VZCZCXRO9257
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0336/01 1101444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201444Z APR 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6035
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0654
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PRISTINA 000336 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BBRAUN, 
USUN FOR DSCHUFLETWOSKI, USOSCE FOR SSTEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER URGES KOSOVARS TO BEAR DOWN ON 
FINAL STATUS, STANDARDS; IMPRESSED BY NEW TEAM 
 
REF: PRISTINA 310 
 
Classified By: Chief of Mission Philip Goldberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  During an April 14-16 visit to Kosovo, U.S. 
Special Representative Frank Wisner congratulated the 
revamped Kosovo Albanian leadership team for its serious 
engagement in the Vienna final status process and for its 
outreach to the Kosovo Serb community.  He urged the team to 
build on its record by making its best offer yet on 
decentralization at the next Vienna meeting and by preparing 
very generous opening positions on upcoming issues, including 
the protection of religious sites, returns, property rights, 
and the special case of Mitrovica.  The Kosovo Albanian 
response was almost uniformly positive.  Ambassador Wisner 
told moderate and hard-line Kosovo Serb leaders alike that 
their continued nonparticipation in Kosovo's Provisional 
Institutions of Self Government (PISG) only made much more 
difficult the task of finding a way out of what all agreed 
was an unsustainable status quo.  Although neither Kosovo 
Serb group predicted a return to the PISG, the moderates at 
least were hopeful of progress in Vienna whereas the 
hard-liners seemed deluded that they would have veto rights 
over any final status determination.  Ambassador Wisner's 
visit to two western Kosovo villages -- one Albanian and one 
Serb -- subjected to brutal violence during and after the war 
demonstrated the special obstacles to returns to that part of 
Kosovo.  Finally, the ambassador's visit to Decani Monastery 
found the resident Serbian Orthodox monks anxious for 
international community commitment to hold the Kosovo 
Albanian public to any agreeements on preservation of 
religious sites negotiated by their leaders.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Frank Wisner, the Secretary's Special 
Representative for Kosovo Final Status Talks, visited Kosovo 
on April 14-16.  In Pristina, Ambassador Wisner met privately 
with new Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu and new Prime 
Minister Agim Ceku.  He met collectively with the Kosovo 
Albanian negotiating team comprising Sejdiu, Ceku, Assembly 
President Kole Berisha, Presidential Advisor Skender Hyseni, 
opposition leaders Hashim Thaci and Veton Surroi, and team 
coordinator Blerim Shala.  Former Prime Minister Bajram 
Rexhepi joined the ambassador and several members of the team 
at dinner.  The ambassador also met in Pristina with SRSG 
Soren Jessen-Petersen and Kosovo Serb leaders Oliver 
Ivanovic, Goran Bogdanovic, and Randjel Nojkic.  In 
Mitrovica, he met with hard-line Kosovo Serb leaders Marco 
Jaksic and Nebojsa Jovic.  In Prizren, he met with Mayor 
Eqrem Kryeziu and non-Serb deputy mayors Ercan Spat (Turk) 
and Cemajlj Kurtishi(Bosniak).  In the Kosovo Albanian 
village of Krushe e Vogel, the ambassador met with missing 
persons activist Agron Limani, two survivors of ethnic 
cleansing who had testified at the Slobodan Milosevic trial 
in The Hague, and several surviving widows.  In the Kosovo 
Serb village of Belo Polje, he met with a dozen returnees. 
Finally, at the Decani Monastery, he met with Bishop 
Teodosije Sibalic Father Sava Janjic.  Ambassador Wisner also 
received a briefing from KFOR Chief of Staff, Bridagier 
General Joseph Orr (US).  COM participated in all meetings 
and visits. 
 
EU: Getting to Final Status in 2006 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Wisner told Kosovo-based interlocutors that 
his visit to Europe and the Balkans had three objectives -- 
to satisfy the USG that our EU colleagues were fully engaged 
on steps to reach final status and beyond; to reach out to 
Kosovo's neighbors in Tirana, Athens, and Skopje regarding 
final status; and to review in Pristina and Belgrade the 
progression of the final status process to date.  The 
ambassador told the assembled Kosovo final status negotiating 
team (a.k.a. the "Unity Team") that he was happy to report 
that he had found EU leaders in Brussels to be "disciplined 
and focused on the issues" and fully intending to help 
determine Kosovo's final status by the end of 2006. 
 
