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Viewing cable 06PARIS2391, MFA OFFICIALS DISCUSS C.A.R. AND CHAD WITH DRL/CAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PARIS2391 2006-04-12 07:49 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO0344
PP RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #2391/01 1020749
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120749Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6210
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0026
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0364
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0712
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR CT CD FR
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS DISCUSS C.A.R. AND CHAD WITH DRL/CAR 
DESKOFF 
 
REF: FBIS RESTON VA 560149 (101042Z APR 06) 
 
PARIS 00002391  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b/d). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  MFA desk officers Charlotte Montel 
(C.A.R.) and Lt. Col. Marc Conruyt (Chad) briefed DRL/CAR 
desk officer Stuart Crampton on April 6.  Regarding C.A.R., 
Montel noted limited but growing contact between French and 
C.A.R. parliamentarians and recent calls for increased 
government transparency.  Information was difficult to 
obtain, particularly concerning the northwest region. 
President Bozize's Presidential Guard continued to act with 
impunity, with Bozize apparently powerless to exert control 
over the Guard.  The GOF had information indicating that 
Lord's Resistance Army leader Kony had recently been in C.A.R. 
 
2.  (C)  SUMMARY CONT'D:  Chad was perhaps the least unified 
and most fractured country in Africa in terms of ethnic 
divisions, Conruyt said.  He expressed continuing GOF support 
for Deby, who remained Chad's only credible political leader, 
and cautioned against the notion that Deby should be asked to 
consider stepping down a year or two after the May 3 
elections.  Conruyt noted Deby's problems with Sudan and with 
other members of his own ethnic group.  Paris daily 
Liberation in its April 8-9 edition carried an article on 
France's strong commitment to the Deby regime and the 
importance of French support to Deby's remaining in power. 
Although not stated directly, the article carried the 
suggestion that France's policies were not balanced and were 
tied too directly to one individual (Deby) whose political 
future and health status were precarious.  NOTE:  These 
conversations took place before news of the heightened 
military activity in Chad began circulating April 11-12.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
C.A.R. 
 
3.  (C)  Montel said the GOF was not assisting C.A.R.'s 
parliament but French parliamentarians (Senate and Deputies) 
were working within their respective "friendship groups" to 
engage Chad's parliamentarians in promoting visits and 
increased contact.  Montel noted French priorities to 
encourage democracy, good governance, and free expression. 
She commented on three MPLC deputies and others, including 
some journalists, who have asked the government for more 
transparency regarding several clashes in the northwest that 
produced scores of deaths. There have also been calls for a 
government investigation.  Montel viewed as very positive 
these public calls for a more responsive government. 
 
4.  (C)  Montel commented on the difficulty of obtaining 
timely and accurate information on C.A.R., especially from 
the northwest, where only two NGOs (CARITAS and Medecins Sans 
Frontieres) maintained a semi-permanent presence.  France 
hoped that the Multinational Force of the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (FOMUC) would collect 
and disseminate more information.  Montel said that France 
wanted a greater EU role in providing development assistance 
to C.A.R.; meanwhile, France continued to provide technical 
assistance via about 40 experts seconded to C.A.R. agencies. 
She noted particular French interest in public finance and 
ways to meet IMF conditions so as to overcome salary 
arrearages for many C.A.R. functionaries. 
 
5.  (C)    Montel lamented the Presidential Guards' brazen 
impunity and willingness to act violently.  She believed 
President Bozize was "trapped" by the debt he owed to those 
who helped him gain power, including many in the Presidential 
Guard.  Bozize could neither control some of them nor bring 
them to justice for their many abuses. 
 
6.  (C)  Montel stressed the serious nature of the attacks, 
including the killing of civilians, reportedly committed over 
the past several months by a mixture of rebels, highway 
bandits ("coupeurs de route"), and other criminal elements 
operating in the northwest and elsewhere in C.A.R.  She said 
the MFA did not know whether former President Patasse was 
behind the unrest and doubted that he could coordinate the 
activities of such diverse groups from Togo, where he has 
remained in exile since President Bozize seized power in 2003. 
 
7.  (C)  While highlighting the lack of available information 
about and in C.A.R., particularly in the northwest, Montel 
said the MFA had reports that Lord's Resistance Army leader 
 
PARIS 00002391  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Jospeh Kony had been in C.A.R. at some point during the last 
few months.  She said the MFA considered these reports 
credible. 
 
8.  (C)  Montel stressed the importance of C.A.R. in relation 
to Chad and the security of the sub-region. She noted that 
northeast C.A.R., along the frontiers with Chad and Sudan, 
was the most neglected and little-known region of C.A.R.  She 
cautioned that this area was of high concern since unrest 
from Sudan and Chad could quickly spillover into C.A.R. 
 
