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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000579 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BEYRLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR EUN LY IZ BG
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING MAY 4 WITH BULGARIAN PRESIDENT 
PURVANOV 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Bulgarian President Georgi Purvanov, whom you will 
meet May 4 in Vilnius, Lithuania, has played a key role in 
ensuring the continuity of this country's pro-U.S. foreign 
policy through three administrations in Sofia.  By any 
measure -- percentage of GDP spent on deployments abroad, 
number of soldiers serving in combat missions, or military 
personnel and civilians killed in Iraq -- Bulgaria is making 
a substantial contribution to international security relative 
to its size and resources.  Now we can also add the Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that Secretary Rice will sign in 
Sofia April 28, which gives the U.S. access to two air bases 
and an army training area as part of the brigade-sized 
Eastern European Task Force.  The long-awaited agreement is a 
milestone in our relations with this consistently reliable 
ally.  President Purvanov's support for the agreement has 
been essential. 
 
¶2. (C) Bulgaria is in Iraq and Afghanistan largely because it 
shares our interest in stability there, but Purvanov-- who 
faces reelection in the fall-- wants to be able to show 
voters that Bulgaria benefits from its strong support for the 
U.S.  It is important that he hear from you that Bulgaria is 
a valued and equal partner, not just in the security sphere, 
but across the entire spectrum of our relationship. 
President Bush said as much when he met Purvanov in the White 
House in October 2005, and the picture now, after the basing 
agreement and new Iraq deployment, looks even better. 
 
¶3. (C) The DCA negotiations have been the subject of 
widespread -- and more often than not, inaccurate -- coverage 
in the local news media.  Many Bulgarians oppose the idea of 
"foreign bases" on their soil, fear the United States will 
use Bulgaria as a launching pad to attack Iran, or believe 
that the U.S. presence will make Bulgaria a target for 
terrorists.  Polls show that the more people learn about the 
proposed U.S. presence, the less they oppose it, but 
Bulgarian officials -- including Purvanov -- need to do more 
to explain the agreement to the public. 
 
¶4. (C) The DCA comes on the heels of a government decision to 
send troops back to Iraq (after campaigning last year on a 
platform of immediate withdrawal), and coincides with the 
ramping up of its presence in Afghanistan, where Bulgaria 
will soon take over security for Kabul airport. 
Consequently, the government is seeking to shift some of the 
focus of public discussion away from the military aspects of 
our relationship and toward the political and economic.  Here 
too, we have a good story to tell.  Huge U.S. investments are 
in the pipeline, including a 1.4 billion dollar clean-coal 
power plant built by AES and a Hewlett-Packard call-service 
center that will create some 1000 knowledge-based jobs.  We 
still lag behind our EU partners in terms of direct foreign 
investment, but Purvanov should hear that we will not be 
satisfied until our investment and trade relations match the 
high level of our security cooperation. 
 
¶5. (C) The current government is understandably focused on 
getting into the EU on time, which means January 1, 2007.  We 
support this goal.  Brussels is sending mixed signals, in 
part to keep Bulgaria's feet to the fire on reform.  Current 
thinking appears to be that Bulgaria will join the Union as 
scheduled, but with at least a Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
safeguard clause and continued EU monitoring in that area. 
The Bulgarians are concerned by rumors the EU may be 
designing additional monitoring mechanisms for Bulgaria even 
after accession that could affect the flow of structural 
funds.  President Purvanov has just sent a plea to President 
Bush asking for a personal expression of support for 
Bulgaria's on-time EU accession.  He will likely reiterate 
this request in his meeting with you. 
 
¶6. (C) Bulgaria's problems with Brussels are primarily in the 
area of rule of law.  Passivity in the face of corruption and 
organized crime has been the weak point not only in this 
government's record, but its predecessors' as well.  This may 
be starting to change under pressure from the EU and with the 
appointment of a respected new Chief Prosecutor, a protege of 
Purvanov's.  However, Purvanov should understand that there 
is no daylight between the U.S. and the EU on this issue: 
corruption and organized crime are his country's Achilles' 
heel. 
 
 
SOFIA 00000579  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) In the longer term, we should encourage Bulgaria to 
wean itself from over-dependence on Russian energy.  Bulgaria 
buys 88 percent of its gas and 73 percent of its oil from 
Russia, resulting as well in a huge bilateral trade deficit. 
This dependency is difficult to break, however, in part 
because Bulgaria is paying 35 percent below market prices for 
its gas, affording Moscow significant potential leverage. 
Helping Bulgaria to avoid putting all its eggs in one basket 
is a long-term project; moving toward market pricing is a 
shorter-term tactic. 
 
¶8. (C) Purvanov will be pleased if you assure him, as the 
President did in October, that we are working hard to secure 
the release of the five nurses unjustly imprisoned in Libya 
since 1999 for allegedly spreading the HIV virus.  The fate 
of the nurses touches ordinary Bulgarians in the same way the 
Iran hostage crisis touched ordinary Americans, and Purvanov 
has been personally involved in discussions with Qadhafi to 
obtain their release.  Finally, you may want to privately 
encourage Bulgaria to continue to play a constructive role on 
the margins of the Kosovo final status talks by helping to 
build confidence between the two sides.  On that issue, the 
government seems to accept that Kosovo will gain its 
independence, but is concerned about a possible spill-over 
effect, especially in neighboring Macedonia. 
Beyrle