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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3475
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 3937
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0471
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2911
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 5472
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0364
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 3139
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 8819
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 1605
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0507
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR KPKO UNUS MO AG
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON WESTERN SAHARA 
 
REF: A. 05 RABAT 2120 
 
     ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 794 
     ¶C. RABAT 772 
 
Classified By: Amb. Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 B and D 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Morocco is engaging in a disingenuous 
process to delay 
movement toward a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara 
conflict. 
Its domestic consultations on autonomy for the Western Sahara 
cannot be taken 
seriously, and have thus far excluded those who might offer 
differing points 
of view.  The Palace currently has sufficient political party 
support to move 
ahead with an autonomy proposal, but Morocco views 
perpetuating the status quo 
as working in its favor.  Quiet discussions between Morocco 
and the Polisario 
as suggested by Ambassador Bolton, with Algeria sitting in, 
are a good idea in 
that they could help to create a sense of inevitability about 
autonomy and lead 
to negotiations.  If they go ahead, we should keep the French 
closely apprised, 
and consider starting joint demarches with the French in 
Rabat and Algiers. 
Embassy concurs that a MINURSO renewal should be limited to 
90 days.  During 
this 90 day period Morocco should also be required to advance 
progress on an 
autonomy plan and discussions with the Polisario. This time 
should be used 
to examine ways to transfer responsibility for preventing 
conflict directly 
to Morocco and Algeria, and identify ways to more effectively 
address the 
equally serious threats related to illicit trafficking and 
terrorism in 
the Western Sahara and Pan-Sahel.  End summary. 
 
Consultations not serious 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  Embassy's view of current Moroccan actions is 
similar to that 
conveyed by USUN in ref (B).  Morocco has begun what can only 
be viewed 
as another slow roll on the Western Sahara, sharing not an 
autonomy plan 
 but a plan for protracted domestic consultation to justify 
more time from 
 the Security Council and avoid direct action that could lead 
to a settlement 
 of the conflict.  While there is a kernel of truth in 
Moroccan emphasis 
 on building a national consensus through a broad 
consultative process, 
this argument appears intended primarily to appeal to U.S. 
and other 
international sensibilities.  In reality, the King and 
government 
currently have broad support from the political parties to 
move forward 
with an autonomy proposal.  This has been borne out in recent 
weeks in 
comments from political parties across the spectrum during 
the 
Ambassador's series of consultations with party leaders, who 
also 
appear to recognize that resolving the conflict will require 
risk 
and sacrifice. 
 
¶3.    (C)  The Embassy's view is that the consultative 
process 
currently being managed on behalf of the King by the Royal 
Consultative 
 Council on Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) cannot be taken 
seriously.  The 
council's members are hand-picked by the Palace and have 
convened in 
Rabat, not Laayoune.  Those who might offer differing points 
of view 
have thus far been shut out, despite Minister-Delegate for 
Foreign 
Affairs Taieb Fassi Fihri's assurances to the Ambassador (ref 
c) 
that debate on the way forward would be serious and credible. 
 
 
 
Why the delay? 
------------------ 
 
¶4.    (C) Why has Morocco elected again to delay?  Likely 
factors are: 
(a) Morocco continues to see its success in outliving the 
Baker plan 
and maintaining its de facto control over the territory as 
working in 
its favor; (b) Morocco does not believe that a satisfactory 
settlement 
will be possible while Bouteflika is in power in Algeria; 
and/or (c) 
the Palace fears that one or more political parties may try 
to oppose 
autonomy and use it as a platform to break away from the 
others in the 
2007 parliamentary elections.  (Fassi Fihri suggested as much 
to the 
Ambassador, and though his concern appears to us to be 
overstated, it 
probably enters into the mix and may have been a key factor 
in Morocco's 
apparent last minute decision to pull back from sharing an 
autonomy plan 
with the U.S. during Fassi Fihri's recent visit to 
Washington.)  The only 
factors motivating Morocco toward a solution are its desire 
for international 
recognition of its sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and 
international 
criticism of its human rights abuses in the territory. 
 
 
Quiet discussion could help 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.    (C)  One issue on which Morocco is probably right is 
the need to 
create within the region a sense of inevitability about 
autonomy as the 
eventual outcome as a means to induce the Polisario to 
negotiate on a serious 
proposal.  The possible willingness of both Morocco and the 
Polisario to have 
a conversation somewhere out of the limelight is also an 
important sign. 
Facilitating a quiet dialogue between Morocco and the 
Polisario as Ambassador 
Bolton suggests, with Algeria sitting in, would be a 
constructive U.S. role at 
this stage, in that it could lead to an agreement for direct 
negotiations. 
Algeria should be invited -- if they attend it could be 
useful, if not, they 
will show their hand at really wanting to help. We should 
anticipate that 
any initial exchanges will be about differences and past 
injuries rather than 
shaping the future, but such exchanges could nevertheless 
serve as the first 
step along the road to real negotiations. At the same time, a 
90-day versus 
six-month MINURSO renewal would be a clear signal to Morocco 
that Security 
Council patience with delay is not unlimited, and that the 
Security Council 
 does not acquiesce to an increasingly ambiguous Moroccan 
timetable. 
 
 
Work with the French 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.    (C) In addition to a 90-day MINURSO renewal and quiet 
direct dialogue 
 between the parties, we should consider working more closely 
with the French. 
Discussions with the French Embassy here suggest that the 
French see little 
substantive difference with the U.S. on the Western Sahara, 
and view this 
conflict as an area with the potential for close U.S.-French 
cooperation. 
U.S. efforts to facilitate the release of Moroccan prisoners 
of war last 
August caught the French by surprise, and raised concern in 
Paris that the 
U.S. might strike out on its own on this issue. A new sense 
and appearance 
of common purpose concerning the Western Sahara between 
Morocco's two most 
important international partners would send a strong message, 
short circuit 
Morocco's efforts to play Security Council members off one 
another, and 
increase pressure for progress on Morocco and Algeria. 
Cooperation should 
include keeping the French well briefed on conversations 
between Morocco 
and the Polisario if they occur (although their actual 
presence in the room 
might scare away the Polisario).  It could also mean joint 
demarches by the 
French and U.S. Ambassadors in Rabat and Algiers to encourage 
a serious 
autonomy proposal and negotiations.  Apart from a potentially 
constructive 
French role, there is no helpful EU consensus on the issue; 
other EU members 
are divided across a spectrum ranging from those focused 
strongly on human 
rights issues (the Nordics) to those concerned with 
preserving their own 
complicated territorial interests (Spain). 
 
 
Focus security responsibility on Morocco and Algeria 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7.    (C) A second factor that should be considered in 
conjunction with 
MINURSO renewal is an assessment of ways in which greater 
responsibility 
for security could be transferred from MINURSO directly to 
Morocco and 
Algeria.  These two countries have primary esponsibility for 
preventing 
renewed armed conflict, and the Security Council should look 
at ways in 
which they could shoulder that responsibility directly.  In 
addition, 
countering trafficking of all kinds and denying safe haven to 
terrorists 
in the Pan Sahel region are two security concerns related to 
the Western 
Sahara that are as significant as the possibility of a 
renewed military 
conflict between Moroccan forces and the Polisario. 
Cooperation between 
Morocco and Algeria on addressing these threats is virtually 
nonexistent, 
creating a vacuum that allows illicit activity to continue 
which MINURSO 
has no mandate to confront. 
 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
Riley