This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL KWBG IS ISRAEL RELATIONS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: BEGINNING THE DISCUSSION ON ISRAEL'S CONVERGENCE 
PLAN 
 
REF: A) TEL AVIV 1470 B) TEL AVIV 1163 C) TEL AVIV 
     1065 D) TEL AVIV 0940 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons: 1.4 (B and D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's 
intention to begin implementation of what he calls the 
"convergence plan" within the next two years (reftels) 
confronts the USG with decisions on whether and how to engage 
with Israel on the issue.  The complexities, potential 
benefits, and pitfalls of the plan complicate our choices. 
Olmert's goal is to establish -- with U.S. concurrence -- the 
"final borders of Israel" by moving up to 80,000 settlers 
from isolated areas to the larger settlement blocs west of 
the separation barrier (but still east of the Green Line in 
the West Bank) and to new development areas in the Negev and 
Galilee.  Unlike Gaza disengagement, his plan would 
apparently retain freedom of movement for Israeli security 
forces in the vacated areas.  Olmert and his advisers claim 
that their plan is in full accordance with the President's 
letter to former PM Ariel Sharon from April 14, 2004. 
Control of the Palestinian Authority by Hamas and Israel's 
reluctance to deal with President Mahmud Abbas make any 
attempt at avoiding unilateral moves and re-starting 
negotiations more difficult.  This is the first in a series 
of cables addressing issues surrounding the convergence 
policy.  End summary. 
 
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Expect GOI Push for U.S. Support and Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) In the next few months, Israeli officials will be 
pressing at the highest levels for public U.S. support for 
convergence.  These discussions will necessitate a decision 
on whether the U.S. will engage on the details of the 
convergence plan and, ultimately, on whether Olmert's moves 
should receive U.S. support.  From post's perspective, the 
key question is whether convergence will further U.S. goals 
in the region, especially a secure Israel with defensible 
borders, living side by side in peace and security with a 
viable and contiguous Palestinian state.  Our decision should 
also take into account the U.S. interest in weakening 
extremist groups such as Hamas, in taking all possible steps 
to improve the lives of both Israelis and Palestinians, and 
in maintaining strong support from both Israel and Arab 
states in the Global War on Terrorism. 
 
¶3. (C) In the upcoming talks with GOI officials, the U.S. has 
a good deal of leverage.  First, Olmert needs USG support as 
domestic political cover to implement the convergence plan. 
Second, the GOI is likely to request substantial USG 
financial assistance for moving the settlers, as it did -- 
albeit indirectly -- with the Negev and Galilee initiative 
following Gaza disengagement.  Such support, if deemed to be 
in the U.S. interest, could be structured to steer settlers 
away from other West Bank locations (where Olmert intends to 
resettle most of them) and into communities within Green Line 
Israel.  Third, Olmert will seek U.S. assistance in obtaining 
recognition for the new "border" from the Europeans, the 
Quartet, and perhaps even the United Nations.  FM Livni has 
already begun this effort in her April 20 meeting with EU 
ambassadors in Israel.  The need for U.S. assistance in 
selling the plan could provide significant leverage to push 
the fence closer to the Green Line, improving the 
connectivity of Palestinian lands and hence the viability of 
a future Palestinian state.  However, it is questionable 
whether the Palestinians and other Arabs would thank the USG 
for any outcome short of the status quo ante 1967. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Main Goal of Convergence for Olmert is to Set Borders 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (C) Olmert recently told Congressional visitors that he 
intends to prepare the convergence plan, coordinate it with 
the USG, and begin implementation within two years.  He 
proposes to move approximately 80,000 settlers from isolated 
areas in the West Bank to the larger settlement blocs west of 
the separation barrier (but still east of the 1967 borders) 
and possibly to new development areas in the Negev and 
Galilee.  As he said on election night, in so doing his goal 
is "the establishment of the final borders of Israel as a 
Jewish state."  In an important difference from Gaza 
disengagement, the GOI apparently plans to retain full 
operational freedom for its security forces in the vacated 
areas and to remain in control of the Jordan Valley. 
 
¶5. (C) Olmert's advisers see the convergence plan as a step 
that will flesh out the remarks on major population centers 
contained in the President's letter of April 14, 2004.  In 
meetings with USG officials, the Israelis routinely claim 
that the President's letter represents U.S. acceptance of the 
annexation of major settlement blocs.  They conveniently 
overlook other sections of the letter, including stipulations 
that secure and recognized borders "should emerge from 
negotiations between the parties" and be "mutually agreed." 
In fact, the convergence plan, as explained thus far by 
Olmert, would effectively negate the "mutually agreed" clause 
by setting the separation barrier as Israel's eastern border. 
 While Olmert has left open the possibility for minor shifts 
in the barrier, he told the press that such adjustments would 
be the result of an inter-Israeli dialogue, not talks with 
the Palestinians.  He has also suggested that he will consult 
with and seek support from the United States. 
 
