VZCZCXRO3755
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #0730/01 1041304
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141304Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5539
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 7798
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1889
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 2415
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2318
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1406
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0362

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000730 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL UZ JP
SUBJECT: GANIEV AND AZIMOV TO VISIT JAPAN 
 
REF: TASHKENT 651 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JON R. PURNELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In the next three months, FM Ganiev and 
Deputy PM Azimov will both travel to Japan.  Ganiev will head 
the Uzbek delegation to the Uzbek-Japan Joint Committee on 
the Economy in May, and Ganiev will represent Uzbekistan at 
the May Central Asia Plus Japan Foreign Ministers Meeting in 
Tokyo.  These trips seem to have the Japanese Embassy worried 
that Japan will be criticized for supporting the GOU. 
Japanese EconOff Sasatani stressed that the Japanese 
government will not meet bilaterally with any senior GOU 
officials, and that Azimov and Ganiev are only visiting Tokyo 
through private sector or multilateral fora.  He also said 
that the GOU is very interested in a visit by PM Koizumi, but 
that the Embassy has advised strongly against it.  Japan has 
also concluded a new strategy on assistance to Uzbekistan, 
but has decided to delay release given the current political 
climate.  Sasatani said that Japan will continue earlier 
announced large-scale infrastructure projects.  However, all 
new projects will be related to technical assistance that 
directly impacts the Uzbek people, such as healthcare and 
education.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) First Secretary for Economic Affairs at the Japanese 
Embassy, Yoshifumi Sasatani, told PolEcon Chief the Japanese 
government has finished a new assistance strategy for 
Uzbekistan.  However, he said, his government does not intend 
to release the strategy now due to continuing human rights 
concerns and worries about how Japanese assistance might be 
viewed, especially by the West.  While the Japanese will 
continue to fund several large infrastructure projects, 
including renovation of the Tashkent Power Plant and a 
regional railroad project, they do not intend to announce new 
grants.  The GOJ will fund two new technical assistance 
programs focused on providing direct benefits to the Uzbek 
people.  One will focus on healthcare and supplying needed 
medical equipment to Tashkent and Jizzak medical 
institutions, as well as to the National Anti-Tuberculosis 
Center in Tashkent.  The other will focus on improving 
schools, mainly through providing materials such as desks and 
computers.  As long as these projects continue to benefit the 
Uzbeks and contribute to the promotion of intra-regional 
cooperation, said Sasatani, Japan will provide funding. 
 
¶3. (C) The next Uzbek-Japan Joint Committee on the Economy, a 
non-governmental organization, will be held in Tokyo on May 
¶18.  Deputy Prime Minister Azimov will lead the delegation, 
which will include other high-ranking officials.  Kiyomi 
Miyagawa, First Secretary for Political Affairs, told Poloff 
that the Japanese government does not see the Committee as 
highly valuable, as the GOU tends to use it as a mechanism to 
control Japanese businesses operating in Uzbekistan. 
According to Sasatani, Azimov has asked for a meeting on the 
margins with PM Koyzumi, but is unlikely to be received. 
Japanese FM Aso will likely be the highest ranking official 
Azimov meets.  Sasatani also said that the GOU is very 
interested in a visit by Koizumi to Uzbekistan as soon as 
possible.  (Note:  According to Sasatani, Karimov was last in 
Japan approximately three years ago.  During that visit, 
Koizumi promised to visit Uzbekistan.  End note.)  Sasatani 
said that the Japanese Embassy is strongly advising the 
Japanese PM against such a trip. 
 
¶4. (C)  Both Sasatani and Miyagawa confirmed that the Central 
Asia plus Japan Forum Foreign Ministers' Meeting is scheduled 
for late June in Tokyo.  Sasatani told PolEcon Chief that FM 
Ganiev will head the delegation.  The participating 
countries, including Afghanistan, will likely sign technical 
cooperation agreements.  Unfortunately, according to 
Miyagawa, the Forum's projects have not been very successful 
because Central Asian countries must initiate the projects 
and regional political and economic differences have hindered 
cooperation.  Miyagawa said Uzbekistan is mostly interested 
in transportation, terrorism, drugs and energy-related 
projects.  Sasatani said that only through multilateral fora 
or private sector events, such as Central Asia plus Japan or 
the Uzbek-Japan Joint Committee, will senior Japanese 
officials meet with their Uzbek counterparts.  Sasatani said 
the unofficial policy is that senior Uzbek officials will not 
be invited for bilateral talks. 
 
¶5. (C) Miyagawa attended an April 3 meeting for OSCE member 
 
TASHKENT 00000730  002 OF 002 
 
 
states.  He told Poloff he was &surprised8 at OSCE 
Ambassador Jenca's report that Karimov recommended that the 
OSCE &make concrete contributions to the Uzbek economy,8 as 
does the Central Asia plus Japan Forum (reftel).  Miyagawa 
said he was &embarrassed8 because the Forum does not make 
such contributions as there are no large projects. 
 
¶6. (C) As to Japanese investment, Miyagawa said Japanese 
businesses are &cautious8 and want payment guarantees.  Two 
years ago, he explained, Japanese fertilizer and chemical 
businesses were here, but were never paid for their goods. 
Japanese companies are far more interested in Kazakhstan.  As 
Japan reduces the amount of loans to Uzbekistan, Miyagawa 
believes there will be fewer opportunities for Japanese 
contractors to work here within the framework of assistance 
that guarantees payment for services. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: The Japanese and Uzbek governments have 
always maintained a cordial, even friendly, relationship. 
Japan has long been a "friend of Uzbekistan," a claim Karimov 
has never been hesitant to throw around.  Based on Sasatani's 
statements, the Japanese government is clearly concerned 
about how the upcoming visits of Azimov and Ganiev might be 
construed, especially on the heels of the love fest in South 
Korea.  Sasatani went out of his way to communicate that the 
Japanese government will not invite senior Uzbek officials 
for bilateral discussions.  He is also concerned, and 
rightfully so, about how the Uzbek press might play up the 
visits.  If recent official travel is a model, it is likely 
that the GOU and Uzbek media will use them to showcase 
Uzbekistan's international political and economic 
interaction, even if the results are lackluster. 
PURNELL