VZCZCXRO7148
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0742/01 0991324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091324Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3193
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR (DICARLO), EUR/SCE 
(ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, 
GREGORIAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA:  VOTES LACKING TO PASS CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS MCELHANEY.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Constitutional reform measures agreed on 
March 18 by Bosnia and Herzegovina's political party leaders 
are now under consideration by relevant committees in the BiH 
Parliament.  Driven by Bosnia's electoral calendar, 
amendments must be approved by the end of April in order for 
the changes to the national government to be in place by the 
October 2006 general elections.  With 15 crucial days to go 
before Parliament acts, our count indicates that we have not 
-- yet -- nailed down all the votes we need.  Some 
parliamentarians continue to argue that the changes do not go 
far enough; they reject the existing package in favor of a 
non-existant but theoretically more sweeping package to be 
negotiated in the future.  As intensive Embassy lobbying 
(bolstered by the international community) moves forward, we 
are emphasizing a united message:  these changes are an 
important first step, essential for BiH's Euro-Atlantic 
integration, and the best which can be agreed by all parties 
now.  For the first time, Bosnians are changing their 
Dayton-era constitution themselves.  As the parliamentary 
vote nears, we will need a strong public message from 
Washington to bolster our public diplomacy outreach.  This 
cable is the first in a series of updates on constitutional 
reform legislation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE TIMELINE:  DECISION BY APRIL 25 
 
¶2.  (C)  After reaching political agreement March 18 on a 
package of measures to strengethn Bosnia and Herzegovina's 
national government, political leaders approved draft 
amendments and legislation for parliamentary approval and 
sent it forward on March 25.  The measures provide for a 
single President with limited competencies and two Vice 
Presidents.  The Council of Ministers becomes the key 
institution of executive authority, and the Prime Minister 
receives enhanced powers.  In Bosnia's bicameral parliament, 
the House of Representatives will double in size, and the 
upper house -- the House of Peoples -- will find its role 
limited to consideration of issues touching on the vital 
national interest of Bosnia's three peoples. 
 
¶3.  (C)  While political leaders agreed to forward the 
legislation on March 25, Bosnian Croat HDZ leader Covic 
insisted on having more time for review.  This week, on April 
5, the leaders met again at his request -- though Covic sent 
a substitute.  As the basis for the meeting, Covic reworked 
some of the amendments, in clear violation of elements of the 
earlier political agreement.  These were rejected by the 
party leaders (bolstered by the Ambassador's presence at the 
meeting). 
 
¶4.  (C)  Legislation is now under consideration by the House 
of Representatives' Constitutional and Legal Affairs 
Committee (CLAC).  The CLAC will hold one public hearing 
only, on April 12.  We anticipate that it will get a large 
turnout, including members of both houses of parliament, the 
Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Court, entity-level 
officials, law school faculty, etc.   The Ambassador plans to 
give extensive media interviews on April 11, so that April 
12's news focuses on U.S. support for the package. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The CLAC will vote on the legislation on April 18 
and forward the legislation to the full House of 
Representatives for consideration.  The Constitutional 
Committee of the House of Peoples will do the same on April 
¶22.  The House of Representatives will hold the required two 
readings of the legislation and vote all in one day:  April 
¶24.  The House of Peoples will do the same on April 25.  The 
Ambassador will attend the House session; we will ask all PIC 
Steering Board Ambassadors to attend as well. 
 
BUILDING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE OF REPS . . . 
 
¶6.  (C)  Both the Embassy and the BiH political party leaders 
are engaged in a full court press to build support for the 
legislation.  Party leaders are counting on party discipline 
to ensure passage (always an iffy assumption here), and are 
briefing their representatives.  Nevertheless, there are 
pockets of opposition. Although the small multi-ethnic 
government coalition partner "Party for BiH" (SBiH) 
participated in the negotiation process, it withdrew and is 
now formally opposed thanks to the Presidential ambitions of 
its once and future leader, Haris Silajdzic.  Also opposed: 
the small Bosnian Serb Radical party and a couple of small 
 
SARAJEVO 00000742  002 OF 003 
 
 
parties without parliamentary representation.  They are 
joined, critically, by several members of the Bosnian Croat 
HDZ who -- having been ousted from their party positions by 
HDZ leader Covic -- are opposed to anything Covic has 
negotiated. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In the 42-seat House of Representatives, 28 votes 
are needed to ensure passage.  We estimate we have 23 solid 
votes now.  Our strategy is to focus on several potentially 
persuadable representatives to get the five votes needed. 
This includes key SBiH parliamentarians who are clearly 
uncomfortable with Silajdzic's self-interested rejectionism. 
The Ambassador met on April 6 with SBiH's Beriz Belkic; 
Belkic, deeply uncomfortable with SBiH's stance (having 
participated in negotiations through January), admitted that 
it was difficult to explain.  Belkic told the Ambassador that 
SBiH planned to offer an amendment to the legislation which 
would eliminate qualified majority voting in the House of 
Representatives (QMV, also known as the "entity vote"). 
Unless QMV was eliminated, SBiH would vote against the 
package (rather than abstaining).  However, Belkic added that 
he was still open for discussion. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Ambassador pressed Belkic to reconsider.  Surely 
Belkic realized, from his participation in the negotiations, 
that the Bosnian Serbs could not agree to end QMV now? 
Belkic admitted he did.  Ambassador  pointed out that Belkic 
and SBiH had a clear choice to make:  support constitutional 
reform now, or be responsible for putting the brakes on 
Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic integration.  With his reputation for 
responsible government, Belkic should not align himself with 
those who wanted the first Bosnian-negotiated constitutional 
reform to fail. 
 
