VZCZCXRO9893
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0133/01 0930232
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030232Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3002
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1178
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0071
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0798
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0974
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2031 
TAGS: PINS PGOV MARR PREL FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI MILITARY'S INTENTIONS: A WORRYING UPDATE 
 
REF: A. SUVA 64 
 
     ¶B. SUVA 72 
     ¶C. SUVA 92 
     ¶D. SUVA 98 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry Dinger.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (S)  The secret report of a late-February conversation 
between Fiji Police Commissioner Hughes (protect) and 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander Bainimarama 
is worrisome reading, with Bainimarama signaling he is 
willing to remove Prime Minister Qarase and place himself in 
power if the PM and his party win reelection in May and 
continue their present course.  Hughes noted (as we have) 
that the Commander's views in a conversation often vary from 
benign to a sense that military intervention is nearly 
inevitable.  Hughes concludes that Bainimarama is distorting 
and exaggerating the Fiji situation in describing what he 
sees as a duty to the nation that transcends democratic 
principles and processes.  Hughes reportedly warned the 
Commander that he is contemplating "treason," which would 
bring him into conflict with the police, the courts and the 
international community.  Bainimarama dismissed such "by the 
book" concerns as not applying to the Fiji context.  He added 
that he does not care about a possible loss of aid from 
Australia, the United States and New Zealand.  Hughes sees a 
"strong possibility" of a coup, if Qarase wins and doesn't 
alter course. 
 
¶2. (C)  In other developments, Bainimarama led 200-400 armed 
troops in a "parade" through Suva on the day Fiji's 
Parliament went into pre-election dissolution.  Our 
conversations with RFMF senior officers lately leave the 
impression the Commander has the support of his troops.  In 
conversations with Bainimarama, the Embassy and senior 
visitors have made clear U.S. views of the proper 
civil-military relationship and have signaled the sort of 
negative consequences that would follow a coup.  It is 
possible the RFMF's recent statements are bluff, intended to 
influence voters against Qarase and his party in the 
elections; but even that would be disturbing.  We will 
continue efforts to convince military leaders to act in 
appropriately democratic fashion.  Commander Bainimarama's 
Iraq-planning visit to Washington in late April will be 
another opportunity to reiterate USG views.  End Summary. 
 
Fiji's fractured civil-military relations 
----------------------------------------- 
¶3. (C) We have received several indications in recent weeks 
that the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) is seriously 
contemplating a coup if the current Qarase government is 
reelected and doesn't change course.  Reftels lay out the 
fractured relationship between RFMF Commander Bainimarama and 
Prime Minister Qarase's government and indications that the 
RFMF might seek to remove the government if it continues to 
act contrary to the RFMF's view of the national interest. 
Bainimarama drew two lines in the sand in February: if Fiji's 
Great Council of Chiefs selections in early March of Fiji's 
new President and Vice President were tainted by the 2000 
coup (in the end the GCC reselected the incumbents, fine with 
the RFMF) or if constitutionally required elections in 2006 
are flawed.  Bainimarama has since qualified the elections 
issue, saying the RFMF believes the elections will inevitably 
be manipulated by the Qarase government and will not be free 
and fair; however, the new government may be given a chance 
to perform appropriately: to set aside flawed reconciliation 
and fishing-rights bills; to turn away from 
"racist/nationalist" politics. 
 
Added evidence of RFMF "coup" contemplation 
------------------------------------------- 
¶4. (S)  We received on March 30 a copy of a "secret" memo 
Fiji Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes (protect) wrote after 
meeting with Commander Bainimarama on February 27. 
Admittedly the memo is a month old, but Hughes told an 
interlocutor on March 30 he considers it still accurate. 
(Hughes, an Australian Federal Police officer on secondment 
to Fiji, is home on holiday for two weeks, so we cannot 
follow up at the moment.  We have known him to be a solid, 
professional policeman with excellent judgment.)  In recent 
months, relations between Hughes and Bainimarama, which 
appeared relatively close seven months ago, have clearly 
become strained.  The Feb. 27 meeting did not help matters. 
Hughes portrayed an erratic Bainimarama surrounded by a 
compliant officers corps that is feeding the Commander's 
 
SUVA 00000133  002 OF 003 
 
 
sense of righteous grievance against the Qarase government. 
 
¶5. (S)  Hughes attempted unsuccessfully to allay 
Bainimarama's concern that the police were gearing up to 
confront the army.  The conversation then broadened to the 
RFMF's Pakistan-like "doctrine of necessity," put forth as 
justification for potential military action against the 
government (ref A).  Bainimarama railed against the "evil, 
corrupt, cannibalistic" Qarase government and expressed 
regret for putting Qarase in power during the events of 2000. 
 He said he should have retained power himself, for 5, 10, 
even 40 years.  Now, if he must remove the distasteful Qarase 
government, he would not appoint an interim government but 
would rule by himself.  Bainimarama discussed three possible 
flashpoints.  First was the March president and vice 
president selection process (now OBE).  Second would be 
re-election of the Qarase government.  Bainimarama said he 
"would not tolerate regression back to ethno-nationalism." 
Third, if the Indo-Fijian-dominated Labor Party wins the 
election and civil disorder results, the military would step 
in to restore order (seemingly to buttress the government, 
not to remove it). 
 
