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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI'S ELECTION: THE SYSTEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 
REF: SUVA 133 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C)  The campaign for Fiji's May 6-13 general elections is 
in full force.  Paragraphs 2-7 describe aspects of Fiji's 
Constitution and current electoral procedures that create 
complications and make it difficult to predict the winner. 
Most everyone expects the two largest parties, Prime Minister 
Qarase's SDL and Opposition Leader Chaudhry's FLP to gain the 
most seats.  Increasing ethnic-Fijian dominance in 
demographics suggests the SDL should win, but a solid Indian 
base and a "preference" voting system gives the crafty FLP a 
chance.  Observers from around the world will help judge if 
the election is "free and fair."  Fiji military politicking 
against the SDL could complicate that judgment.  If Qarase's 
SDL wins and continues past policies, the Fiji military has 
threatened to remove him.  If Chaudhry's FLP wins, 
ethnic-Fijian nationalists may well plot a repeat of the 2000 
coup.  Even an orderly election may not guarantee a stable 
path forward for Fiji.  End summary. 
 
A primer on Fiji elections 
-------------------------- 
¶2. (U)  As Fiji prepares for general elections May 6-13, we 
provide this brief summary of the system under the 1997 
Constitution.  The basic concept is a Westminster model, with 
the public electing 71 parliamentarians who select a prime 
minister from among themselves.  The PM selects other 
parliamentarians to take on ministerial responsibilities for 
the various government functions.  (The PM, Opposition 
Leader, and Great Council of Chiefs contribute selections for 
an appointed Senate, as well.)  As with any electoral system, 
the devil is in the details. 
 
Race still counts... 
-------------------- 
¶3. (U)  The Constitution accepts that Fiji has race-based 
politics and attempts to moderate that fact.  Recognizing 
history and perceived voter inclinations, most electoral 
districts are "communal:" 23 are ethnic-Fijian, 19 
ethnic-Indian, 3 "General," and one Rotuman (from a island 
far in Fiji's north).  The ratio was believed roughly to 
reflect actual ethnic percentages as of 1997.  When voters 
register, they declare their ethnicity and provide proof as 
necessary.  In the election, each voter casts a communal vote 
for a candidate from his/her racial group running for a 
race-based seat.  Three separately-drawn electoral maps are 
each overlaid across the entirety of Fiji for the 23 Fijian, 
19 Indian, and 3 Generals communal seats.  The 1997 
Constitution instituted a new concept as well: "open" seats. 
Yet a fourth electoral map is overlaid on the nation, 
supposedly so that each of 25 "open" seats has roughly equal 
population.  All those registered voters residing in an 
"open" geographic district are eligible to vote for any 
open-seat candidate running in that district, regardless of 
ethnicity.  Thus, every registered voter casts two ballots, 
one communal and one open.  Voting is compulsory.  Those who 
fail to do so can be fined, though implementing that rule has 
proved difficult. 
 
...With preferences aimed at bridge-building 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶4. (U)  In an attempt to encourage politicians to build 
bridges across the ethnic divide, the 1997 Constitution 
instituted "preferential" voting, instead of "first past the 
post."  In order for a candidate to win a seat, that 
candidate must obtain more than 50% of the vote.  If no 
candidate has achieved that on the first, raw count, the 
candidate with the lowest raw total drops out and that 
candidate's votes are redistributed to all other candidates, 
based on preferences filed by the low-total candidate in 
advance of the elections.  If still no candidate has a 
majority, again the lowest remaining candidate drops, with 
that candidate's preferences redistributed, etc.  In reality, 
given a plethora of parties in Fiji, quite a number of 
candidates only win after receiving others' preferences. 
Pre-election negotiations among parties for preference 
allocations are intense. 
 
A complicated ballot; many invalid votes 
---------------------------------------- 
¶5. (U)  The Fiji ballot is complicated.  Each party and 
independent candidate running in a constituency chooses a 
symbol.  The voter can tick next to a party/independent's 
symbol "above the line," in which case that ballot is cast 
for that party/independent and its preferences.  Or the voter 
can number next to the individual candidates "below the 
line," in which case consecutive numbers must be placed 
 
SUVA 00000167  002 OF 003 
 
 
beside the names of all candidates who are vying for that 
constituency's seats.  If a voter ticks both above and below 
the line or numbers only some candidates below the line, the 
ballot is invalid.  In the two elections under the 1997 
Constitution (1999 and 2001), many ballots were invalidated, 
about 12% of those cast in 2001. 
 
Registration complicated, too, with room for errors 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶6. (SBU)  Voter registration is also complicated.  To save 
money, Fiji doesn't register voters continually.  A new, 
mandatory registration takes place in advance of each 
election.  (Proposals are in place to convert to continuous 
registration.  Time will tell whether the next Government 
will fund the Elections Office sufficiently in the out years 
to permit that, though New Zealand is prepared to front most 
of the cost.)  Inevitably there are complaints that the 
intensive, house-to-house voter-registration effort in the 
lead-up to an election misses some voters or registers some 
in wrong constituencies or as the wrong ethnic group, either 
by accident or by malign design.  The FLP has alleged 
thousands were wrongly registered this time around and that 
the Elections Office has corrected only some of the problems. 
 Interestingly, two FLP politicians are currently under 
police investigation for allegedly bribing 
election-registration officials to shift batches of voters 
across constituency lines. 
 
