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OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHHM
DE RUEHUL #1270/01 1080730
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180730Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7360
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 5987
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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 001270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM AGMT KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG DISCUSSES BANGKOK SIX AND KIM CHUN-HEE 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 2202 
     ¶B. STATE 60901 
     ¶C. SEOUL 1108 
     ¶D. STATE 60316 
     ¶E. SEOUL 911 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) MOFAT DG for Policy Planning Nam Gwan-pyo on April 18 
told POL M/C that Seoul was relieved to hear that the six 
North Koreans had arrived safely in Bangkok (ref a).  MOFAT 
has instructed its Embassy in Bangkok to assist in vetting 
and resolving the case quickly and quietly.  Seoul was 
positively considering some of the logistics, like whether to 
provide interpretation services from a South Korean seconded 
to UNHCR or another method.  If asked by the media, the ROKG 
would reiterate its long-standing position of neither 
confirming nor denying individual North Korean asylum cases. 
Pressed on the Kim Chun-hee case (ref c), Nam said that ROKG 
officials were considering whether to raise the broader 
concerns about the safety and welfare of anyone forced to 
return to North Korea at the inter-Korean ministerials later 
this week. END SUMMARY. 
. 
BANGKOK SIX 
----------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In an April 18 meeting with POL M/C, Nam Gwan-pyo, 
MOFAT's Director-General for Policy Planning, expressed 
relief that the six North Korean asylum seekers had safely 
arrived in Bangkok.  He said that he had been somewhat 
concerned given the involvement of several NGOs and the long 
distance the North Koreans had to travel.  MOFAT has 
instructed its Embassy in Bangkok to assist in resolving the 
case quickly and quietly.  Regarding vetting, he said Seoul 
would extend all assistance.  For now, he saw no need for 
ROKG officials to talk directly with the North Koreans, 
unless the USG needed it.  The ROKG also stood willing to 
respond to any informational inquiries.  It was examining how 
to best provide interpretation services, perhaps by tasking a 
South Korean seconded to the UNHCR or finding other skilled 
personnel.  Nam said, however, Seoul probably would not 
select a diplomat from its Embassy in Bangkok. 
 
¶3.  (C) He had heard that NGOs were involved and foreign 
media might be aware of the case.  Still, he believed that 
the whole situation should be approached with extreme 
discretion.  If asked by the media, the ROKG would reiterate 
its long-standing position of neither confirming nor denying 
individual North Korean asylum cases.  The most important 
thing was to process the case quickly and quietly.  Seoul 
would respect the free will of the North Koreans in regard to 
where they wanted to resettle. 
. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CASES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Nam noted that the case of the Bangkok Six was 
different from what had been generally discussed between USG 
and ROKG officials (ref c).  Those discussions had been 
focused around processing a North Korean who was already in a 
refugee camp or otherwise in hiding.  In this situation, 
however, the North Koreans directly approached the U.S. 
 
SEOUL 00001270  002 OF 002 
 
 
Embassy upon arrival.  He opined that this was unlikely to 
escape public attention and might encourage other North 
Koreans to do the same.  After a successful application for 
resettlement to the United States, conservative media outlets 
or NGOs might try and instigate other North Koreans to follow 
suit. 
 
¶5.  (C) To the question of whether many North Koreans might 
seek resettlement outside South Korea, Nam replied that after 
recent media coverage of asylum seekers being resettled in 
Europe, the numbers of applicants had increased.  This was 
relatively surprising because Europe was so far away that 
some in Seoul had not seen Europe as a viable option.  He 
speculated that crackdowns in China coupled with increasing 
NGO resourcefulness contributed to a greater flow to Europe. 
 
¶6.  (C) He reiterated that if North Koreans approached ROKG 
missions and requested asylum in South Korea, Seoul would 
consider the person a defacto ROK citizen and would help the 
individual relocate.  In the event, however, that a North 
Korean approached a ROKG mission and asked for asylum in the 
United States, which he said had not happened yet, Seoul 
would find it hard to do much beyond referring the person to 
UNHCR.  Seoul would prefer not to contact third country 
missions directly but rely on UNHCR. 
. 
KIM CHUN-HEE 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) POL M/C informed Nam about USG efforts to encourage 
governments to follow-up on the case of Kim Chun-hee, also 
known as Choi Eun-sun (ref d).  Nam said that Seoul had 
raised the issue with Beijing several times and was in close 
cooperation with UNHCR in China.  Pressed further on the need 
to make the ROKG position clear, Nam said that there were 
different opinions within the ROKG on timing and method for 
approaching this issue.  It was unlikely that the specific 
case of Kim Chun-hee would be raised at the inter-Korean 
ministerials in Pyongyang (April 21-24).  However, he hoped 
that the ROKG side would mention in general terms its concern 
regarding North Koreans forced to return to the DPRK. 
VERSHBOW