VZCZCXRO6183
RR RUEHAG RUEHMR RUEHPA
DE RUEHTC #0762/01 0971451
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 071451Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5344
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4918
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 0224
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1307
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5E
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0281
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E (E. REDDICK), AF/C (AMB J. LEADER AND J. 
GAFFNEY), AF/RSA (M. BITTRICK AND C. BECK) 
OSD FOR OASD/ISA/AFR (COL K. LANGDORF, C. IKINS, T. WONG) 
EUCOM FOR MAJ T. RAYMOND 
MOLESWORTH FOR S. HRICIK 
NAIROBI PLEASE PASS TO CDC (T. BOO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL KGHA KHIV KPKO MARR MASS MOPS BE BY CG
FR, NI, NO, RW, SF, SU, UG, UK, US, NL 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: PLANS TO EXPAND PEACE AND SECURITY 
PROGRAMS IN AFRICA 
 
REF: GENEVA 706 
 
THE HAGUE 00000762  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew J. Schofer; reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 6. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: The GONL is paying increasing attention to 
African Peace and Security Architecture and is ready to 
commit additional resources.  The GONL wishes, in cooperation 
with the Belgians, to take a lead on Burundi Security Sector 
Reform (SSR).  It is considering contributing a small 
contingent of headquarters staff to the European Union,s DRC 
election mission.  On SSR, DDR and an African Standby Force, 
the GONL is taking a comprehensive look at possibilities for 
multi-donor or unilateral programs.  It is interested in 
contributing specialized personnel to our ACOTA and, 
possibly, HIV/AIDS programs.  End summary. 
 
Background: growing support for Africa initiatives 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Embassy officers met March 23, 29 and 30 with 
specialized Dutch MOD and MFA colleagues, to discuss Dutch 
interest in SSR, DDR, HIV/AIDS, peacekeeping, and related 
programs in sub-Saharan Africa.  For much of the past year, 
the GONL has signaled an interest, but its goals have been 
vague.  With the increasingly likely prospect of a Labor-led 
government in 2007, interest now appears to be solidifying. 
Regardless of whether Labor wins, Dutch interest in Africa is 
likely to grow, as the GONL seeks domestically popular 
alternatives to its commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans 
and elsewhere.  Poloff held follow-on discussions April 6 
with Africa researchers from the Netherlands Institute for 
International Relations ("Clingendael") and received insight 
entirely consistent with what GONL officials are saying. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Embassy points of contact are Colonel John Gross 
(DAO, grossjd2@state.gov), Ted Burkhalter (political officer, 
primary for Africa, burkhaltereb@state.gov) and Jason Grubb 
(political-military officer, back-up for Africa, 
grubbjb@state.gov). 
 
Dutch propose taking lead, with Belgium, on Burundi SSR 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The GONL has proposed taking a lead, with the 
Belgians, on Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts in Burundi. 
 The program would start with the drafting of a white paper, 
followed by staff  level assistance.  SSR implementation 
would be some time off and would require multiple donors. 
The Dutch have stressed they were heavily involved in early 
demobilization efforts in Burundi.  For this reason, the 
Dutch parliament is more comfortable with direct assistance 
to the Burundian military and police than to those of other 
Great Lakes countries. 
 
¶6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: The GONL would welcome U.S. 
participation.  However, it wants to be sure the 
Dutch/Belgian lead role is maintained.  It therefore seeks 
full U.S. buy-in, before moving ahead.  Post requests cleared 
points from Washington, informing the GONL that we welcome 
the Dutch/Belgian SSR leadership role in Burundi and look 
forward to discussing further at the next meeting of the 
Great Lakes Contact Group.  END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
Great Lakes Intelligence Fusion Cell 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Dutch provided the initial funds for Burundian 
participation in the Great Lakes Intelligence Fusion Cell. 
They are willing to consider providing some additional funds 
but need Burundian budget estimates ASAP.  They would 
appreciate any help and note positively our DATT,s and their 
 
THE HAGUE 00000762  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
DATT,s persistent efforts in Bujumbura. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Dutch say the Burundians need, ultimately, to 
fund the continuing costs of the fusion cell on their own. 
We suspect the need might materialize sooner rather than 
later. 
 
ACOTA 
----- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The GONL has overcome initial reservations, which 
may have been fueled by inaccurate NGO reports on ACOTA's 
goals.  The Dutch are eager to provide specialized military 
personnel, on a case-by-case basis.  They request that ACOTA 
program coordinators inform them 2-3 months in advance of 
personnel needs.  They are unwilling to work with ACOTA 
civilian contractors, unless uniformed U.S. officers are 
present. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Post, after consulting with ACOTA coordinators, 
suggested the GONL also consider independently funding PSO 
"bricks and mortar" projects in Mozambique, Nigeria, and 
elsewhere.  According to the MFA, funds for this are not 
currently available.  We suggest this issue be raised again, 
following next year,s election. 
 
Lord,s Resistance Army 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) MFA representatives noted the Geneva core group 
meeting (reftel) and said that the GONL fully supports an 
integrated political/military/security/development approach 
to the LRA.  However, because of Dutch concerns about the 
human rights record of the UPDF, the GONL is unlikely to 
participate in any military component.  Poloff followed up 
March 28 and 29 with MFA political and political-military 
advisors, who stressed, though, that the possibility is not 
entirely ruled out.  Development Minister van Ardenne (who 
plays an influential role in Dutch Africa policy) reiterated 
to Ambassador Arnall on March 29 that the GONL supports core 
group/UN/MONUC/UNMIS efforts to capture LRA leaders. 
 
¶12. (S) The Dutch have asked, repeatedly, whether the U.S. 
has reached any decisions on military options for assisting 
the UPDF against the LRA.  They have asked that we consider 
sharing this information with them as soon as is possible. 
 
ASF and African security architecture 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Dutch had several questions and comments 
stemming from the March London clearinghouse conference. 
They are likely to raise these at the next contact group 
meeting.  First, they will participate in C3IS workshops, but 
to learn, rather than to lead.  Second, they are interested 
in African Standby Force (ASF) buildup but want to be clear 
that it must be done in a multi-donor framework.  Third, they 
asked whether we had any thoughts on the modalities of the 
ASF.  Fourth, they would like to know whether there are any 
specific areas of ASF in which the U.S. would like Dutch 
assistance.  They suggested a strong preference for logistics 
assistance.  Finally, what is our thinking with regard to 
positioning of schools?  Will every regional grouping (i.e., 
ECOWOS) have its own school(s)?  The Dutch did not indicate 
whether they are contemplating anything beyond the current 
Burundi PKO training center. 
 
Congo (DRC): EU election mission and DDR 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The GONL will not contribute ground troops to the 
European Union,s election mission in Congo (DRC).  It may, 
however, contribute a staff contingent to the proposed 
Operational HQ in Potsdam and a "very small number - 3 or 4" 
 
THE HAGUE 00000762  003 OF 003 
 
 
of officers to a forward HQ in the DRC.  This remains under 
discussion and is contingent on the success of the German 
proposal.  MFA colleagues have told us they are frustrated 
that the MOD (and Defense Minister Kamp) remain wary of 
sending ground troops to Africa.  They believe that, if Labor 
wins the 2007 elections, this will change. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The MFA again emphasized the GONL view that a 
premature international withdrawal from the DRC would have 
dire consequences.  They urged us to press this point within 
the administration and with members of Congress.  They 
predict a continued need for a strong international presence 
well beyond the last round of elections, likely to be held in 
late September or October. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The MFA stressed that future DRC DDR efforts will 
require large sums of money and must therefore be conducted 
in a multi-donor setting.  The Dutch will participate in such 
efforts but will not take a lead.  They are finalizing 
preparations on existing integrated brigades programs, in 
conjunction with the South Africans.  MFA representatives 
explained the Dutch position, saying the GONL had already 
provided several hundred thousand dollars of "tailor made" 
assistance for joint MONUC-FARDC operations.  They are 
interested in knowing the scope of possible U.S. 
contributions. 
 
HIV/AIDS in the SSR context 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Dutch military has still not grasped the 
necessity of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment in SSR and 
peacekeeper training programs, according to MOD and MFA 
officers.  The MFA has a rough conceptual plan, but, as one 
of their representatives told us, "The U.S. is way ahead on 
that."  The Dutch expressed interest in sending military 
health officials (whether uniformed or civilian) to visit, or 
even participate in, U.S. HIV/AIDS programs with African 
militaries.  Although the idea has not received high-level 
consideration within MOD, the officers with whom we met felt 
it might be helpful in generating greater awareness.  We 
passed the Dutch a summary of ODC Pretoria,s programs with 
the South African military (prepared by Pretoria for Dutch 
consumption).  We also told them about U.S. programs in 
Nigeria and suggested they contact our HIV/AIDS coordinator 
in Abuja (Nina Wadhwa). 
 
Sudan/Darfur 
------------ 
 
¶18. (C) Netherlands Sudan policy is currently coordinated by 
the MFA Sudan Task Force, which operates outside the Africa 
Department.  The issue was therefore not discussed.  In 
brief, though, the Dutch hold positions similar to our own 
and are very active in support of the Abuja talks and UNSC 
action.  Should NATO or EU technical or logistical support to 
an eventual rehatted force be needed (as seems probable), the 
Dutch are likely contributors.  They have a small military 
and police presence in UNMIS and have provided logistical 
support to AMIS. 
 
Conclusion: Encouraging the Dutch 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Dutch interest in African Peace and Security 
programs is genuine and largely altruistic.  The GONL is 
constrained, however, by three factors: acute human rights 
sensitivities, a relative lack of experience, and hesitancy 
among its military leaders.  We can significantly increase 
Dutch expertise, as well as support among the military, by 
inviting MOD specialists to observe or participate in our 
HIV/AIDS programs with African militaries and our ACOTA 
peacekeeper training programs. 
ARNALL