PRISTINA 00000336  002 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Going into a more detailed accounting with SRSG 
Jessen-Peterson, Wisner said EU leaders, particularly (EU) 
enlargement chief Olli Rehn, were clearly focused on wrapping 
up the process in 2006 and were developing a timetable of 
tasks needing completion this year to create "a Kosovar 
entity that can stand on its own feet, perhaps with 
supervision at the beginning.  He said the EU envisions an 
international "superchief with specific authorities" to lead 
Kosovo through a transition phase upon determination of final 
status.  Wisner said he would personally like to see this 
individual named early enough in 2006 events to "help write 
his or her own job description."  Wisner said he had also 
found the EU very focused on the potential transformation of 
the Kosovo Protection Corps into a combination 
security/border police/civilian protection force. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Wisner often noted the challenge the EU 
faces in bringing 25 member states to consensus on Kosovo's 
final status and often suggested that to this end the strong 
approval of other capitals and the United Nations Security 
Council would be essential.  He was happy to see that the EU 
is sending a police and justice fact-finding team to Kosovo 
and congratulated the SRSG on his role in bringing about that 
visit.  Wisner offered his own office as a point of ongoing 
USG outreach and coordination. 
 
New Team Off to Great Start But Final Status Gear Shift 
Needed to Bring on End Game 
-------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Wisner reminded Kosovo Albanian leaders 
that he had asked them for two things when he last met with 
them in February -- their full engagement with the 
Ahtisaari/Vienna process and a maximum effort on the ground 
in Kosovo, particularly to reach out to the Kosovo Serb 
community.  He congratulated them for substantial efforts on 
both counts, particularly praising the work of Veton Surroi 
and his consultative process that had produced the most 
serious Kosovar-organized gathering of Albanian and minority 
leaders (in Durres, Albania) since the war.  Accepting this 
praise, Surroi said he had been personally astonished to 
realize in Durres that none of the Kosovo Serbian leaders in 
attendance (all moderates) had even been briefed by Belgrade 
on developments at the Vienna talks, adding that the Kosovo 
Albanians leaders would be priviledged to continue providing 
these briefings. 
 
¶7. (C) Surroi also had high praise for the cooperative spirit 
exhibited by new Unity Team members Sejdiu, Berisha, and 
Ceku, a sentiment strongly shared by SRSG Jesen-Petersen. 
The SRSG said the new leaders "had brought about a change in 
the political landscape of Kosovo."  Drawing unmistakable 
though tacit comparisons to the former president, Assembly 
president, and prime minister, the SRSG said: "Sejdiu engages 
and discusses.  Berisha has created a new, cooperative, and 
transparent Assembly, even inviting UNMIK to conduct audits. 
Ceku is strongly motivated and organized; we covered eight or 
nine topics in our weekly meeting today in 55 minutes." 
 
 
¶8. (C) While praising Unity Team members for their efforts 
over the last several weeks, Ambassador Wisner was also 
careful to praise them for not picking public quarrels with 
Belgrade, most recently over its decison to compel Kosovo 
Serb public servants to refuse salaries paid by Pristina. 
The ambassador and the SRSG agreed that this combination of 
outreach to Kosovo Serbs and restraint in reaction to 
Belgrade provocation would serve the Unity Team well in the 
face of what they saw as an obvious hardening of Belgrade's 
negotiating position.  Jessen-Petersen believes "the primary 
reason for this hardening is that Belgrade sees which way 
this is going" (i.e., to independence for Kosovo), but the 
SRSG also believes the arrival of Ceku as prime minster has 
boxed Belgrade in to a degree in that Ceku "is getting out 
there" (i.e. reaching out to Kosovo Serbs) because his war 
 
PRISTINA 00000336  003 OF 006 
 
 
record as Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) commander leaves him 
fearless of accused of betraying the Kosovo Albanian cause. 
Ambassador Wisner assured Unity Team members that he would 
tell leaders in Belgrade that the USG has duly noted their 
very unhelpful salaries initiative and their generally 
uncooperative approach to the Vienna negotiations. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambasador Wisner urged Kosovo Albanian leaders to 
continue to build on their recent positive record by 
developing generous and full negotiating positions on the 
component elements of the final status process.  On 
decentralization, Wisner cautioned against a recent 
unfortunate tendency of Kosovo Albanian negotiators "to get 
hung up on legalisms."  On property rights, law and order, 
freedom of movement, and returns, he urged them to consider 
that every step forward they make collectively supports their 
negotiating goals and provides him evidence of progress he 
could carry to Belgrade.  He frankly told Unity Team members 
that they should "keep their eye on the main game, the final 
status solution, and that to my mind means independence." 
 
¶10. (C) During a COM-hosted dinner with several Unity Team 
members joined by former Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi (now 
drafting a position paper on the ethnically divided city of 
Mitrovica for the team), Ambasador Wisner continued on this 
big picture theme.  In urging greater generosity in the 
negotiations, he said most every Kosovo Albanian concern 
melts away when viewed in a broad contex -- "if you don't get 
everything you want today, so what?  You may prefer a united 
Mitrovica in a united Kosovo, but you may not get it; you may 
get it tomorrow.  It will be hard to accomplish in the 
negotiations everything that wasn't done in the past seven 
years.  Think carefully about how to secure final status.  We 
need to be very smart, flexible, and maybe drive around some 
obstacles to deal with them later." 
 