Census postponed; boundary and voter calculations doubtful 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶7. (U)  By happenstance, 2006 was to be the year both for 
Fiji's 10-yearly census and for general elections.  The 
Government decided such a juxtaposition would be too 
complicated and, thus, postponed the census until 2007.  In 
the past ten years, many Fiji citizens have migrated, either 
from outer areas to Suva and Nadi/Lautoka or from Fiji to 
places abroad.  As a result, election-district boundaries 
based on the 1996 census are certainly out of date; but with 
no census data to support changes, Fiji's Electoral 
Boundaries Commission decided to maintain existing 
boundaries.  Also, with the existing election districts 
having very different and uncounted actual populations, it is 
impossible to know with any certainty whether all or nearly 
all actual voters have been registered. 
 
What does it all mean for 2006?  Open seats are key 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶8. (U)  The two biggest parties from the 2001 election, PM 
Qarase's (predominantly Fijian) SDL and Mahendra Chaudhry's 
(predominantly Indian) FLP, are expected to win the most 
seats again in 2006, with each winning most, if not all, of 
their predominant ethnic group's communal seats, often on the 
first count.  The election will likely hang on the dozen or 
so open seats where voter registration displays no clear 
ethnic lead.  There, voter turnout and preference allocations 
among the various more minor parties will matter a lot. 
 
Demographics indicate SDL; Indians' last chance? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶9. (SBU)  Historically in Fiji, Indians have voted in higher 
percentages than Fijians.  Qarase is hoping to change that by 
adding more polling stations and by appealing to his 
ethnic-Fijian base to turn out and keep the PM-ship in 
ethnic-Fijian hands.  That message resonates loudly. 
Interestingly, ethnic-Indian voter registration appears to be 
down significantly this year, at least in part because of 
migration abroad, which accelerated after the coup/riots of 
¶2000.  Another factor, reportedly, is a sense among some in 
the Indian community that voting is not worth the effort.  In 
the two instances when parties with significant Indian 
leadership won government (1987 and 1999), coups removed them 
within a year.  Some observers figure, given the 
demographics, that 2006 is the ethnic Indians' last chance to 
win a predominance of open seats and thus form a government. 
Most have presumed, though, given the demographics, that the 
SDL has the better chance. 
 
Preferences shake SDL confidence? Or a motivating tool? 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶10. (U)  Parties officially recorded their preference 
allocations on April 18.  Analysts have since been focusing 
on how independent candidates and the two biggest of the 
minor parties, the NFP and the NAP, apportioned open-seat 
preferences between the SDL and FLP.  It appears the minor 
parties and independents generally distributed high 
preferences among themselves.  When it came to favoring SDL 
or FLP for last preferences (which could well be crucial), 
allocations sometimes went on a seat-by-seat basis.  On April 
20, PM Qarase accused the NFP of bad faith in placing FLP 
 
SUVA 00000167  003 OF 003 
 
 
ahead of the SDL in preferences for a number of key open 
seats.  Qarase claimed that, as a result, SDL cannot win the 
election...unless ethnic Fijians turn out in force and cast a 
majority of the raw vote for SDL.  How much of that is 
genuine concern and how much is political motivation of the 
Fijian base is unclear. 
 
So many factors, so little certainty 
------------------------------------ 
¶11. (C)  Given Fiji's mix of communal and open seats, the 
outdated electoral boundaries, a migration of rural residents 
to urban areas which changes the ethnic and political mixes 
across the board, the arrival of a new, multi-ethnic National 
Alliance Party (NAP), some dissatisfaction with the ability 
to date of PM Qarase's government to improve the lives of 
ordinary citizens, concerns about the confrontational 
leadership style of opposition FLP leader Chaudhry, worries 
about whether an FLP-led government would stir another 
ethnic-Fijian-led coup (which factor might move some Indian 
votes to the NFP party), the Fiji military's repeated 
interventions into the political process in recent months in 
tacit opposition to Qarase's SDL, and Commodore Bainimarama's 
public threats to remove the future government if Qarase wins 
election and continues past ethnic-oriented policies (refs), 
it would be foolhardy to predict the election's outcome. 
 
A free and fair election?  Observers will help judge 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶12. (U)  A number of observers from abroad will be in Fiji 
for the elections, with sizable delegations from the EU and 
the Commonwealth.  We intend to observe a number of key 
polling sites using embassy personnel, with the intent to 
make our own judgment of whether the process appears "free 
and fair."  The University of the South Pacific will send out 
observers.  Each major party will have poll watchers.  The 
media, already reporting heavily and generally independently, 
will watch as well. The Fiji Police intend to have some 1500 
personnel on the electoral beat, both observing polling 
places and securing ballots through the counting.  And the 
Fiji military will be observing the whole process from its 
own vantage points.  Australian and New Zealand advisors to 
the elections office predict the process will be within the 
range of "free and fair."  Fiji Police Commissioner Hughes 
agrees.  Military commander Bainimarama has told us he is 
convinced Qarase and his SDL cohort have already corrupted 
the process irredeemably.  If the SDL loses, it may well be 
arguable that the Fiji military's blatantly anti-SDL lobbying 
and threats of a coup in recent months tarnished the process. 
 
And then what?  Unstable options? 
--------------------------------- 
13 (C)  It appears there are two likely outcomes to the 
election: either Qarase's SDL or Chaudhry's FLP forms the 
next government, on its own if it has the numbers, or in 
league with third parties and independent candidates to reach 
the magic majority of 36 seats.  If Qarase's SDL returns and 
resumes its legislative path toward controversial 
reconciliation and fishing-rights bills, the specter of 
Commodore Bainimarama's threat to intervene arises.  If after 
winning the elections, Qarase seeks to have the "system" 
remove Bainimarama, that could easily be another red-line to 
trigger military intervention.  If Chaudhry's FLP takes 
power, many will expect ethnic-Fijian nationalists to begin 
plotting their own coup yet again, despite Fiji military and 
police intentions to oppose any such action.  The only 
clarity is that no electoral outcome appears an inherently 
stable path forward for Fiji's democracy. 
DINGER