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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0308/01 0971719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071719Z APR 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6005
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0642
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN, 
USUN FOR SCHUFLETWOSKI, USOSCE FOR STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: STAKES HIGH AS LDK CHOOSES NEW LEADER 
 
REF: (A) PRISTINA 131 (B) 05 PRISTINA 1224 
 
Classified By: COM Philip S. Goldberg for reaons 1.4 b/d. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  The next president of the Democratic Party 
of Kosovo (LDK) could reconfigure the government, the 
Assembly leadership, and a good part of the makeup of 
Kosovo's final status negotiating team.  With the passing of 
Ibrahim Rugova, the LDK leadership has no organizational 
center and the party will drift into a convention this summer 
at which it will elect its new leadership.  Several 
pretenders have already emerged, chief among them the 
embittered Nexhat Daci, recently ousted as president of the 
Kosovo Assembly.  The race is wide open and the stakes, for 
Kosovo's democracy and the final status process, are huge. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
Why We Care Who Runs The LDK 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The president of the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK) has the ex-officio potential to become a kingmaker  The 
late President Ibrahim Rugova wielded unchecked power within 
the party, effectively naming every LDK official from the 
president of the Assembly to submunicipal officials. 
Although a great deal of Rugova's power derived from his 
unique personal stature as the de facto father of Kosovo, his 
successor as LDK president will nevertheless carry a great 
deal of clout in his own right on at least an ex officio 
basis.  The room to operate afforded the new party president, 
on the other hand, will depend in large measure on his 
ability to unify behind him (there is little chance of a 
woman being elected) the 20-member party presidency, also to 
be elected at the coming convention.  (COMMENT. It is safe to 
say Rugova never had to give a thought to the views of the 
party presidency, and rarely did.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Election of a new LDK president and presidency is of 
particular interest to the international community in that 
the LDK is easily the major partner (47 seats) in the 
governing coalition (65 seats total).  The LDK's dominance of 
the Kosovo political scene translates to control or veto 
power over three seats (president of Kosovo, Assembly 
president, and prime minister) on the five-seat Kosovo 
Albanian final status negotiating team (aka the "Unity Team"). 
 
The Coming Summer Of LDK's Discontent 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Kosovo law requires political parties to hold 
internal elections at least every two years. The LDK's last 
party-wide get-together was in July, 2004 and resembled much 
more a coronation (of Rugova) than a convention.  The 
gathering included a general assembly of 275 delegates, a 
meeting of the 151-member general council, and election of 
the party president (Rugova) and presidency -- all of which 
was concluded in two hours flat. 
 
¶5. (C) The LDK's 2006 convention will be different.  Control 
of the party is very much up in the air with one candidate 
for party president (Nexhat Daci) already announced and 
several others testing the waters.  Daci, recently 
unceremoniously ousted as Assembly president in large measure 
because of his autocratic style and disruptive influence 
within the Unity Team (Ref A), is clearly bent on pay-back. 
The cornerstones of his support have become apparent as he 
very publicly cultivates both diaspora financier Bexhet 
Pacoli and LDK Youth Forum leader Sejde Tolaj.  Daci also 
less publicly pursues an on again-off again courtship with 
shadowy Rugova family intimate Rame Maraj (Ref B) who, in 
turn, continues quiet associations of apparently mutual 
convenience with Culture Minister Astrit Haracija, Public 
Services Minister Melihate Termkolli, Deputy Prime Minister 
Lutfi Haziri, and Tolaj. 
 
¶6. (C) Fluidly allied against the Daci camp are LDK "old 
guard" members including Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu, 
Assembly President Kole Berisha, and Kosovo Assembly 
 
PRISTINA 00000308  002 OF 002 
 
 
presidency member Sabri Hamiti.  On April 6 Berisha expressed 
to E/P chief his increasing concern that the Daci camp has 
taken advantage of the old guard's preoccupation with 
governing and the final status process to steal the campaign 
march.  He suggested that several pending audits and 
investigations of Daci camp members could counter that 
advantage if brought to fruition before the convention. 
Another possibility is that the convention could be delayed 
if the general Kosovo elections set for October 2006 are 
themselves postponed by SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen until 
after the status decision. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT. Major change in Unity Team composition or 
negotiating positions would be most unwelcome as the final 
status process reaches what otherwise would be its 
culmination.  The LDK's long history of back room dealing has 
left the party ill-equipped to deal with the sudden onset of 
real internal democracy.  Much as the LDK is getting a 
measure of what it deserves, therefore, summer 2006 is hardly 
the best time to settle accounts. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Post clears this cable for release in its entirety 
to UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. 
GOLDBERG