VZCZCXRO5593
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0800/01 1071905
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171905Z APR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8737
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0328
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0797
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0654
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1040
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0209
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0797
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE PRIORITY 0069
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0152
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0600
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 0209
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0908

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD CT PGOV PREL SU UNSC
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: CHAD INSTABILITY IS REGIONAL THREAT 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000800  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At April 13 consultations, United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Africa Director 
Titov gave the Security Council an overview of the current 
situation in Chad and its potential consequences for regional 
stability, calling for a strengthening of the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to enhance its capacity to address 
this threat.  Congolese PermRep Ikouebe, speaking on behalf 
of the African Union (AU), set the stage for a U.S. amendment 
to his delegation's proposed Press Statement (text in 
Paragraph 8) by linking Chad/Sudan instability to uncertainty 
at the Abuja Talks.  He further urged that the SC focus not 
on accusations and denials of responsibility exchanged 
between the Chadian Government (GOC) and the Sudanese 
Government of National Unity (GNU), but rather on condemning 
any attempt to seize power by force, which could imperil the 
Darfur peace process underway in Abuja.  Ikouebe went on to 
say that AMIS transition by September 30 could be threatened 
if Chad-Sudan tensions were left unaddressed.  Not entirely 
heeding Ikouebe's admonition to ignore accusations between 
the sides, French PR de La Sabliere gave a lengthy and 
hard-hitting exposition on the close links between the 
Janjaweed and the Chadian Zaghawa rebels, charging that Chad 
was 'a victim of the conflict in Darfur.'  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) At April 13 consultations, UN DPKO Africa Director 
Dmitry Titov gave the UNSC an overview of the current 
situation in Chad and its potential consequences for regional 
stability.  He reported the situation in N'Djamena as 
'fluid,' as of 05:00A.M. local time, with shelling and 
machine gun fire audible but with President Deby's forces in 
control of the city.  Titov noted that GOC forces had 
repelled the advancing rebel column as it neared the National 
Assembly and that some rebels had been taken prisoner.  Titov 
also mentioned that France was enforcing its national 
contingency in country. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Titov gave a general description of the situation on 
the Chad/Sudan border, noting that 'armed nomad militias' 
from Sudan and burgeoning rebel movements from Chad had been 
clashing there for the past year, culminating in the GOC's 
declaring a 'state of belligerence' with the GNU after 
charging Sudan with aiding and abetting Tama-led rebels in 
the 18 December 2005 attack on the town of Adre.  Despite the 
confidence-building measures under the February 8 Tripoli 
Accord to which both the GOC and the GNU had agreed, both 
countries continued to exchange accusations, Chadian forces 
continued to defect to rebel movements and rebels continued 
to fortify strongholds in Darfur.  Titov said that dialogue 
and a renunciation of violence by both sides would be 
necessary. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Titov noted the negative effect Chad/Sudan tensions 
could have on IDPs and refugees, with camps in southern Chad 
already exposed to rebel attacks and raids, the possibility 
of targeting civilians and potential refugee flows as far as 
Cameroon.  Humanitarian staff remained in place in N'Djamena 
and Abeche, but Titov said an aircraft from the UN 
Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was on standby in the 
event NGO and UN staff evacuation became necessary.  Titov 
said DPKO was liaising with AMIS, which should be 
strengthened as much as possible to enhance its capacity to 
address the Chad/Sudan issue.  Titov appealed for the 
international community - namely the SC, the AU and the SYG - 
to remain engaged and acknowledged that the proposed SC Press 
Statement offered by the Congolese was a step in the right 
direction. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Congolese PermRep Ikouebe, speaking on behalf of the 
AU Presidency, was quick to highlight what the AU saw a the 
inextricable link between Chad-Sudan tensions and the future 
of the Abuja Talks: 'Destabilization in one means 
destabilization in the other.'  Ikouebe acknowledged Chad's 
predicament of being party to negotiations in which it 
accuses one of the sides of equipping rebels in Chadian 
territory.  Ikouebe urged that the SC focus not on 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000800  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
accusations and denials of responsibility exchanged between 
the GOC and the GNU, but rather on condemning any attempt to 
seize power by force (a major priority for the AU), an action 
which could imperil the Darfur peace process underway in 
Abuja.  Further, Ikouebe stated, there was now hope that an 
agreement would be reached on AMIS transition, progress that 
could be threatened if Chad-Sudan tensions were left 
unaddressed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) French PermRep de La Sabliere French PR de La 
Sabliere gave a lengthy and hard-hitting exposition on the 
close links between the Janjaweed and the Chadian Zaghawa 
rebels, charging that Chad was 'a victim of the conflict in 
Darfur.'  He was explicit in referring to both the rebels who 
orchestrated the 18 December 2005 Adre attack and the column 
of 800 who penetrated Chad via Central African Republic (CAR) 
as 'Arabs' including Sudanese Janjaweed.  De La Sabliere 
noted the rebels were heavily armed, with 60 vehicles and new 
equipment, a product of the continued arms trafficking in 
Sudan that was further contributing to Chadian 
destabilization.  He cited Chadian President Deby's decision 
to forgo solidarity with his own Zaghawa tribe in concluding 
the 8 April 2004 N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement as the reason 
behind the tribe's uniting with Darfur fighters against him 
to weaken his position.  Zaghawa rebels, de La Sabliere 
continued, could see a further opportunity for 
destabilization in the Abuja process, thus jeopardizing the 
international community's political efforts to solve the 
Darfur crisis.  De La Sabliere also expressed considerable 
concern for the security of CAR. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  In the wake of these interventions, Ambassador 
Bolton proposed adding language to the Congolese draft Press 
Statement urging the parties in Abuja to conclude an 
agreement by April 30 for the sake of regional stability; 
this amendment was unanimously endorsed.  Both the Ghanaian 
and the Tanzanian representatives recommended inclusion of 
language encouraging Chadian parties to subscribe to the 
electoral process underway.  Peruvian PR de Rivero requested 
adding a line condemning attacks on refugee camps.  Congolese 
PR Ikouebe was amenable to all suggestions and noted that the 
AU Peace and Security Council would convene imminently to 
endorse the resultant statement from the SC.  He went on to 
say that future AU action on the matter should be in concert 
with the SYG. 
 
¶8. (U) Begin Press Statement text: 
 
The situation in Darfur and the mounting tension at the 
border between Sudan and Chad was under consideration by the 
members of the Security Council. 
 
The members of the Security Council express their deep 
concern regarding the deteriorating situation in Darfur and 
recent attacks by armed groups in Chad. 
 
The members of the Security Council condemn attacks on the 
refugee camps. 
 
The members of the Security Council condemn any attempt to 
seize power by force, pursuant to the resolution of Algiers 
adopted in 1999 by the African Union Organization and call on 
the rebels to put an end to violence and to participate in 
the democratic process. 
 
The members of the Security Council urge the Governments of 
Sudan and Chad to respect the Tripoli Declaration and 
Agreement of 8 February 2006 endorsed on 10 March 2006 by the 
46th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union and to fully implement the commitments made and to 
facilitate the work of the relevant follow-up mechanisms that 
have been agreed upon in the Tripoli Declaration and 
Agreement. 
 
The members of the Security Council express support for the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000800  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
efforts of the African Union and invite the Secretary-General 
and the African Union to make available their good offices to 
address this crisis. 
 
The members of the Security Council also urge the parties to 
the Abuja peace talks to conclude a peace agreement by April 
30, as called for by the African Union's Peace and Security 
Council, in order to contribute to the peace and stability of 
the entire region. 
 
¶9. (U) End Press Statement text. 
BOLTON