggested an 
unspecified 'multinational force') would have to assume 
responsibility for Darfur.  Annabi concluded by repeating the 
need for an assessment team to fine-tune the work DPKO had 
done so far. 
 
. . . BUT CONGO EVIDENTLY ISN'T 
------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Congolese PR Ikouebe began his intervention by noting 
Khartoum's reluctance toward AMIS transition and stressing it 
was up to Africans to obtain GNU consent, calling upon the AU 
to support its March 10 communique.  Ikouebe's tone changed 
as he discussed the importance of reaching an April 30 Abuja 
agreement, insisting that with only four days to the 
deadline, the Council needed to stop sending 'mixed messages' 
which might be misconstrued by the GNU.  Ikouebe said the 
Council should wait a week to assess Abuja results; 
otherwise, 'we will be faced with a war.'  In an obviously 
pre-cooked collaborative statement with France, he compared 
the Darfur situation with Cote D'Ivoire, making a bid for a 
troop increase to UNOCI and calling for the Council to hold 
off on planning for a UN Darfur mission.  Qatari PR Al-Nasser 
cited Ikouebe's statement when voicing his own delegation's 
stance that DPKO planning had reached its limits and that to 
proceed further now would be at the expense of Abuja 
agreement. 
 
¶7. (C)  French PR de La Sabliere - after obligatory remarks 
about the 'indispensability' of an Abuja agreement with a 
credible ceasefire, the need to strengthen AMIS and the 
'disturbing' reluctance displayed by the GNU - made clear his 
delegation's priorities with respect to a UN Darfur mission. 
He wanted to know how such a mission would address the 
situation with Chad and demanded a financial evaluation of 
DPKO's options, which he predicted would result in a doubling 
of expenditures.  With Congo's statement as cover, de La 
Sabliere echoed Ikouebe's sentiments on Cote D'Ivoire and 
mentioned the draft resolution his delegation had just tabled 
in that regard. 
 
GHANA RALLIES SUPPORT FOR DIVINING CAUSES OF GNU OPPOSITION 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶8. (C)  In contrast to the Congolese statement, Ghanaian PR 
Effah-Apenteng began a call echoed by the majority of other 
Members for divining the root causes of Khartoum's opposition 
to a UN presence in Darfur and stressed the need for the UN 
to proceed with its contingency planning.  He stressed that 
the Council should focus on 'making the Government of Sudan 
cooperative,' and he recommended using the AU and the Arab 
League to accomplish this task.  Russian DPR Dolgov endorsed 
the suggestion for Arab League involvement and expressed hope 
that the GNU position would change, particularly regarding 
the assessment team. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000889  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Bolton shared Effah-Apenteng's sentiments, 
drawing a direct correlation between the GNU's reaction to 
DPKO's efforts to secure entry for the assessment team with 
the escalation of Darfur violence.  SYG Annan agreed that the 
GNU had not lived up to its responsibility to protect its 
people, a point he said he had tried repeatedly to make in 
letters to President Bashir and in his requests for 
interventions with Khartoum by African and Arab League 
leaders, including Egyptian President Mubarak.  Annan was 
hopeful Khartoum would change its tune after April 30 and 
demonstrate its 'good faith' in the event of an Abuja 
agreement. 
 
¶10. (C) Peruvian PR de Rivero was even more explicit about 
the GNU's attitude, stating that its obstructionism was 
nothing new, given its 'disdain' for the UN and humanitarian 
organizations.  He urged the Council to enlist the assistance 
of African leaders in selling the GNU on AMIS transition, 
which, in his opinion, should not be conditioned on prolonged 
Abuja discussions.  UK PR Jones Parry insisted that DPKO 
maximize its contingency planning but noted that in the 
absence of a successful Abuja outcome and GNU consent, the 
Council 'faces a stark choice,' given the GNU's failure to 
exercise its responsibility to protect its population. 
 
¶11. (C) Japan joined the call for immediately dispatching the 
assessment team and questioned whether the GNU's 'mistrust' 
of the UN was a genuine concern or merely a pretext.  The 
Japanese DPR asked about any UN public relations strategy to 
counter this problem; the SYG said such an effort would not 
be effective, given the centralized nature of the Khartoum 
regime.  Argentine PR Mayoral recommended the Council send 
unequivocal messages to Khartoum that the incoming UN force 
would not be a 'crusade' and that the UN would not abandon 
the Darfur civilian population.  Slovakian PR Burian asked 
about a rumored visit by Sudanese FM Lam Akol, which the SYG 
said had not yet been scheduled. 
 
¶12. (C) Tanzanian DPR Manongi warned that if Abuja failed to 
restore peace in Darfur, the Council should be ready to 
respond, making a UN role all the more critical and AMIS 
transition planning all the more urgent.  Manongi suggested 
the Council issue a strong statement on the necessity of GNU 
cooperation and the urgency of its acceptance of the UN 
assessment team.  The Congolese PR declared he did not share 
the Council's concept of urgency and would not associate his 
delegation with any initiative that was 'hasty' or that 
risked angering the GNU.  Similarly, Chinese PR and SC 
President Wang advised that open pressure on the GNU would 
not succeed; to deal effectively with Khartoum, Members must 
make the GNU feel 'equal' to the Council and not portray it 
as 'the bad guy.' 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
¶13. (SBU) We are still awaiting release of the SYG Report on 
Sudan, originally due April 24 but delayed at least until 
early May as a result of Khartoum's refusal to grant access 
to the assessment team.  According to the draft calendar for 
May (when Congo will hold the UNSC Presidency), Sudan 
consultations will be May 5; SRSG Pronk will be in New York 
and is likely to brief. 
BOLTON