VZCZCXRO7315
RR RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0173/01 1172223
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272223Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3046
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1195
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0815
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0990

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016 
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL FJ
SUBJECT: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN FIJI: ANSWERING 
QUESTIONS 
 
REF: A. USDAO SUVA FJ 181938Z APR 06 
 
     ¶B. HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI 112254Z APR 06 
     ¶C. CIA WASHINGTON DC 143447 
     ¶D. SUVA 133 
     ¶E. SUVA 167 
 
SUVA 00000173  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Dinger, Sec. 1.4 (B and D) 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
¶1. (C)  Ref A provided a partial response to a number of 
questions raised by HQ PACOM (ref B) and CIA (ref C) 
concerning issues raised in Suva reporting (ref D and 
previous) about the state of play in Fiji between Republic of 
Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander Bainimarama and the 
Qarase government.  This cable supplements the response to 
PACOM's queries and scenarios.  Headlines key to Ref B. 
Embassy comments are necessarily speculative.  Some are based 
on recent conversations with Fiji Police Commissioner Hughes 
(protect) and Fiji Attorney General Bale.  In short, the RFMF 
has continued to attempt to influence Fiji politics in the 
lead-up to May elections and has suggested, at times, that it 
could intervene if the current Qarase government is 
re-elected and then continues past policies.  That rhetoric 
could be bluff, but at times Bainimarama gives the distinct 
impression he means what he says. 
 
National security discussions? 
------------------------------ 
¶2. (C)  Ref B asked about Fiji national-security discussions 
and National Security Council (NSC) meetings.  Commissioner 
Hughes informed us that Prime Minister Qarase and Home 
Affairs Minister Vosanibola, both of who are in caretaker 
status as they campaign for parliamentary seats in general 
elections to be held May 6-13, have not been holding 
regularly scheduled discussions with Hughes.  Neither has 
Hughes been asked to attend any National Security Council 
(NSC) meetings in recent months.  Hughes and Qarase had not 
met at all within the past month until, during our meeting 
with Hughes, the PM's office phoned and requested a briefing 
regarding the Solomon Islands crisis and the deployment of 
Fiji Police to assist. 
 
What role for the police in a coup? 
----------------------------------- 
¶3. (C)  Asked per ref B what role the Fiji Police would take 
if Commodore Bainimarama and elements of the Fiji military 
(RFMF) were to attempt a coup, Hughes said he has instructed 
the police not to attempt to intervene before or during any 
such event, acknowledging that the Fiji Police are no match 
for the RFMF in firepower.  In the aftermath of a military 
coup, Hughes suggested, the police could help "sort out" the 
situation.  Both Hughes and RFMF spokesmen have made clear 
that both police and military stand ready to protect a 
lawfully elected new government from any civilian-led coup 
attempt such as happened in 2000. 
 
What course might follow a coup? 
-------------------------------- 
¶4. (C)  Turning to ref B questions regarding Commodore 
Bainimarama's possible course of action if he were to 
institute a coup, we inquired what Hughes currently thinks is 
Bainimarama's intent.  Hughes indicated he is unable to read 
the man and suggested, as he has in the past, that 
Bainimarama suffers from "post-traumatic stress" related to 
the military mutiny of November 2000 when he was shot at by 
some of his troops.  Hughes noted that sometimes Bainimarama 
sounds like he is bluffing when he talks coup, but sometimes 
he seems very serious.  We recall that Bainimarama speculated 
in the past that if he felt compelled to remove the 
government he would want to turn over powers quickly to an 
interim civilian government, one which would agree in advance 
not to run in any elections held later to return Fiji to 
normalcy.  On the other hand, per ref D, Bainimarama told 
Hughes in late February that he learned from 2000 (when he 
installed Qarase as interim PM), and if he were to act now he 
would retain executive power for the long term. 
 
What if the government attempts to remove Bainimarama? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶5. (C)  Ref B inquired about several possible "combat 
indicators" for a coup.  Ref B's first queried combat 
indicator: what if the government were to attempt to remove 
Bainimarama?  Qarase told us a few weeks ago that he does not 
intend to do anything until after the election, but if he 
 
SUVA 00000173  002 OF 003 
 
 
retains power he "will have to sort it (Bainimarama's 
insubordination) out."  During the current political 
campaign, Qarase has publicly mentioned taking the RFMF's 
expansive interpretation of its national-security duties 
under the Constitution to Fiji's Supreme Court for an 
opinion.  Note: many legal scholars believe Fiji's 1997 
Constitution deliberately and dramatically reduced the powers 
of the RFMF in the political arena as compared to the 1990 
Constitution which was enacted by those who engineered Fiji's 
1987 coups.  The RFMF publicly disputes that interpretation. 
End note.  Vice President Madraiwiwi has indicated privately 
that he and President Iloilo "may have to consider" invoking 
executive powers over the military commander under the 
Constitution if after the elections Bainimarama remains a 
serious thorn.  Pretty clearly though, the President and Vice 
President would much prefer Bainimarama to exercise 
self-restraint.  Per Ref A, some sources close to the 
military indicate strongly that any serious attempt to force 
Bainimarama from his job would bring a "coup" response. 
 
What happens if a new government passes "the Bill"? 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶6. (C)  Ref B's second queried combat indicator: what if 
there is legislative action to pass controversial 
ethnic-Fijian-oriented bills on reconciliation, fishing 
rights, and Fijian courts?  Fiji Attorney General Bale told 
us April 27 that if Qarase's SDL wins the elections, it does 
intend to reintroduce a reconciliation bill; however, he 
said, it would be considerably improved, attempting to take 
into account the many criticisms of last year's bill.  The 
new bill would still set up a commission to consider remedies 
to help the people of Fiji escape the past, and either a 
perpetrator or a victim could seek to invoke the commission. 
But both perpetrator and victim would have to accept the 
commission's jurisdiction for there to be any remedial 
action.  Asked Embassy Suva's comment, we noted that the 
Qarase government failed to consult with the Indian community 
before pushing the original bill, giving the "victims" from 
2000 no real input or sense of ownership.  Bale gave no 
indication that any deliberate effort to consult the Indian 
community in advance is contemplated this time either.  In 
addition, we recalled past concerns that "amnesty" could 
contribute to a continuation of Fiji's "coup culture." 
Certainly, it would be important to study the details of the 
new bill in that regard.  AG Bale indicated that a 
fishing-rights bill will also be re-introduced in the new 
Parliament if the SDL wins.  When we noted Bainimarama's past 
fierce opposition to both bills, Bale offered no response. 
Bainimarama has indicated that those bills are among the 
Qarase policies which, if pursued again by the new 
government, could trigger RFMF intervention. 
 
What if coup-criminals achieve high office? 
------------------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) Ref B's third queried combat indicator: what if 
convicted coup participants are appointed to key government 
ministries?  That already took place last fall, when Ratu 
Naigama, who was convicted of assisting coup participants in 
Labasa, later was reinstated in the Qarase Cabinet as 
Transport Minister.  The move drew heated criticism from 
Bainimarama but nothing more.  Bainimarama did make clear 
prior to the Great Council of Chief's selection of the 
President and Vice President in March that inserting a coup 
convict into either of those senior roles would be 
unacceptable.  The GCC evaded that threat by reappointing the 
incumbents. 
 
What if new-government cabinet seats become an issue? 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶8. (C) Ref B's final queried combat indicator: what if 
Qarase's SDL is re-elected and it refuses to follow the 
Constitution's requirement to allocate Cabinet seats to all 
parties that garner 10% or more of seats in Parliament?  This 
was a serious constitutional issue following the 2001 
elections when Qarase initially declined to provide Cabinet 
slots to opposition-leader Chaudhry's FLP and then, when 
forced by the courts, offered only relatively powerless 
slots.  Even though the Fiji Supreme Court has ruled that the 
Constitution's requirements must be followed, much grumbling 
continues, including by Qarase, that the allocation provision 
is wildly impractical.  Bainimarama did not impose his views 
regarding the issue post-2001, and it has not been visible on 
his agenda lately. 
 
Does U.S. or Australian pressure help? 
 
SUVA 00000173  003 OF 003 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
¶9. (C)  Finally, ref B inquired about the effect, if any, 
that U.S. or Australian pressure has had on Bainimarama.  He 
told Hughes, per ref D, that he doesn't care about 
international opinion, including the possible loss of aid 
money from Australia, the United States, and New Zealand. 
Certainly, Aussie, Kiwi, and American repeated expressions of 
concern about his coup rhetoric and repeated reminders of the 
proper, subordinate role for a military in a democracy have 
not deterred Bainimarama and his military spokesmen from 
continuing to threaten intervention if they see the need. 
That said, we know Bainimarama values his military 
relationships abroad, and he is anxious to host the Pacific 
Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) in September.  He knows full 
well that a coup would shatter such plans.  While PAMS and 
other such relationships surely factor into Bainimarama's 
calculations, we think his sense of "what Fiji needs" weighs 
much heavier.  It remains possible that recent RFMF rhetoric 
is simply bluff, intended to warp the elections against 
Qarase's SDL.  Even bluff, of course, is worrisome if it 
distorts a "free and fair" election. 
 
And the winner is? 
------------------ 
¶10. (C)  We are told that Bainimarama is feeling quite upbeat 
about the coming election, believing that Chaudhry's 
opposition FLP will win, at least in part due to the RFMF's 
concerted "truth and justice" campaign in Fijian villages. 
The RFMF describes that campaign as not oriented against any 
particular party, simply an attempt to educate the 
ethnic-Fijian populace about the evils of 2000-style ethnic 
politics; however, much of the rhetoric is clearly 
anti-Qarase.  As noted in ref E, many observers believe 
Qarase's SDL is still the favorite, though the FLP could pull 
an upset.  Qarase told us his sense is that the RFMF's 
anti-SDL campaign has actually driven ethnic-Fijian voters 
toward the SDL rather than away.  Time will tell. 
DINGER