Ceku Gets It 
------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Wisner found that new Prime Minister Agim 
Ceku understands, instinctively it seems, what has to be done 
on the Kosovo ground to keep the final status process on 
track.   When the ambassador urged Ceku privately to continue 
the very public outreach on minority issues that has 
characterized his first month in office, Ceku rolled out a 
five-point plan to do just that.  The PM said his five 
priorities for the next two to three months would be: 
standards implementation; interethnic confidence building; 
law and order; economic development; and setting the stage 
for eventual EU integration.  Specific measures slated for 
implementation include the creation of more police 
substations and post offices in minority areas, a public 
campaign of zero tolerance for interethnic violence, the 
appointment of Croatian Serb leader Milorad Pupovac as 
advisor for minority outreach, rolling financial audits of 
ministries and public officials, and development of a 
strategic plan for electrical energy development.  Ambassador 
Wisner suggested that a public information campaign be 
launched to assist in the filing of agricultural and 
commercial property claims with the new Kosovo Property 
Agency, a step Ceku said would be taken. 
 
Thaci: Letting Us Know He's Here 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) In a minor discordant note, opposition leader Hashim 
Thaci (president of the Democratic Party of Kosovo) resisted 
Ambassador Wisner's call for Unity Team endorsement of an 
unabridged right of return for all Kosovo citizens to any 
part of Kosovo.  Thaci insisted that some parts of Kosovo, 
naming Mitrovica in particular, were not sufficiently secure 
to permit returns and that other parts of Kosovo lacked 
economic opportunity for returnees.  The ambasador suggested 
that Thaci would do better to frame Kosovo policy as 
supporting an "unabridged right of return" and committing the 
team to do all that is necessary to supply security and 
economic opportunity for returnees. 
 
PRISTINA 00000336  004 OF 006 
 
 
 
Moderate and Hard-line Kosovo Serbs: Some, But Not Much, Room 
for Discussion 
------------------------------------------ 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Ambassador Wisner urged representatives of the 
moderate Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) to 
rejoin Kosovo government institutions.  SLKM leader Oliver 
Ivanovic asked Wisner to ensure a peaceful status 
negotiations process after which individual Kosovo Serbs 
could reasonably decide whether to stay in Kosovo or leave. 
Wisner's praise for the new Kosovo government brought a 
strong reaction from Goran Bogdanovic, a member of Belgrade's 
negotiating team, who said that the current government had 
only issued "false promises" on standards implementation and 
done nothing to improve safety for Serbs in Kosovo, encourage 
returns or develop the economy in Serb-inhabited areas. 
Wisner agreed that there are problems, but added that he is 
convinced Ceku and Sejdiu are addressing them in good faith. 
Bogdanovic also conceeded that the Vienna talks showed 
promise.   Randjel Nojkic warned against the international 
community imposing a solution for Kosovo and complained that 
Belgrade does not want the SLKM to participate in Kosovo 
institutions because it does not want progress prior to final 
status.  He also said that although no one will admit to 
favoring the partition of Kosovo, he believes it may be the 
practical solution that Belgrade is aiming towards. 
 
¶14. (C) Hard-line Kosovo Serb leaders in northern Kosovo 
showed no interest in participation in Kosovo institutions or 
in cooperation or reconciliation with Kosovo Albanians. 
Ambassador Wisner lamented that northern Kosovo Serb leaders 
seem to "persist in habits of obstruction."  He offered to 
act on Kosovo Serb economic and security interests in the 
context of a final status solution, but said his ability to 
do so would be seriously limited by their continued refusal 
to engage.  Marko Jaksic (EO-listed leader of the Association 
of Serb Municipalities and member of Belgrade's negotiating 
team) replied that Kosovo Serbs had participated in Kosovo 
institutions for three years and were rewarded with the 
violence of March 2004. 
 
¶15. (C) Going to the status bottom line, Jaksic said Kosovo 
independence and Kosovo Serb survival are mutually exclusive. 
 He said the United States must choose between Serbia and 
Kosovo -- if the U.S. chooses Kosovo's independence, it will 
never have Serbia as an ally and Serbia will turn away from 
EU integration.  He added that if Albanians think they can 
get independence without Serbia's consent, they are "kidding 
themselves."  Ambassador Wisner said that he had visited 
Serbs who were returning to Kosovo and who travel freely and 
that he has seen churches being rebuilt.  He agreed that a 
multiethnic Kosovo had not been achieved but insisted that to 
deny progress was "ridiculous."  The ambassador said Jaksic 
was ill-serving his community by presenting a false choice 
between Serbia and Kosovo and that such a choice would risk 
driving the U.S. away at the same time Jaksic and others are 
urging that U.S. to protect Kosovo Serbs. 
 
