VZCZCXRO4781
OO RUEHGH RUEHHM
DE RUEHIN #1337/01 1070900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170900Z APR 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9742
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2026 
TAGS: ECCT PARM MTCRE JP TW
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN EXPORT CONTROL TECHNICAL ISSUES 
 
REF: A. STATE 5106 
 
     ¶B. STATE 36441 
     ¶C. STATE 30954 
     ¶D. STATE 21176 
     ¶E. AIT TAIPEI 00171 
     ¶F. STATE 008195 
     ¶G. AIT TAIPEI 00141 
 
Classified By: AIT DEPUTY DIRECTOR DAVID KEEGAN, REASONS 1.4 B, C, D. 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: On April 10 CSI Kaohsiung Head Probo Munoz 
met with BOFT Export Control Taskforce Head Wally Su to 
discuss changes that needed to be made to Taiwan's regulatory 
system and the challenges of implementing the export control 
"gameplan."  Munoz acknowledged that some of the challenges 
were complex and needed further research on solutions.  AIT 
also delivered ref A demarche.  Action request para 10.  End 
summary. 
 
AIT/T Calls for Technical Assistance 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (S) In an April 2 meeting with Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign 
Trade (BOFT), AIT Taipei delivered ref A demarche and 
listened to BOFT discuss its frustration over trying to meet 
some of the technical challenges of implementing the export 
control gameplan.  AIT Taipei relayed the general substance 
of these frustrations to Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
Kaohsiung Head Probo Munoz, and arranged for him to meet with 
BOFT Export Control Taskforce Head Wally Su on April 10. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Munoz is a veteran U.S. Customs officer now 
stationed in Kaohsiung, Taiwan as an AIT/K CSI consultant. He 
works closely with Taiwan Customs, the Port of Kaohsiung 
Harbor Bureau, and the shipping lines using the Port of 
Kaohsiung and is familiar with the atual practices at 
Kaohsiung Harbor and at other harbors around the world.  On 
the morning of April 10, he noted to AIT that he had just 
received instructions from his headquarters in Washington to 
assist in helping Taiwan deal with its larger export control 
issues. 
 
Export Control Impossible with Current Practices 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (S) Munoz began the discussion with Su by pointing out 
that Taiwan would never have effective export controls as 
long as it allowed goods to be added to containers after the 
manifest was completed, as, he said, was now commonly done in 
Kaohsiung.  He also noted that many transit or transshipment 
cargoes still came into port manifested only as "general 
cargo" or "personal effects."  Until Taiwan started requiring 
a complete manifest for all transit cargoes and prohibited 
changes to a container's contents after the manifest is 
completed, effective export control would be impossible, he 
said.  He asked Su to consider issuing administrative 
regulations to change these two aspects of current 
procedures. 
 
CSI Could Improve Taiwan's Export Control 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) When Su asked if CSI could help target ships with 
cargoes to or from North Korea or Iran, Munoz said that while 
CSI did not have data on transit cargoes manifested as going 
to or coming from North Korea or Iran, it did have data on 
companies that do business with these countries.  He said 
that one of the most powerful features of CSI was its 
extensive database on trading companies, the commodities they 
handled, and the customers they serviced. He said that he 
would check with his headquarters in Washington about 
providing this information to Taiwan export control 
officials.  Munoz said that all of the items that Taiwan was 
asked to control in transit were also controlled when they 
transited U.S. ports on the way to or from North Korea or 
Iran.  Munoz suggested that Taiwan's difficulty with 
 
TAIPEI 00001337  002 OF 002 
 
 
licensing transit cargoes could be overcome if Taiwan 
required the shipping line to provide a complete, detailed 
manifest to Taiwan Customs officials 24-48 hours prior to the 
arrival of ships in harbor. 
 
No Easy Solution to Transit License 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Su responded by pointing out that even a detailed 
advance manifest would not provide sufficient information to 
determine whether or not a transit/transshipment license 
should be issued for items on Taiwan's unique sensitive 
commodities lists (SCL), as required by Taiwan's export 
control "gameplan" commitments.  Su noted that to determine 
whether a license should be issued, BOFT needed to know 
information not normally on the manifest, such as the name of 
the manufacturer, ultimate consignee, intended use, end user, 
agent, etc.  Su illustrated his point with the example of a 
good being shipped from Japan to Hong Kong to Kaohsiung to 
Iran.  The item might not be on any of the Strategic 
High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) international control lists, and 
so not require a formal export license from Japan.  However, 
the item might be on Taiwan's unique SCL (which contains many 
items not on any other control list) and require a transit 
license to pass through Kaohsiung. 
 
Legal Consequences All Around 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Su explained that in this situation the exporter 
would not necessarily know that the ship was routed through 
Kaohsiung, and captain of the ship would have no way of 
knowing the additional information needed for license 
determination, and would not risk the penalties for bringing 
his ship to Kaohsiung with goods that might be denied a 
transit license.  Not only would no licensing information 
would be collected by Japanese authorities if no formal 
export license was required for export, but, Su added, Taiwan 
Customs had no direct channels of communication with Japan 
Customs and these types of information were considered highly 
sensitive in Japan and most places.  Su noted that two Taiwan 
Customs officials had been sent to jail recently for 
revealing information on shipping manifests, and while TECRO 
and AIT have exchanged letters on sharing customs 
information, Japan has not agreed to share such information 
with Taiwan. 
 
Further Study Required 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Munoz said he did not have any ready answer for the 
problem Su had described, but that he would research and 
consult with his headquarters regarding a solution. 
 
¶9.  (S) Su said he would be holding meetings with industry 
representatives in the near future to discuss Taiwan's new 
SCL and license requirements.  He said that Taiwan companies 
had already expressed interest in learning how U.S. companies 
deal with complex export control regulations and he wondered 
if CSI or AIT might be able to help him locate U.S. companies 
willing to discuss their procedures.  AIT will discuss this 
possibility with AmCham Taipei. 
 
10  (S) Action request: AIT requests guidance from Washington 
agencies on how to advise BOFT to deal with the technical 
issue described in para 6-7. 
YOUNG