VZCZCXRO0877
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0383/01 1111634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211634Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4567
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2033
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000383 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KS MK
SUBJECT: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER'S MEETING WITH 
MACEDONIAN PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI 
 
REF: SKOPJE 373 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1. (C) During a tete-a-tete meeting April 13 in Skopje, 
President Crvenkovski gave Amb. Wisner his assessment of 
Serbian President Tadic as "pragmatic" in dealing with Kosovo 
status issues, while characterizing Serbian PM Kostunica as 
unlikely to compromise and more likely to walk out of the 
status talks, call for a referendum, and then call for early 
elections.  Complaining that Belgrade lacks strong leaders 
who can prepare the Serb public for independence as the 
likeliest status process outcome for Kosovo, Crvenkovski 
suggested a UN decision on future status that would appeal to 
neither side, while at the same time ensuring that neither 
party fully rejected the outcome, might cut through the 
Gordian knot. 
 
¶2. (C) Crvenkovski said some Serb leaders supported 
independence for Kosovo provided the breakaway province did 
not receive a UN seat, which they probably thought would 
allow Belgrade to tell the public that Kosovo had not 
received full independence.  Wisner argued that the U.S. aims 
for a Kosovar state with full attributes and 
responsibilities.  The President told Wisner that both Tadic 
and Kostunica were trying to be more nationalistic than the 
opposition Serbian Radical Party; it was therefore unlikely 
that anything could induce leaders in Belgrade to level with 
the public about Kosovo's future status.  Wisner asked 
Crvenkovski to continue regular contacts with Tadic and 
Kostunica, and to urge them to take a more constructive 
approach toward the final status process and its inevitable 
outcome.  End Summary. 
 
WISNER-CRVENKOVSKI MEETING 
 
¶3. (SBU) U.S. Special Representative for Kosovo Talks Frank 
Wisner met in private with President Crvenkovski April 13 in 
Skopje to discuss Kosovo status issues, with only the 
Ambassador accompanying.  The tte--tte meeting followed an 
expanded discussion that included Crvenkovski, his chief of 
cabinet and national security adviser.  Reftel reports on 
Amb. Wisner's additional meetings that day with other senior 
GOM officials and party leaders. 
 
TADIC PRAGMATIC, KOSTUNICA UNMOVING 
 
¶4. (C) Amb. Wisner warned that Belgrade was acting in ways 
that could have dangerous consequences for the status 
process, using MUP agents to warn Kosovar Serbs that they 
would suffer if they cooperated with the Kosovars and telling 
Kosovar Serbs that they would be financially cut off if they 
accepted salaries from local authorities.  Belgrade was 
sabotaging the process, which was unacceptable to the U.S. 
How could the international community (IC) get President 
Tadic and PM Kostunica to stop such actions? 
 
¶5. (C) Crvenkovski recounted a conversation he had with Tadic 
over dinner in December 2005 in Ohrid. He had asked Tadic a 
hypothetical question -- if the IC agreed that Kosovo would 
stay in Serbia and the Kosovars did not object, what was 
Serbia's capacity to handle the resulting situation, given 
the overwhelming K-Albanian population and the need for 
Serbia to move ahead on the path to NATO and EU membership? 
 
¶6. (C) Tadic had replied that that would be the worst 
possible outcome.  The best outcome, Tadic said, would be one 
that protected the K-Serbs' religious/cultural sites and 
property rights, and permitted continued K-Serb relations 
with Belgrade.  That outcome also would have to provide 
continued trade ties with Kosovo, and a real prospect for 
Serbia to receive EU membership and investment. 
 
¶7. (C) Crvenkovski's assessment was that Tadic understood how 
limited his options were, and that he would be pragmatic 
about next steps in the status process.  Crvenkovski said he 
did not think Tadic was behind the use of the MUP agents to 
intimidate K-Serbs, but agreed that someone in Belgrade, 
 
SKOPJE 00000383  002 OF 003 
 
 
possibly Serb military intelligence, was controlling them. 
 
¶8. (C) PM Kostunica, on the other hand, refused to discuss 
independence as a possible outcome.  Tadic had told 
Crvenkovski that he believed Kostunica would walk out of the 
talks and would take the issue to a referendum "with a 
question that would guarantee massive public support."  After 
that, the government would likely call for early elections. 
 
STRONG LEADERSHIP LACKING 
 
¶9. (C) Crvenkovski said Serbia needed, but did not have, 
strong leadership to deal with impending challenges.  Tadic 
did not have any real power, and Kostunica's party's poll 
ratings were under 10 percent.  As a result, there was no one 
in a leadership position who could tell the Serb public the 
truth about the likely course of developments in Kosovo. 
Former FM Siljanovic would be inclined to do so, Crvenkovski 
thought, but his influence was limited. 
 