¶9.  (C)  SBiH's proposed amendment would put the Bosniaks and 
Croats in a bind.  President Tihic told the Ambassador on 
April 4 that his party, SDA, could not be put in the position 
of voting to maintain the practice.  In the meeting of party 
leaders with the Ambassador on April 5, Tihic proposed that 
-- if the amendment was tabled by SBiH -- the Bosnian Serb 
parties allow SDA, HDZ and the largely Bosniak SDP to side 
with SBiH.  The Bosnian Serbs could then veto the provision 
in the full House.  While the Bosnian Serbs rolled their eyes 
(realizing that they would once again be portrayed negatively 
in the press), SDP leader Lagumdzija argued persuasively that 
all the party leaders must stand, together, against amendment 
and for the compromises they had negotiated together.  The 
Ambassador will reinforce this point with Tihic in the coming 
days. 
 
¶10.  (C)  We are also putting the pressure on several Croat 
HDZ MPs.  Over the past few months, HDZ President Covic has 
consolidated his hold over the party, while ousting his 
internal opposition.  That has made several key HDZ 
parliamentarians rebel; they are strongly and publicly 
against any plan negotiated and backed by Covic.  The Embassy 
has told key HDZ parliamentarian Martin Raguz not to make 
constitutional reform a weapon in his fight against Covic. 
Raguz is sweating under the pressure (which he is also 
getting from European ambassadors).  Several other anti-Covic 
HDZ rebels we met with this week are waiting to see what 
Raguz does before making up their own minds. 
 
. . . IN THE HOUSE OF PEOPLES . . . 
 
¶11.  (C)  By our reckoning, party solidarity in the House of 
Peoples means that we already have sufficient support there. 
Nine of 15 votes are required, including three from each 
ethnic caucus.  We estimate we have twelve solid votes; there 
are no HDZ rebels among the House of Peoples delegates. 
 
 . . . WITH RELIGIOUS FIGURES . . . 
 
¶12.  (C)  Public support will also be essential to getting 
constitutional reform through parliament.  Both party leaders 
and the Embassy are reaching out to leading civil society 
figures.  The Islamic Community's governing body Rijaset 
issued a supportive statement on March 28.  However, 
conservative Catholic Church leaders are proving a tougher 
sell.  President Tihic reportedly met with Vatican General 
Secretary Angelo Soldano the week of March 25, explaining the 
 
SIPDIS 
benefits of constitutional reform and asking for support. 
The Ambassador met with Cardinal Puljic in Sarajevo on April 
¶6.  Puljic initially claimed that the Church did not get 
involved in politics, but when pressed by the Ambassador 
 
SARAJEVO 00000742  003 OF 003 
 
 
acknowledged that Peric's statements had blatantly already 
crossed the line by putting out a statement strongly critical 
of reform, and making clear Church criticism of the U.S. 
Puljic argued that, as Bosnia's smallest constituent people, 
the Croats needed more from constitutional reform -- i.e., 
more ways to block legislation with their minority votes. 
However, he eventually agreed that the upcoming Easter 
holidays were a good time to focus on religious, not 
political, matters. 
 
. . . AND WITH OPINION LEADERS 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Over the past ten days, Ambassador, in 
conjunction with the German, Austrian and UK ambassadors, 
have continued outreach to BiH's opinion leaders.  (UK PM 
Blair's comments on the issue here were greatly welcomed.) 
In separate meetings with newspaper columnists, media editors 
and owners, NGO representatives, academic and cultural 
figures, he has stressed the importance of constitutional 
reform for BiH's Euro-Atlantic future.  The response has been 
strongly supportive, though Croats remain the most skeptical. 
 The Ambassador will conduct targetted media outreach next 
week, and host similar discussions in Herzegovina the week of 
April 18 for those who have been unable to make the trek to 
Sarajevo. 
 
¶14. (C)  Our outreach to the Bosnian Serb community has, of 
necessity, been more low-key.  Constitutional reform is not 
viewed as positive by most Bosnian Serbs.  They are ready to 
accept the political leaders' agreement on this set of 
reforms precisely because it focuses on national 
institutions.  Our challenge will be to get support for the 
next -- post-election -- phase of the constitutional reform 
process.  That is the phase which, by examining 
"sub-national" government structures, will most threaten 
entity (read:  Republika Srbska) prerogatives. 
 
DEPLOYING EU, SBA AMBASSADORS -- AND CAPITALS 
 
¶15.  (C)  At our request, the German and Austrian ambassadors 
have been focusing pressure on Bosnian Croat politicians, 
particularly HDZ rebels.  Ambassador briefed the April 7 
meeting of Steering Board Ambassadors on constitutional 
reform.  The High Rep and SBA agreed to work out a 
coordinated lobbying strategy, to be deployed the week of 
April 10.  Included will be suggestions for using statements 
from both Brussels and Washington to ratchet up pressure 
closer to the April 24/25 votes.  Further updates to follow. 
 
¶16.  (C)  COMMENT:  We are not there yet.  If the majority 
parties in favor of the package do not stick together, 
Silajdzic and the Croats could bring the whole reform process 
down.  Interestingly, those who believe the reforms are not 
enough and those who want more have formed an alliance of 
convenience.  Intense lobbying and media work will continue. 
MCELHANEY