VZCZCXYZ0017
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1349/01 1141019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241019Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7490
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0532
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7265
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0611
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1187
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PBTS PHSA PREL EFIS MOPS KSAC JA
SUBJECT: ROKG READOUT ON MARITIME RESOLUTION WITH JAPAN 
 
REF: A. SEOUL 1323 
 
     ¶B. SEOUL 1314 
     ¶C. SEOUL 1271 
     ¶D. SEOUL 1246 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (C) MOFAT DG for the Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau Lee 
Hyuk on April 24 told POL M/C that Seoul was relieved that it 
managed the maritime survey dispute and prevented a worsening 
of the already strained relationship with Tokyo.  Both sides 
agreed that (1) Japan would recall its ships and drop its 
current survey plan; (2) the ROKG would maintain the right to 
name undersea features in its exclusive economic zone at an 
appropriate time (meaning after the International 
Hydrographic Organization meeting in June); and (3) Seoul and 
Tokyo would resume discussions on resolving EEZ disputes as 
soon as possible, perhaps in May.  Lee emphasized that the 
ROKG had stuck to its initial position and was relatively 
satisfied, despite domestic criticism for not being tough 
enough with Japan.  Seoul planned to conduct its own surveys, 
perhaps in July, in waters that Tokyo might consider to be 
overlapping EEZs.  South Korea also intended to submit new 
names of underwater features to the IHO next year.  Lee 
appealed for USG efforts to persuade Japan not to repeat its 
most recent provocation.  END SUMMARY. 
. 
ROKG STRATEGY: CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In an April 24 meeting with POL M/C, Lee Hyuk, Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Bureau DG Lee Hyuk, expressed relief that 
Seoul negotiated an understanding with Tokyo that essentially 
maintained the ROKG's initial position, despite some domestic 
criticism that it had not been tough enough.  South Korean 
and Japanese diplomats on April 22 agreed to a three-point 
understanding: (1) Japan would recall its survey ships; (2) 
Korea maintained the right to name undersea features within 
its EEZ at an appropriate time; and (3) the two sides would 
hold discussions on delineating their EEZs perhaps as soon as 
May. 
 
¶3.  (C) Lee emphasized that Seoul successfully rebuffed 
Japanese efforts that could have weakened South Korean 
sovereignty to the islet of Dokdo (Takeshima) and the 
surrounding waters.  It maintained the precondition that 
Tokyo first had to drop its plan to dispatch survey ships to 
the region before anything could be agreed.  Thereafter Seoul 
emphasized that it still had the right to name undersea 
features within its EEZ, but that it would proceed with such 
efforts after necessary preparations were completed.  Lee 
said that Japan was allowed to explain that it understood the 
term "appropriate time" to mean that Seoul would not submit 
names to the International Hydrographic Organization in June, 
even though Seoul did not explicitly say this.  The ROKG 
position was to neither deny nor endorse that Japanese 
interpretation. 
 
¶4.  (C) Lee said the discussions over the weekend nearly 
ruptured a couple of times.  The talks began at 5:30pm Friday 
night and went until midnight before resuming at 5:30am on 
Saturday.  Around 3:30pm Saturday, the South Korean side was 
ready to say the talks had failed.  Still, talks continued. 
Later, around 7:00pm South Korean negotiators were again 
ready to quit and were on their way back to MOFAT before 
receiving a call from the Japanese side to return.  Lee 
reported that the Japanese side then yielded.  Earlier 
Japanese proposals included joint maritime surveys in waters 
that Tokyo claimed were in overlapping EEZs; Seoul, however, 
responded that there were no areas of overlapping EEZs. 
 
¶5.  (C) Lee opined that Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yachi 
came to Seoul looking for an amicable solution and proved to 
be reasonable and forthcoming.  Yachi reportedly faced 
criticism from conservatives in Japan for his initiative to 
visit Seoul, and therefore was open to the risk that the 
talks could have proven unsuccessful. 
. 
TOUGH SEAS AHEAD 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The agreement bought both side time, Lee asserted, 
but what was needed was to convince Tokyo not to create 
another provocation because the ROKG could not tolerate any 
challenges to South Korean sovereignty over Dokdo.  The ROKG 
could not and would not change its plan to conduct scientific 
surveys in July of South Korean EEZ waters, some of which 
Japan might consider as an area of overlapping EEZs.  Perhaps 
next year, Seoul would submit names for undersea features 
within its EEZs.  It was unclear how Tokyo would protest 
either of these actions.  Should Japan respond with a similar 
provocation, South Korea would have to take defensive action. 
 
¶7.  (C) Lee said that President Roh was also quite firm on 
the issue of Dokdo, noting that Roh would make a statement on 
April 25 about the agreement and Korea's relations with 
Japan.  Lee did not preview the message but indicated that, 
since the negotiations over the weekend were conducted under 
Roh's instructions, his statement would probably be 
consistent with the resolution. 
 
¶8.  (C) Lee concluded the meeting by appealing for USG 
efforts to persuade Japan not to repeat this type of 
provocation.  Seoul hoped that Washington would seek to 
restrain Tokyo. 
VERSHBOW