"Coup as catastrophe" argument falls on deaf ears 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶6. (S)  Bainimarama rejected Hughes view that a military 
government would be catastrophic for Fiji, suggesting that 
unnamed Indo-Fijian businessmen had told him Fiji could 
bounce back from another coup in 18 months.  Bainimarama 
added that he does not care about international reaction, 
including the possible loss of aid money from Australia, the 
United States and New Zealand. 
 
"Don't worry" v. "the stick" 
---------------------------- 
¶7. (S)  Hughes noted (as we have) inconsistencies in 
Bainimarama's logic.  He swung between saying "Don't worry, 
there won't be a military intervention" to implying a near 
inevitability of intervention no matter what happens at the 
polls.  Hughes reported he told Bainimarama that removing the 
government "would amount to treason."  The police, the 
courts, and others would be compelled in turn to take action 
against him.  Bainimarama dismissed this as "doing it by the 
book," which would not work under the circumstances.  Hughes 
suggested Bainimarama should educate rather than threaten. 
The Commander said education wouldn't work.  The Fijian 
people "only respond to the stick from us."  When Hughes 
raised practical issues for his police under a coup scenario, 
including for personal-protection officers who might be 
caught in the middle, Bainimarama responded: "as long as they 
didn't get in the way, they would be all right."  The Hughes 
memo notes that the police would be powerless to prevent a 
takeover. 
 
Lines have been drawn 
--------------------- 
¶8. (S)  In conclusion, Hughes painted a bleak situation in 
which "the lines have been drawn."  Hughes alleged the 
Commander is "distorting and exaggerating" the situation in 
Fiji to suit his own agenda.  He sees a duty to protect the 
nation in a role that "transcends democratic principles and 
processes."  He professes not to want to intervene 
militarily, but unless the government and Great Council obey 
his demands, he will take over.  He will not listen to 
contrary views and is underestimating or ignoring the 
repercussions of a coup.  Hughes concludes that Bainimarama 
is prepared for a military takeover, and there is a strong 
possibility this will occur if Qarase is returned to power in 
May and pursues policies that offend the Commander's sense of 
what is right.  Hughes ends by judging that the RFMF is not 
as strong nor as well-led as in 1987 (Fiji's first coups). 
In any coup attempt, factions would occur.  Hughes predicts 
any military government would be inherently unstable, which 
would lead to bloodshed and, inevitably, to that government's 
downfall. 
 
Recent events: an RFMF march in the streets 
------------------------------------------- 
¶9. (U) In March, Bainimarama and his spokesmen injected 
themselves frequently into Fiji's political debate.  On March 
27, the day Parliament was dissolved to make way for the 
elections (May 6-13), the commander led some 200-400 
(estimates vary) of his troops in a military "parade" across 
the capital city, passing by the Parliament compound.  The 
soldiers and their leader dressed in camouflage and carried 
weapons.  Bainimarama told the media the soldiers were doing 
"what soldiers should be doing - taking long walks, but this 
 
SUVA 00000133  003 OF 003 
 
 
is a public display of reassurance to the public." 
 
RFMF inner circle: support for the Commander 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶10. (C) At a recent social event hosted by the Embassy DATT, 
the Ambassador talked at length with several of Commander 
Bainimarama's inner circle, stressing the importance of the 
military taking its appropriate place subordinate to the 
elected civilian leadership in a democracy.  A few months 
ago, similar conversations with RFMF officers brought 
reasonably comforting responses: that the RFMF fully 
understood the lessons from 1987 and 2000: coups are a 
disaster for Fiji, and the nation "can not go down that road 
again."  Now the responses are unsettling: that the Qarase 
government and its corrupt, racist policies are a disaster; 
the RFMF has a duty to protect Fiji's best interests; the 
Commander has the support of his troops; the RFMF does not 
want to act but will do so if necessary. 
 
Comments 
-------- 
¶11. (S) The Ambassador, the DATT, and senior-level visitors 
like PACOM Commander Fallon, CENTCOM Commander Abizaid, and 
MFO Director General Larocco have good relations with 
Commander Bainimarama.  All have used interactions with the 
Commander in recent months to emphasize the U.S. view of 
civil-military relations.  Bainimarama is certainly giving 
the impression that, despite such advice, he is prepared to 
remove the Qarase government, if that government is reelected 
in May and if it then does not immediately change course to 
policies that meet RFMF approval.  The realities that such a 
course would contribute to Fiji's "coup culture," would have 
severe economic consequences, especially for Fiji tourism, 
and would result in ruptured military relations, including 
cancellation of the U.S. Army Pacific PAMS conference which 
is now scheduled for Fiji in September, appear not to be 
major factors in Bainimarama's calculations.  Such factors 
also do not seem to sway the senior officers we have been 
talking to lately. 
 
¶12. (S) It is conceivable that the rhetoric is just bluff, 
intended to influence the voting public to reject Qarase and 
his cohort in the elections.  Bainimarama has backed away 
from extreme statements before, suggesting he had been 
misunderstood.  Bainimarama and some of his senior officers 
have repeatedly tried to reassure us, saying "you don't need 
to worry."  Still, Commissioner Hughes is clearly worried 
that the threats are not bluff.  We worry, too.  We worry 
that the threats may be real, and we worry that, in any case, 
such threats will warp Fiji's electoral environment to the 
detriment of a free and fair election.  We will continue to 
utilize opportunities to try to convince RFMF leaders to play 
their proper, limited role in Fiji's governance.  Commander 
Bainimarama is planning to attend an Iraq planning conference 
in Washington later this month.  That will be another 
opportunity for the USG to reiterate its views. 
DINGER