MACEDONIAN EXPERIENCE PARALLEL 
 
¶10. (C) Drawing a parallel between the challenge facing 
Serbia today and the challenge facing the GOM in the early 
1990s when Macedonia was trying to join the UN and the name 
issue seemed insoluble, Crvenkovski noted that, in the end, 
the UN simply had told Athens and Skopje under which name the 
country would be admitted to membership.  Neither side had 
been satisfied with the outcome, but the UN decision had cut 
through the Gordian knot.  Wisner argued that all of our 
thinking about a Kosovar state had to be clear -- it would 
have the full attributes of statehood. 
 
¶11. (C) The key to the Kosovo conundrum, in Crvenkovski's 
view, was arriving at a solution that neither side would 
agree to or accept fully, while ensuring they did not 
entirely reject the outcome.  Wisner pointed out that the 
current challenge confronting Belgrade was more complex than 
the name issue.  If a referendum were held, followed by early 
elections, that would stop the status process for six months. 
 K-Albanian frustration would be difficult to contain. 
 
BELGRADE'S ATTEMPT TO CREATE DE FACTO PARTITION 
 
¶12. (C) Wisner said Belgrade's refusal to allow K-Serbs to 
participate in Kosovar institutions suggested it was trying 
to separate Serb areas from Kosovo in reality, if not on the 
map.  Belgrade had to allow the K-Serbs to make a deal in 
Pristina, and then implement in good faith whatever deal was 
reached.  Regular practical implementation of the Kosovo 
agreement would be critical; it would not suffice for both 
sides simply to agree not to reject the status outcome. 
 
MACEDONIA WILLING TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE 
 
¶13. (C) Crvenkovski said he would talk to Tadic again to try 
to persuade him to be more forthcoming.  PM Kostunica, his 
nationalism bolstered by the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), 
would be tougher to tackle.  Wisner said the SOC was split on 
Kosovo, with more moderate voices in the church calling for 
cooperation with the Kosovars to save the SOC's patrimony and 
to protect believers.  He said the U.S. would work on getting 
a "package deal" to address the SOC's concerns.  Wisner asked 
Crvenkovski to periodically visit Belgrade and to invite Serb 
leaders to Skopje to "hold their hands through this process." 
 
TWO SIMPLIFIED SOLUTIONS 
 
¶14. (C) Crvenkovski replied that Tadic had been right in 
pressing for elections before starting the talks, but it was 
too late now to move forward with that idea.  He suggested 
proposing to Belgrade two simplified solutions: 1.) Kosovo 
receives independence and Belgrade and the Kosovar Serbs 
receive nothing in return as compensation; or 2.) 
independence for Kosovo and maximum benefits in return for 
K-Serbs and Belgrade.  Wisner replied that, unfortunately, 
there was a third, unstated, option: delayed status process 
and the use of NATO forces in Kosovo to keep the K-Albanians 
under control.  The last was not an option anyone wanted to 
contemplate. 
 
SKOPJE 00000383  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT A UN SEAT? 
 
¶15. (C) Crvenkovski said some Serb political leaders had told 
him they could support independence for Kosovo as long as the 
breakaway province did not receive a UN seat.  Crvenkovski 
had asked them what was the point of such an arrangement, and 
they had not replied.  His own assessment was that they 
wanted to be able to tell the Serb public that Kosovo, 
without a UN seat, would not be fully independent. 
 
¶16. (C) Wisner said Tadic and Kostunica needed to clearly 
articulate what incentives were needed for them to persuade 
the Serb public that independence as an outcome was the only 
feasible option.  The USG would take a serious look at their 
suggestions.  Crvenkovski answered that it was not a question 
of what outcome the leadership could sell to the Serb public, 
but was instead a question of what Kostunica himself could 
accept. 
 
STABILITY OF SERBIA AFTER STATUS 
 
¶17. (C) Crvenkovski said that the main issue for the region 
at the end of 2006 would be the stability of Serbia. 
Belgrade's leaders would find 2006 a terrible year for 
Serbia: losing Montenegro and Kosovo, the impact of 
Milosevic's death, and having to hand over Mladic.  He noted 
that the Serb opposition, along with Milosevic, had lost 
Kosovo by trying to be more nationalistic than Milosevic 
himself.  The same thing was happening now in Serb politics. 
Tadic and Kostunica were trying to be more nationalistic than 
the opposition Serbian Radical Party.  Given that approach, 
it was  hard to see what could induce either leader to level 
with the public about Kosovo's future status. 
MILOVANOVIC