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Complexities, Benefits and Pitfalls 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The complexities of the convergence plan complicate 
the decision on whether the U.S. should support Olmert's 
move.  While the evacuation of settlers removes a partial 
obstacle to a two-state solution, strengthening other 
settlement blocs in the West Bank makes it even less likely 
that Israel will ever relinquish any of these areas to a 
future Palestinian state.  The undefined status of the 
evacuated parts of the West Bank, free of Israeli civilians 
but still subject to regular patrols and raids by Israeli 
forces, is also problematic.  Such a scenario would erode 
Palestinian responsibility for security and leave Israel as 
an occupying power in the eyes of Palestinians and others in 
the region and around the world.  The most contentious issues 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as Jerusalem, are not 
directly addressed by the convergence plan at all except 
insofar as it strengthens the settlement blocs around the 
city and defines its municipal boundaries with the separation 
barrier. 
 
¶7. (C) Olmert's plan could result in some tangible benefits 
for the region.  First, any dismantling of West Bank 
settlements would represent the crossing of an important 
psychological hurdle in relinquishing the dream of "greater 
Israel" (i.e., setting Israel's eastern border at the Jordan 
River) that helped propel the settlement movement forward; it 
also could prepare the ground for future negotiations. 
Second, a withdrawal should allow the Israeli Defense Force 
to ease considerably the closure regime and thereby reduce 
constraints on the Palestinian economy and quality of life. 
Although some restrictions are likely to remain in place, we 
could make a substantial easing part of the price for U.S. 
acquiescence or support, if we choose to engage on details. 
Third, a withdrawal may increase acceptance of the two-state 
solution among the vocal minority of Israeli society 
currently opposed to such a step.  Fourth, the GOI believes 
that the initiative will result in defensible borders and 
reduce the number of suicide bombings.  Disengagement is a 
model here; despite daily rocket attacks, there have been 
fewer Israeli fatalities since disengagement removed settlers 
and soldiers from direct proximity with Gazans.  Finally, the 
convergence plan offers the advantage of action when there 
are few other alternatives.  This appears to be a major 
motivation for Olmert.  He told Senator Lieberman that 
inaction would result in a third Intifada and additional 
bloodshed. 
 
¶8. (C) At the same time, Olmert's plan has some serious 
pitfalls.  Israeli moves resulting in a less-than-viable 
Palestinian state or in prolonging the military occupation of 
the West Bank are incongruous with a two-state solution. 
Convergence could potentially strengthen Hamas, since the 
group will take credit for any Israeli withdrawal (as it did 
in Gaza) without giving anything in return.  Some 
Palestinians could interpret Israel's actions as de facto 
recognition that Hamas will remain in control of the PA 
indefinitely.  Completion of the security barrier and the 
effective cantonization of large parts of the West Bank will 
complicate efforts at economic development in the remaining 
Palestinian areas and could further increase tensions and/or 
violence.  Engagement on the part of the USG is likely to be 
interpreted as complicity in what some in the international 
community will see as the GOI's illegal annexation of 
occupied territory.  Such involvement may adversely affect 
support for other U.S. policies -- including the war on 
terrorism -- among the Arab states, Europeans, or in the 
developing world.  Finally, U.S. support for convergence is 
almost certain to deepen existing rifts within the Quartet, 
calling into question the continued viability of the group 
and its Roadmap. 
 
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Are Negotiations an Option? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Olmert has said he is willing to give negotiations 
with the Palestinians a chance before moving ahead with 
convergence.  Nevertheless, his (and our) demand that Hamas 
accept the Quartet's three principles, combined with the 
GOI's unwillingness to hold any political discussions with 
Abbas, currently preclude such an outcome.  If Abbas were to 
take the necessary steps to move back to the Roadmap and give 
up what Israelis believe is his sole intent to move directly 
to final status issues, there might be a possibility of 
bilateral talks.  While the Labor Party has hinted during 
coalition negotiations that it wants a serious effort on the 
negotiating front, Olmert recently told Senator Lieberman 
that he assessed the chances of the Palestinians taking steps 
necessary to restart talks as "nonexistent."  It seems 
equally, if not more, doubtful that his convergence plan will 
move them toward the Quartet principles, however. 
 
¶10. (C) The reality is that Olmert has given up on the 
negotiating track and is unlikely to reassess this view 
without an unexpected emergence of a credible Palestinian 
partner or the precipitate fall of a Hamas government. 
Israeli political pundits have noted that only Hamas has the 
organization and power to seriously negotiate with Israel, 
but such conjecture is moot as long as Hamas fails to 
recognize Israel and change its unacceptable policy on 
terrorism.  The international community's desire to work 
through Abbas and the president's office to bypass, isolate, 
and weaken Hamas has already been rejected by the current 
Israeli Cabinet.  Olmert's argument is that Abbas is not a 
viable partner, which leaves -- in his mind -- unilateral 
moves as the only way forward. 
 
¶11. (C) While Labor's presence in the new government may 
temper his views, we doubt the change will be sufficient to 
allow negotiations without strong outside encouragement.  The 
UN and the Europeans will also be key partners as the new 
Israeli policy evolves.  There will be issues left from 
convergence that will require international understandings, 
at a minimum in the face of a continuing lack of a viable and 
empowered Palestinian partner.  While the U.S. will remain 
critical to their plans, the Israelis recognize that they 
will need other partners as well if they are to gain 
international acquiescence to this bold endeavor. 
 
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