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PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0814/01 1031704
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P 131704Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3241
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR (DICARLO), EUR/SCE 
(ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, 
GREGORIAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA:  HDZ REBELS FOUND BREAKAWAY PARTY -- WITH 
DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS MCELHANEY.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  On April 8, HDZ rebels -- some 
formally ousted from HDZ by its leader, Dragan Covic -- 
founded a new BiH political party:  "HDZ 1990."  The name is 
intended to recall (supposed) prewar days of Croat unity in 
BiH.  The approximately 350 attendees at the session were a 
schizophrenic mix of anti-Covic moderates and hardline 
nationalists, an unstable pairing made possible largely by 
shared electoral ambitions.  But while "HDZ 1990" may not be 
viable over the long term, it is bad news for the 
constitutional reform package agreed by party leaders last 
month (and scheduled for parliamentary debate two weeks from 
now).  For "HDZ 1990," opposition to Covic means opposition 
to the package.  In the days ahead, we (and European 
ambassadors) will heighten the pressure we are already 
putting on HDZ 1990's more moderate members (particuarly 
Martin Raguz), trying to get them to take a more constructive 
stance. It will be an uphill battle.  In a meeting this week 
with HDZ 1990's leader, the Ambassador underscored that 
America and the EU would judge this new party by its stance 
on constitutional reform.  Our first goal:  getting HDZ 
1990's MPs to allow the constitutional reform package to move 
from committee to the House floor -- even if their proposed 
amendments are rejected.  At this point, the committee vote 
hinges on three votes, one of which belongs to HDZ 1990's 
Martin Raguz.  His support is critical if the package is to 
move forward.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE OUSTED, THE DISAFFECTED AND THE REPREHENSIBLE JOIN FORCES 
 
¶2.  (C)  Since Dragan Covic's removal from the BiH Presidency 
last year, he has focused on consolidating his leadership of 
BiH's primary Bosnian Croat political party, HDZ.  But 
Covic's election as party president was highly 
controversial, with well-founded allegations of a fraudulent 
vote count at last June's party congress.  Covic's 
challenger, Bozo Ljubic, protested strongly and publicly -- 
joined by sympathizers from within HDZ ranks.  Covic, 
however, brooked no opposition.  In November, Covic formally 
ousted Ljubic, Parliamentary Speaker Martin Raguz and 
Federation Deputy Speaker Josip Merdzo from HDZ.  These 
"rebels" were left with few options.  Joining one of the 
fringe Croat parties would not get them what they needed: 
viable candidacies for office in the October 2006 general 
elections. 
 
¶3.  (C)  They joined forces with Ljubic at Saturday's 
"founding congress," along with some 350 other attendees. 
Prominently arrayed in the ranks were not only relative 
moderates such as Raguz, but also some with troubling 
hardline credentials.  Among the latter:  Vinko Zoric, a 
Croat member of the BiH House of Representatives who was a 
known advocate of Croat self-rule.  Other attendees at the 
conference with hardline backgrounds:  Slavica Josipovic, 
Pero Markovic, and Ivo Lozanzic.  Their credentials were 
reinforced by the large presence of those active in the 
"Third Entity" movement of 2000-2002 (Note:  the 
international community acted forcefully to blunt this 
movement, including via the removal, by then-High Rep 
Petritsch, of the ethnic Croat member of BiH's 
Tri-Presidency).  In addition, the Congress gave special 
recognition to the "founders of the HDZ and HVO." 
 
WHAT DOES HDZ 1990 STAND FOR? 
 
¶4.  (C)  With this troubling membership mix, HDZ 1990 
desperately needs a defining issue beyond mere personal 
opposition to Covic.  And it believes it has found one in the 
Covic-backed constitutional reform package now before 
Parliament.  At the congress, Covic-challenger Bozo Ljubic 
alleged that the agreement would reduce the Croat people to a 
national minority, and termed it unacceptable.  Martin Raguz 
echoed Ljubic's opposition -- while underscoring that HDZ 
1990 took as its model Sanader's HDZ in neighboring Croatia. 
Vinko Zoric called the constitutional changes a "betrayal of 
the Croat people" in BiH and said he would rather see his 
"hands dry up" than sign on. 
 
¶5.  (C)  HDZ 1990's program hits on predictable themes.  It 
advocates a decentralized state "which respects the 
tripartite separation of power."  Looking at current 
constitutional reform efforts, the program specifically 
singles out retention of qualified majority voting for 
condemnation.  It insists on a new constitution for BiH, and 
 
SARAJEVO 00000814  002 OF 002 
 
 
advocates a federal formula based on ethnic, geographic, 
economic, traffic and historical criteria.  However, a 
none-too-subtle sub-theme is one that smacks distinctly of 
"third entity," a non-starter for the USG and European 
capitals. 
 
U.S. PUTS THE PRESSURE ON LJUBIC TO LIMIT IMPACT ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
¶5.  (C)  With constitutional reform scheduled for debate in 
the House of Representatives, every HDZ vote counts.  That is 
true not only in the vote in the Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs Committee (CLAC) on April 18, but also on the House 
floor on April 24.  It is therefore troubling to find that 
two HDZ parliamentarians have sent HDZ 1990 letters of 
support (though hedging their votes by not joining):  Ruza 
Sopta and Filip Andric. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador met with HDZ 1990 leader Ljubic on 
April 12.  The Ambassador sent Ljubic a clear message:  the 
U.S. would judge its relationship with his party based on its 
ability to play a constructive role on constitutional reform. 
 We understood that HDZ 1990 would try to lobby for certain 
amendments (Ljubic focused on qualified majority voting and 
beefing up the role of the House of Peoples) -- but HDZ 1990 
should not make rejection of amendments an obstacle to 
eventual support of the package.  If HDZ 1990's proposed 
amendments failed, we expected party members to allow the 
reforms to move forward. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Ljubic argued that HDZ 1990's requests were 
reasonable; he himself could not support the constitutional 
reform package, as it currently stood, in Parliament.  The 
Ambassador pressed:  Ljubic was not an MP, but had influence 
on those HDZ 1990 members and sympathizers who were.  Ljubic 
needed to allow HDZ 1990 MPs to support the package.  The 
U.S., the EU and the international community would judge HDZ 
1990 on the basis of its conduct at this crucial moment. 
 
AND ON OTHER HDZ 1990 MPS 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Ambassador made a similar argument to Martin 
Raguz, who is sweating the pressure.  When the High 
Representative spoke to Raguz on April 12, Raguz did not 
suggest blocking the package.  Rather, he indicated that, 
while he could see the possibility of getting HDZ 1990s 
amendments adopted, he did not exclude seeing the package 
moving forward unamended.  However, Raguz was clearly looking 
for assurances that the issue of qualified majority voting 
could be raised, again, in "phase 2."  The Ambassador meets 
with Raguz again today; we will provide further details 
septel. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Finally, we are also pressing two other key MPs. 
Filip Andric, while HDZ, is on the outs with Covic.  While he 
has not formally cast his lot with HDZ 1990, he knows that, 
as a witness against Covic in his upcoming trial, he may be 
booted from HDZ in the near future and will be looking for a 
soft landing.  Andric's opposition to constitutional reform 
is strongly focused on the role of the House of Peoples.  The 
Embassy message to Andric:  given his critical role in the 
committee stage, Andric needs to allow the package to move to 
the floor, unamended. 
MCELHANEY