CHAD 
 
9.  (C)  The briefing continued during a meeting with back-up 
Chad deskoff Lt. Col. Marc Conruyt, a military secondee to 
the MFA.  (NOTE:  Lead Chad deskoff was on TDY in Benin.  END 
NOTE.)  Emphasizing the complexity of Chad and its history, 
as well as the country's current multiplicity of players and 
interests, Conruyt said Chad was essentially a "country only 
in name."  Fragile and populated by a large number of nomadic 
and agriculturalist ethnic groups, Chad was unique, and, in 
his view, perhaps the least unified African country. 
Populations with different interests -- black Africans and 
North African "Arabs" -- found their destinies suddenly and 
awkwardly intertwined during the colonial period.  During 
that period, French training and education tended to serve 
the black African community in the south and not the more 
nomadic "Arab" populations to the north.  Conruyt commented 
that some of the northerners, such as the Zaghawa, were 
historically viewed as great warriors, which might help 
explain why they remained largely in control of Chad today. 
The lack of a military tradition in the south had hampered 
the development of a mature political opposition, he 
speculated. 
 
10.  (C)  Conruyt said that rebels of various backgrounds, 
including the Sudan-supported Rally for Democracy and Liberty 
(RDL) and former allies of President Deby, had coalesced 
against Deby.  Although Deby's overthrow remained a major 
French concern, Conruyt said it was not clear what France 
would do if Deby were deposed by force.  In addition, Conruyt 
repeatedly said that, despite Deby's serious flaws (including 
a lack of respect for human rights), Deby was a "statesman" 
and a much more viable leader than anyone else.  The 
opposition severely lacked the "necessary political skills," 
in Conruyt's view. 
 
11.  (C)  Conruyt acknowledged that the lifting of 
presidential term limits, which began with the National 
Assembly's vote in May 2004 and concluded with the June 2005 
referendum, was lamentable.  However, when pressed on the 
issue of whether Deby might stand down a year or two after 
this May's elections -- provided that a deal was brokered 
discreetly by France, among others, and that a suitable 
successor were identified -- Conruyt replied that such 
intervention by France, the U.S., and other members of the 
international community would lack legitimacy.  Conruyt did 
not think Deby would agree to step down under such a 
scenario.  France simply viewed Deby as the only person able 
in the circumstances to lead the strife-ridden country, 
particularly since the political opposition, according to 
Conruyt, was "not credible," too divided, and "incapable" of 
agreeing on any sort of platform other than to have Deby 
leave power. 
 
12.  (C)  The opposition's boycott of the May 3 election, 
according to Conruyt, was similar to the boycott of the 
referendum held in June 2005 to end presidential term limits. 
 Although some members of the opposition had made strong 
statements threatening to "block" the elections, Conruyt said 
he did not expect them to succeed in blocking the elections. 
Conruyt thought it quite possible that, after winning the May 
3 election, Deby would make some concessions to the 
opposition. 
 
13.  (C)  Conruyt highlighted Deby's problems with Sudan and 
members of his Zaghawa ethnic group, some of whom have 
accused Deby of failing to protect his own clan members, in 
Darfur and Chadian villages on the Sudanese border, from 
Janjaweed and Sudanese government attacks.  Conruyt remarked 
that Deby belonged to both the Bideyat and the Zaghawa, very 
similar but separate groups, with the Bideyat nonetheless 
"subordinate if not inferior" to the Zaghawa.  Although the 
exact source and details were murky, Chad continued to 
provide intermittent support to rebels in Sudan, just as the 
 
PARIS 00002391  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Sudanese government supported rebels in Chad, Conruyt stated. 
 Despite this situation, however, Conruyt said that both 
governments claimed to work together to monitor the border in 
efforts to prevent the outbreak of war. 
 
14.  (C)  Asked about the status of the oil revenue 
management agreement, which Chad breached in 2005, and 
relations with the World Bank, which suspended all loans to 
Chad as a result, Conruyt said that the World Bank team 
currently visiting Chad was attempting to renew contacts, 
repair the badly damaged relationship, and arrive at a 
face-saving "gentleman's agreement" to move beyond the 
current impasse, which benefited neither the Bank nor Chad. 
Conruyt said he expected that Deby likely would pursue some 
judicial reforms and anti-corruption measures after his 
re-election in 2006. 
 
LIBERATION 
 
15.  (U)  The April 8-9 edition of Paris daily Liberation 
carried a story on the importance of French civilian and 
military support to Deby's ability to stay in power (ref A). 
The article notes the role France played in assisting Deby to 
overcome the March coup attempt and French support for the 
campaign against the rebels.  Deby remains "in the eyes of 
the former colonial power, and also according to a number of 
local analyses, the only one who can govern a profoundly 
unstable country.  Is it Deby or chaos?" asks Liberation.  A 
member of France's military chief of staff in Paris says that 
French forces "accomplish a deterrent mission concerning 
external threats and furnish logistical support to Chad's 
armed forces.  In no case will our soldiers participate in 
combat."  But for how long, Liberation asks?  A Chadian 
observer notes:  "We are protected and directed by France. 
No one cares about the future of Chad; the only thing that 
counts is guaranteeing the regime." 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton