VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0882/01 1171730
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271730Z APR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8852
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0817
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0094
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0998
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0843
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0936
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0424
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0529

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
VIENNA FOR JEFF HOVENIER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC YI UNMIK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER DISCUSSES KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS 
WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNAN 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: In an April 25 meeting in the office of UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Secretary's Special 
 
SIPDIS 
Representative for the Kosovo Final Status Talks Ambassador 
Frank Wisner communicated current U.S thinking on the road 
ahead for Kosovo in 2006 and solicited the 
Secretary-General's views.  Wisner brought the 
 
SIPDIS 
Secretary-General up to date on his recent trip to Europe and 
 
SIPDIS 
reviewed current U.S. thinking on a final UNSC resolution. 
Ambassador Wisner offered the Secretary-General full U.S. 
support for Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his team and 
argued for the importance of bringing the Kosovar Albanians 
along on reconciliation and preventing European partners from 
losing necessary resolve.  Secretary-General Annan expressed 
strong agreement with U.S. thinking and evinced a clear 
understanding of where the Future Status Process was headed 
and the obstacles likely to be erected by Belgrade and 
Moscow.  The Secretary-General also agreed that a "no-UN-seat 
option" for an independent Kosovo would be unworkable and 
concurred that it would be important to have the support of 
Kosovo's neighbors in the region.  End Summary. 
 
Ambassador Wisner Reviews European Trip: Expect Strong Serb 
Opposition 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Noting that he had met with Under Secretary Burns 
the previous day and had just spoken with Martti Ahtisaari, 
Wisner thanked Secretary-General Annan for the opportunity to 
meet him again.  Providing a brief readout of his recent 
European trip, Wisner expressed concern that he had begun to 
see "total Serb opposition to an independence outcome in 
every way."  Prime Minister Kostunica had stated his extreme 
position twice now and President Tadic was falling into line. 
 If we looked at unreasonable positions Belgrade was staking 
out, the goal appeared to be functionally carving out part of 
Kosovo, not focusing sincerely on minority rights.  Also 
worrisome, Belgrade had begun to say it could not reach 
conclusions on municipal rights until after it knew final 
status. 
 
Kosovo's New Leadership: Building a Strong Horse 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Ambassador Wisner appealed for a look inside of 
Kosovo where there was "an extremely talented leadership 
team."  However, President Sejdiu did not have the moral 
authority of Rugova and Prime Minister Ceku, despite his 
numerous strengths, lacked a domestic political constituency. 
 Ambassador Wisner noted there was reason to suspect that 
former Prime Minister Harradinaj does not want Ceku to 
"become too comfortable in his chair."  He noted that 
Albanian leaders, including Prime Minister Berisha, talked 
the most about "possible threats" and wanted to work to 
strengthen Ceku.  Wisner noted that he and Under Secretary 
Burns had discussed inviting Sejdiu and Ceku to Washington 
this summer.  The Secretary-General asked Ambassador Wisner 
whether that would not solicit a strong reaction from 
Belgrade.  Ambassador Wisner responded that this was 
inevitable to some degree, but, it was "important to build a 
strong horse so it could finish the race." 
 
Timeline For Status Process in 2006 and UN Strategy 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Wisner stressed clearly to Secretary-General Annan 
that the U.S. believed the status process needed to be 
completed in 2006 and would "not linger into 2007."  Wisner 
explained that a conceptual timeline for the rest of the 
status process would leave it concluding on UN turf by the 
end of the year.  Ahtisaari would likely produce a report 
focusing on decentralization, minority rights and protection 
of religious sites that the UNSC would approve, making it "a 
chapeau under which Kosovo could become independent." 
However, one question to be addressed was precedent for the 
UN disassembling a legally sovereign nation.  It would be 
necessary to study whether there was anything useful in past 
cases such as East Timor.  The Secretary-General agreed the 
question was an important one and promised to have his staff 
research it, but, said his initial thinking was that neither 
East Timor nor Ethiopia/Eritrea were applicable cases.  "East 
Timor and Ethiopia/Eritrea both involved referenda, whereas 
Kosovo will essentially involve the international community 
acting by fiat," explained the Secretary-General. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Wisner noted that Germany had circulated at a 
recent Contact Group meeting the idea of accepting 
independence for Kosovo while denying it a UN seat.  Wisner 
said he had told FM Bakoyannis in Athens that that was an 
extremely poor idea, saying Under Secretary Burns shared 
fully his sentiments.  Wisner also noted that FM Draskovic 
had argued the idea as a gambit in Belgrade, but, 
encountering opposition, dropped it as quickly as he had 
raised it.  "I do not think placating Belgrade on this point 
will buy us anything," explained Wisner.  The 
Secretary-General agreed fully, saying a sovereign and 
 
