VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #0907/01 0921306
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021306Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3430

S E C R E T SANAA 000907 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER KAWC YM
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO STATUS OF TRANSFERS FROM GTMO 
 
REF: STATE 47838 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1.  Summary.  (S)  This cable is post's response to reftel 
request for a Country Team assessment of the ROYG's ability 
and willingness to provide security and humane treatment for 
the 13 Yemeni GTMO detainees cleared for transfer.  Regarding 
humane treatment, the ROYG provided adequate written 
assurances that the detainees will be treated in accordance 
with Yemeni law, but will not explicitly agree to third-party 
monitoring, especially by USG officials.  Domestic political 
pressure and limited capacity render the ROYG unable to 
ensure that the detainees will no longer pose a continued 
threat to the international community. Increased training, 
equipment, and facilities upgrades, as suggested in reftel, 
may improve the ROYG's ability to investigate and prosecute 
these individuals, but will not provide a short-term solution 
to the shortcomings of the ROYG's security services.  End 
Summary. 
 
-------- 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  The ROYG is likely to provide written assurances 
that it will take responsibility for the security of the 
returnees, but will view this pledge as an indication that 
the ROYG, and not the USG, has the authority to make all 
decisions related to the detainees once they have been 
returned to Yemen. 
 
¶3.  (S) The limited capacity of the Yemeni security apparatus 
hinders the ROYG's ability to ensure that these individuals 
will no longer pose a threat to the international community. 
Security officials have a limited ability to surveil and 
monitor.  In addition, large regions of the country have 
limited to no government presence, which further erodes the 
ROYG's ability to maintain constant surveillance.  The ROYG 
has the ability to deny passport privileges and stop an 
individual from transiting any official border crossing. 
Given Yemen's long and porous borders, however, an individual 
can easily leave the country without being detected. 
 
¶4.  (S) The ROYG's limited security capabilities are 
compounded by pervasive corruption, as evidenced by the 
escape of 23 al-Qa'ida supporters from prison in February. 
While the ROYG's investigation into that incident continues, 
it is likely that the bribing of prison officials played a 
significant role in facilitating the prisoners' escape. 
While cooperation with USG agencies has increased in the wake 
of the breakout, the ROYG is unlikely to provide the USG with 
information on the detainees' movements in a comprehensive or 
consistent manner. 
 
----------------------------- 
Investigation and Prosecution 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S)  The ROYG has a limited but increasing ability to 
investigate and prosecute individuals if there is evidence 
that they are members of (or have aided) al-Qa'ida or one of 
its affiliates.  Within the last several years, the ROYG has 
successfully tried a number of al-Qa'ida supporters, even 
though Yemeni law has no specific anti-terrorism provisions. 
Most suspected al-Qa'ida supporters have been tried and 
convicted under laws related to forming an armed gang 
(maximum sentence of 15 years) or obtaining fraudulent 
documentation (maximum sentence of seven years).  Yemeni law 
allows suspects to be detained for 48 hours without charges, 
but this law is frequently ignored and individuals have been 
detained indefinitely on suspicion of terrorist activity. 
 
 
¶6.  (S)  The ROYG's ability to complete independently a 
comprehensive investigation is limited, given a lack of 
resources and expertise related to forensics and 
surveillance.  During the USS Cole trial, for example, the 
ROYG relied heavily on FBI-collected and analyzed data. 
Investigations of suspected terrorist crimes are also 
generally conducted by the Political Security Organization, 
which rarely shares all the information derived from 
investigations with the Attorney General's office. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Humane Treatment and Access 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S)  The ROYG will likely only agree to treat detainees 
in accordance with domestic law, which prohibits torture. 
The ROYG is unlikely to explicitly agree to USG or 
third-party access to transferred individuals.  While it is 
unlikely that the ROYG will grant any kind of consistent 
access to USG officials, the ROYG has granted periodic access 
to third-party organizations like Amnesty International to 
visit security detainees who claim they were transferred from 
USG custody.  ROYG officials responded to public inquiries 
about these detainees by stating that they were being held 
without trial at the behest of the USG. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Comment: The Question of Political Will 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S)  In addition to a clear lack of capacity, domestic 
politics will play a large role in terms of Yemen's 
willingness to provide assurances and devote their limited 
resources to managing the security threat, especially 
considering the resources already being devoted to tracking 
down the al-Qa'ida escapees.  Because of the September 
presidential and local council elections, President Saleh 
will be hesitant to provide any written assurances that give 
him the appearance of being controlled by the United States. 
 
¶9.  (S)  Given the ROYG's limited capacity to monitor 
detainees and independently investigate and prosecute 
terrorist-related crimes, the ROYG cannot guarantee that the 
transferred detainees will no longer pose a security threat. 
While post already works with the ROYG on a number of levels 
to increase its ability to combat terrorism, there are no 
short-term solutions to these shortcomings.  Training, 
equipment, and facilities upgrades could significantly 
increase the ROYG's ability to conduct investigations and 
prosecute these individuals, but would not have a measurable 
impact on the failings of the ROYG's corrupt security 
services or the tremendous domestic political forces 
buffeting Saleh. 
 
¶10.  (S)  If the detainees are released into ROYG custody, 
the Department should be prepared for the likelihood that the 
security services' deficiencies may allow these individuals 
to once again pose a security threat to the international 
community.  The best chance we have of managing this threat 
is to coordinate the monitoring of these individuals at a 
working level, rather than continuing to demand written 
assurances we do not foresee a prospect of obtaining at this 
point in time. 
Krajeski