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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7605
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0564
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7283
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0884
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0642
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1198
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL MNUC EAID SW KN KS
SUBJECT: SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO DPRK DISCUSSES INTERNAL 
CONDITIONS IN APRIL 24 CALL ON THE AMBASSADOR 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) In an April 24 call on the Ambassador, Swedish 
Ambassador to the DPRK Mats Foyer confirmed that last year's 
bumper harvest was not sufficient to overcome the food 
shortage in North Korea caused by systemic failures in 
central food distribution.  Foyer saw, however, little sign 
of political unrest despite overall displeasure among the 
North Korean population from adverse living conditions. 
North Koreans' actual knowledge of the outside world was hard 
to ascertain, given the tight internal controls and 
restrictions on domestic travel for Koreans and foreigners 
alike.  Foyer also reported that the DPRK had surprised EU 
mission diplomats in September, when MFA North American 
Affairs DG Li Gun personally briefed them on the fourth round 
of the Six Party Talks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) On April 24, Swedish Ambassador to the DPRK Mats 
Foyer called on the Ambassador while visiting from Pyongyang 
for consultations in Seoul.  Foyer was accompanied by 
Karl-Olof Andersson, Swedish MFA Deputy Director for Asia and 
the Pacific, and Sophie Olsson, First Secretary at the 
Swedish Embassy in Seoul. 
 
FOOD SITUATION BAD DESPITE INCREASE IN HARVEST 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3.  (C) Foyer said the food situation was not good in North 
Korea despite last year's bumper harvest, largely due to 
failures in the DPRK's central distribution system.  Despite 
government estimates of a 30 to 50 percent increase in 
harvest from the previous year, the World Food Program 
believed, based on information from multiple sources, that 
the crop yield for 2005 was only about 15 percent above 2004 
figures.  Few parts of the country received full daily 
rations, with most provinces receiving only about 500 grams 
of food for each citizen per day.  Moreover, agents of the 
State Security Department reportedly stopped cracking down on 
black market trade in rice and other foodstuffs because 
ordinary North Korean people could not otherwise obtain 
enough food to survive.  Foyer also reported that many North 
Koreans had sought second jobs outside normal working hours 
and scavenged the countryside for tree sprouts, edible grass, 
and other items to supplement their diet. 
 
INSTABILITY UNLIKELY DESPITE DISCONTENT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Foyer noted that political movement to change the 
status quo was unlikely despite the clear discontent among 
ordinary citizens.  He said there were no signs of major 
unrest or any other form of political threat to the Kim 
Jong-il regime.  The DPRK appeared to have tightened social 
and political control in the past several months by keeping 
working-class civilians preoccupied with political studies, 
social activities, mass mobilization of labor for public 
works, and preparations for major public celebrations such as 
the 60th anniversary of the Korea Workers Party. 
 
¶5.  (C) Foyer believed efforts to tighten control suggested 
that the regime feared the possibility of changes to the 
status quo.  Pyongyang's recent move to drive out foreign 
NGOs and international aid workers should be seen in this 
context.  Foyer opined that the regime was not as concerned 
about external influence on civilians or low-level officials 
as it was about the effect on mid-ranking officials who 
engage well with foreigners.  As a result of tightened 
internal controls, the Swedish Embassy and other EU missions 
in Pyongyang had not been able to conduct field visits for 
their various assistance projects outside Pyongyang since 
December.  Foyer noted, however, that DPRK authorities had 
recently told EU chiefs of mission to "postpone" their 
proposed April visit to Hamhung instead of rejecting their 
travel request.  Foyer said they now sought approval for a 
visit to Hamhung from May 11 to 12. 
 
NORTH KOREANS' KNOWLEDGE OF OUTSIDE WORLD 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Foyer said it was difficult to ascertain the extent 
to which ordinary North Korean people knew about the outside 
world.  Noting that public propaganda had presented the ROK 
as having worse conditions than the DPRK during the famine in 
the 1990s, Foyer hypothesized that North Koreans could 
attempt to initiate change in their own society if they 
realized the world beyond North Korea was not as portrayed by 
the regime's propaganda.  He cautioned, however, that 
restrictions on domestic travel had stymied the spread of 
media that offered a window to the outside world, such as 
bootlegged videos of South Korean television shows and tales 
of visits across the border into China.  At the Swedish 
Embassy, however, the situation was quite different, as local 
staff had access to uncensored internet and foreign news 
outlets, such as BBC World, Foyer added. 
 
DPRK MFA SURPRISINGLY INFORMATIVE ON OCCASION 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Foyer said the Swedish Embassy currently sought to 
get a briefing on the April 11 session of the Supreme 
People's Assembly.  While he did not expect a detailed or 
candid read-out, Foyer pointed out that the North Koreans 
could, on occasion, reveal more information than expected. 
As an example, he recalled that MFA North American Affairs DG 
Li Gun, the deputy head of delegation to the Six Party Talks, 
had provided resident foreign diplomats a briefing on the 
September 19 Joint Statement shortly after the conclusion of 
the fourth round of the Six Party Talks.  The briefing was 
unusual because: (1) the DG for European Affairs would 
normally provide the briefing; and (2) Li, having personally 
participated in the Talks, could not prevent himself from 
stating "a bit more" than his talking points might have 
allowed. 
 
QUESTIONS TO AMBASSADOR ON 6PT, U.S-ROK RELATIONS, JAPAN 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Deputy Director Karl-Olof Andersson asked the 
Ambassador about the status of the Six Party process, as well 
as his views on Washington's relationship with the ROK and 
Japan.  The Ambassador said the DPRK continued to condition 
its return to the Six Party Talks on unfreezing DPRK accounts 
at Banco Delta Asia (BDA).  U.S. law enforcement measures 
were not, however, subject to negotiation.  Nevertheless, the 
Ambassador stressed, the Six Party Talks remained the most 
sensible way to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue and the United 
States was ready to return at any time. 
 
¶9.  (C) On U.S.-ROK relations, the Ambassador stated that the 
bilateral relationship was in good shape, although some 
difficult issues remained.  The difference in the two 
governments' viewpoints on certain policy issues -- such as 
the North Korea problem -- was, however, often exaggerated in 
the Korean press.  On ROK-Japan relations, the Ambassador 
stressed that the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo 
appeared stable despite occasional political skirmishes on 
territorial and historical issues. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for the 
Swedish Embassy's assistance in Pyongyang in assisting 
American citizens and representing U.S. interests. 
VERSHBOW