¶16. (C) Nebojsa Jovic's nuanced version of Jaksic's points 
stressed that Serbs realize the status quo is not viable and 
want to participate in the resolution of the current 
situation.  He urged that the USG work directly with the 
Serbian National Council to decide Kosovo's status, saying 
that "you've probably dealt with other Serbs who want to make 
you like them," (i.e. the SLKM) but that agreements entered 
into by such people could not be implemented in the field. 
He urged that final status not "punish" Serbs for the actions 
of Milosevic and look at a status solution between autonomy 
and independence.  Ambassador Wisner expressed appreciation 
for Jovic's comments as "something to work with." 
 
Western Kosovo Feelings Still Run High 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) During an April 15 visit to Krushe e Vogel/Mala 
 
PRISTINA 00000336  005 OF 006 
 
 
Krusa, villagers told Ambassador Wisner of a March 1999 
massacre in which 112 men and boys were murdered by Serbian 
forces, allegedly including regular army troops, police, and 
local Serbs.  Relatives of the massacre victims and survivors 
(two of whom testified in the Milosevic trial at 
International Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague) 
described the massacre and their frustration that no 
prosecutions had resulted, despite their identification of 56 
former Serb neighbors (who are now living in Serbia) as 
perpetrators.  Asked for their views on the return of 
displaced Serbs, Agron Limani, who heads the 26 March 1999 
Association and whose father, brother, and two nephews were 
killed in the massacre, replied that "money should not be 
spent to bring these criminals back here." He said that the 
local population bitterly resented international community 
care for Kosovo Serbs and failure to prosecute those who have 
committed crimes. 
 
¶18. (C) Serb returnees in Belo Polje, a village near Pec/Peje 
where 65 displaced Serb families have returned since 2003, 
said they had come back to Kosovo because their homes were 
dear to them and because they lacked the money to buy 
property elsewhere.  Although appreciative of the 
international assistance which rebuilt their homes, they 
faced a near-total lack of employment (only one resident, a 
Kosovo Police Service officer, is employed), fear of 
venturing into town or working outlying fields, and alleged 
attempts by local ethnic Albanians to fraudulently 
appropriate their land.  Freedom of movement concerns were 
intensified by the unrest of March 2004, during which ethnic 
Albanian rioters from Peja/Pec burned down virtually the 
entire village and forced the resident Serbs to flee to the 
near-by Italian KFOR base.   In converstion with Ambasador 
Wisner the returnees showed much more interest in the 
concrete conditions of their lives than in Kosovo's future 
status.  They were very open to increased contact with their 
Kosovo Albanian neighbors. 
 
Church Protection: International Presence Pending Ethnic 
Reconciliation 
------------------ 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶19. (C) Ambassador Wisner visited the Decani Monastery where 
he asked Bishop Teodosije and Father Sava for the continued 
active involvement of Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) leaders 
in efforts to design protections for SOC properties.  Church 
protection, the ambassador noted, would necessarily involve 
the cooperation of the international community and a strong 
security presence, adding however that an international 
presence could not substitute for ethnic reconciliation and 
cooperation, especially with respect to more ordinary 
churches for which protection zones like that recently 
created around Decani would be less feasible.  Ambassador 
Wisner also suggested that the monastery invite President 
Sejdiu to its Easter services, and the Bishop agreed.  (NOTE: 
 Sejdiu accepted a subsequent invitation to the 23 April 
services. END NOTE.) 
 
¶20. (C) Bishop Teodosije described his own active 
participation in the working group on protection of religious 
and cultural heritage and spoke with approval of the previous 
day's visit of Ora party leaders Veton Surroi and Ylber Hysa, 
who are preparing the Unity Team's position paper on 
protection of religious sites and cultural heritage.  The 
bishop also outlined an SOC initiative to host an 
interreligious conference at the Pec Patriarchate in May and 
his own initiative to invite mayors and heads of prominent 
local ethnic Albanian families for discussions at the 
monastery.  Sava and he frequently expressed concern, 
however, that Kosovo Albanian leaders would be willing to 
deliver strong SOC-protection messages to their constituents 
and, if such messages were delivered, to follow them up with 
enforcement of agreements made in the context of a final 
status determination.  Sava said that the church appreciates 
the efforts of the international community, especially those 
of USOP, to use their influence with local Kosovo Albanian 
 
PRISTINA 00000336  006 OF 006 
 
 
leaders to protect Decani Monastery, but fearded that a 
system that relies on "calling a few phone numbers" rather 
than institutionally respected legal measures is inherently 
fragile. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Ambassador Wisner cleared on this message.  USOP 
clears this cable for release in its entirety to UN Special 
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. 
GOLDBERG