SIPDIS 
independent Kosovo that lacked a UN seat would be "wholly 
unworkable." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Wisner noted Ahtisaari would have the difficult job 
of taking positions to Belgrade and Pristina to show he has 
gone the extra mile and bringing them back and would then sit 
down with the Contact Group probably in June to discuss the 
ultimate questions.  Through the summer and into the fall it 
would be necessary to make a decision and then to implement 
it in the final months of the year, explained Wisner. 
Secretary-General Annan responded that he hoped by then there 
 
SIPDIS 
would be significant progress on decentralization, minority 
rights and protection of religious sites that would put the 
Kosovar Albanians "in the right light and avoid playing into 
the hands of Belgrade."  Wisner agreed, emphasizing that we 
had stressed to the Kosovar Albanians that they ought to be 
highly magnanimous even outside of the constraints of the 
Future Status Process.  He noted that Bishop Theodosia's 
invitation to President Sejdiu to Easter Mass in Decani had 
played out very well. 
 
Countries in the Region 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Turning to the subject of neighbors in the region, 
Wisner explained that some were complaining the future status 
process was moving too fast.  The Secretary-General asked 
whether that meant Russia and Wisner explained that it did, 
but, messages were also coming from capitals closer in 
proximity to Kosovo.  In Athens, Foreign Minister Bakoyannis 
had stressed strongly that the status process at the current 
time was "too fast, too bold and too ambitious."  The 
Secretary-General noted neighboring countries including 
 
SIPDIS 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece would surely have 
concerns.  Wisner concurred, adding that Slovakia was 
conveying concerns as well.  The USG had recently demarched 
European capitals and there had been no voices completely 
opposing independence, but, a majority had cautioned against 
moving too quickly and favored finding a fig leaf for 
Belgrade.  The Secretary-General stated that he thought it 
would be important for the U.S. to support these countries 
and carry them along.  Wisner agreed, noting he had also 
discussed with Under Secretary Burns the need to make sure 
that Moscow saw no rift between Washington, London and Paris. 
 Wisner noted that China seemed convinced that Kosovo was a 
special case, but, it was not yet clear whether this argument 
would work with Russia.  Wisner explained that he would make 
ample free time to be part of the discussion on the final 
UNSC resolution and had also told Ahtisaari that he was 
prepared to assist him in upcoming shuttle diplomacy. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Secretary-General Annan said he believed "the 
outcome of the referendum in Montenegro would also have 
impact."  Wisner suggested that in recent conversations in 
Belgrade President Tadic and young intellectuals had behaved 
as if Montenegro was already over in their minds and were 
treating it like it was "a matter of the good kids and bad 
kids in the same family."  To Belgrade's thinking, it might 
not be so significant, he stated. 
 
UNMIK Should Finish Strongly 
 
¶9.  (SBU) As the meeting drew to a close, Wisner raised with 
the Secretary-General the U.S. belief in the importance of 
the Kosovo process ending with "a gold star on the UN's blue 
flag." "It is important that we think about how UNMIK should 
operate in its final phase and ensure it has energy right 
until the end and then a smooth hand off," stated Ambassador 
Wisner.  He also asked whether SRSG Jessen-Petersen's 
 
 
successor would be the first Euro super Ambassador and last 
SRSG or whether his term would be a short one.  The 
Secretary-General agreed that this was an important question 
 
SIPDIS 
to reflect on and offered that he recalled having brought in 
a double-hatted deputy as the UN mission in Bosnia was 
winding down, which might serve as a good model for Kosovo. 
On this point, too, the Secretary-General would task his 
staff with research. 
 
¶10.  (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Wisner. 
 
BOLTON