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DE RUEHUL #1377/01 1150819
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O 250819Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7522
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0542
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7270
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0622
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EAP/K PASS USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: A/S HILL'S APRIL 13 MEETINGS WITH CHUNG 
DONG-YOUNG, PARK GEUN-HYE 
 
Classified By: Pol M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) In separate meetings April 13, EAP A/S Christopher R. 
Hill discussed the status of Six Party Talks and U.S.-ROK 
relations with the leaders of Korea's two main political 
parties.  Chung Dong-young, Chairman of the ruling Uri Party 
and former Minister of Unification, expressed concern that 
the confluence of U.S. actions at the Six Party Talks and on 
illicit activities gave the impression of a hardening in the 
U.S. position.  Park Geun-hye, Chairwoman of the Grand 
National Party (GNP), stressed the importance of a unified 
U.S.-ROK approach to North Korea, saying that the allies must 
not let the North Korea issue harm our bilateral 
relationship.  On other issues, Chung told A/S Hill that 
there was some concern within the ruling party that the ROKG 
was rushing into FTA negotiations against the deadline set by 
the expiration of U.S. TPA authority.  He suggested that 
inclusion of Kaesong-made products could persuade skeptics to 
support the trade agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A/S Hill was accompanied to both meetings by the 
Ambassador and NSC Asia Director Victor Cha.  Chung was 
joined by Reps. Chae Su-chan and Suh Hae-sook.  Park was 
accompanied by Amb. Lee Jai-chun, GNP International Relations 
Committee Chairman, and Rep. Yoo Jung-bok, Chief of Staff to 
the Chairwoman. 
 
NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In separate meetings April 13, A/S Hill briefed Uri 
Chairman Chung and GNP Chairwoman Park on his meetings in 
Tokyo on the margins of the April 11-12 Northeast Asia 
Cooperative Dialogue (NEACD) conference.  He had good 
meetings with ROK counterparts, noting the usefulness of the 
U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral meeting.  All five parties had 
delivered a single message: It was incumbent upon North Korea 
to return to the Six Party Talks.  A/S Hill expressed 
disappointment that the North Koreans had proved unprepared 
to discuss a return to the Talks.  He acknowledged that other 
parties had pressed for him to meet bilaterally with the 
DPRK's VFM Kim Gye-gwan, but that he had declined as 
Pyongyang's track record suggested that such contact at this 
time was unlikely to be productive.  A/S Hill stated that 
Washington continued to hope to solve the nuclear issue 
through the Six Party Talks, but underscored that patience 
was running out.  He stressed that we must continue to press 
Beijing to lean on Pyongyang. 
 
¶4.  (C) Chung agreed that Pyongyang's truculence was 
disappointing.  It had been seven months since the parties 
had agreed to the September 19 Joint Statement.  The parties 
should be implementing the agreement, but instead we were 
forced to waste time standing still.  Chung observed that A/S 
Hill's refusal to meet with VFM Kim, along with continuing 
U.S. action on illicit activities, was creating the 
impression that Washington was not only shunning North Korea 
but was moving to assume a threatening stance. 
 
¶5.  (C) Separately, GNP Chairwoman Park expressed her full 
support for the U.S. approach to the North Korean nuclear 
issue, human rights, and illicit activities.  She stressed 
the importance of the bilateral and trilateral relationships 
among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, noting that Pyongyang 
sought to exploit any differences among the three.  She 
remarked that, during a visit to Tokyo the previous month, 
she had been struck by the fact that Japanese leaders agreed 
with her views on North Korea, while current South Korean 
leaders did not.  Park observed that if the international 
community were to speak with one voice that integration was 
the only way for the North Korean regime to survive, the 
problem would be resolved sooner than expected.  Park 
speculated that differences in opinion between Washington and 
Seoul were encouraging Pyongyang to defer its return to the 
Six Party Talks.  She also criticized the Roh Administration 
for its silence on human rights abuses in North Korea and the 
regime's counterfeiting activities.  She vowed that the 
ROKG's approach to North Korea would be better aligned with 
the USG's if and when her party won the presidency in 2007. 
 
(NOTE: Park is a front-runner to be the GNP's nominee in the 
December 2007 presidential race. Her main challenger within 
the party at this point is Seoul Mayor Lee Myung-bak. END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶6.  (C) A/S Hill told Park that it was important not to allow 
problems with the DPRK to weaken the U.S.-ROK relationship. 
He said that the biggest difference between Washington and 
Seoul was that the ROKG sometimes wanted dialogue for the 
sake of dialogue, while Washington wanted results.  He also 
noted that the media's penchant for exaggerating differences 
contributed to needless misunderstandings.  A/S Hill 
expressed concern that other issues, such as the 
re-examination of the USFK/CFC/UNC command structure and FTA 
negotiations, could further strain bilateral relations. 
 
FTA, KAESONG 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Asked to comment on the ruling party's stance on a 
U.S.-ROK FTA, Chung stated that there was consensus that an 
FTA was necessary and useful.  That said, reflecting public 
opinion, many in the ruling party bridled under the pressure 
and sense of haste imposed by the March 2007 deadline for 
completing negotiations.  Given that there were more than 
12,000 items to be covered by the U.S.-ROK FTA, the Korean 
public needed to feel that the country had had sufficient 
time to prepare for and conduct negotiations.  Aside from 
rice, Chung noted that Koreans would be particularly 
concerned that an FTA could "destroy" the ROK's public 
education and public health care systems.  He acknowledged 
that because the debate over the FTA would be divisive, the 
Uri Party would not conduct formal intra-party discussions of 
the FTA until after the May 31 nation-wide local elections. 
 
¶8.  (C) Continuing, Chung said that he would lead a 
delegation of about 100 Uri lawmakers on a visit to the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) at the end of April.  He 
offered his "personal opinion" that inclusion of KIC-made 
products under the terms of a U.S.-ROK FTA would be very 
persuasive to those Uri lawmakers currently opposed to the 
FTA.  Many Uri members believed that KIC-made products should 
be included in the FTA not just for political, but also for 
economic reasons.  After all, if Korean companies were unable 
to get their KIC-made products to U.S. and EU markets, it 
would limit the KIC's potential.  Chung asserted that we 
needed to create a situation in which Kim Jong-il came to see 
KIC as integral to his regime's survival.  He claimed that, 
under the ROK Constitution, Kaesong, along with the rest of 
the DPRK, was part of the ROK.  Responding to A/S Hill's 
quey, Chung stated that ROK companies were attracted to KIC 
for three reasons: physical proximity, shared language and 
culture with North Korean workers, and low monthly wages of 
about USD 57 per month.  He predicted that, if the nuclear 
issue were solved, South Korean companies would flood into 
KIC.  A/S Hill noted U.S. concerns about the KIC, especially 
the issue of wage rates and whether these would constitute an 
unfair labor practice or even a human rights issue. 
VERSHBOW