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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0540/01 1171523
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271523Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3878
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL EAID PHUM PTER NO XF KPAL
SUBJECT: "RELAXED" ABU MAZEN IN NORWAY 
 
REF: OSLO 383 
 
Classified By: P/E Counselor Mike Hammer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  At Norway's invitation, PA President 
Mahmoud Abbas visited Oslo April 24-25.  His Norwegian 
interlocutors described Abbas as "relaxed," but focused on 
ensuring that the international community does not turn its 
back on the needs of the Palestinian people in efforts to put 
pressure on the Hamas government.  Abbas supports the 
Quartet's demands on Hamas, but told the Norwegians that he 
has made no headway with Hamas.  One of Abbas's major themes 
was a call for immediate international efforts to restart 
peace negotiations; negotiating peace with Israel is 
something that Abbas believes he has the mandate and 
authority to carry out.  Abbas told the Norwegians that he 
would be prepared to dismiss the Hamas government in three to 
four months if "everything is still blocked" domestically. 
No mention was made with Abbas of Hamas officials possibly 
visiting Norway in May.  We are unlikely to succeed in 
convincing the MFA not to meet these as officials, if the 
Hamas representatives in fact manage to get visas to come to 
Norway.  FM Stoere was most pleased with the visit and is 
energized to push for donor assistance to the PA that does 
not directly support Hamas.  End Summary 
 
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Don't Abandon the Palestinian People 
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¶2.  (C) Abbas's schedule in Oslo included meetings with Prime 
Minister Stoltenberg, Foreign Minister Stoere, Development 
Minister Solheim, Parliament President Jagland, Crown Prince 
Haakon, and a speech at the Norwegian Nobel Institute. 
Senior Advisor in the Prime Minister's Office Arne Bjoernstad 
told us that Abbas was more relaxed than he had seen him in 
past meetings, opining that a visit to Europe might be a 
welcome change of scene from the pressure Abbas faces at home. 
 
¶3.  (C) Bjoernstad said that Abbas asked PM Stoltenberg to 
help convey the message to the U.S. and others not to punish 
the Palestinian people while sanctioning the Hamas 
government.  Sanctions hurt Fatah and help Hamas, Abbas told 
the Norwegians, by allowing Hamas to say "we told you so" to 
the Palestinian people.  It was important, Abbas said, for 
the international community to show the Palestinians that 
they have not been abandoned and can trust the rest of the 
world to help them.  The Norwegian press is already quoting 
Foreign Minister Stoere as saying that Norway will deliver 
this message. 
 
¶4.  (C) Abbas described the situation in the Palestinian 
areas as quite desperate, highlighting the problems of 
official salaries and the maintenance of collapsing 
infrastructure.  As an example of the problems faced, Abbas 
pointed to the water distribution system in Gaza.  This 
system is under Presidential control, Abbas said, but is 
likely to be hit by sanctions that don't adequately 
differentiate between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. 
If Palestinian political and physical infrastructures 
collapse, Abbas said that Hamas is likely to gain further 
control by meeting the Palestinian people's needs with its 
own institutions.  PM Stoltenberg asked Abbas if Hamas 
intended, like the Taliban, to set up a fundamentalist 
Islamic society, for example limiting the rights (and dress) 
of women.  Abbas said that Hamas certainly would like to do 
so, but would not succeed if they tried. 
 
¶5.  (C) Stoltenberg told Abbas that Norway would help to try 
and find creative means to provide support that does not 
assist Hamas.  Norway publicly announced a support package of 
USD 20 million (not new money) within the health, education 
sectors as well as energy supplies.  Bjoernstad also said 
that Norway would support any efforts by the international 
community to find a creative mechanism to help on the 
salaries issue, although he acknowledged that doing so would 
be most problematic if it reduces the leverage available on 
Hamas. 
 
¶6.  (C) All of our Norwegian contacts repeatedly assure us 
that Norway fully stands behind the Quartet's three demands 
on Hamas.  Abbas specifically told PM Stoltenberg that he too 
identified with and supports the Quartet's demands, but that 
the Hamas leadership has not responded to him when he has 
approached them on this subject. 
 
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Abbas anxious to tread the peace road 
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¶7.  (C) A major theme of Abbas's visit and a notable feature 
of his speech at the Nobel Institute was a call for immediate 
international efforts to restart peace negotiations.  Abbas 
told Stoltenberg that he is ready immediately to begin 
negotiations with a new Israeli government.  Such an effort 
would be directly linked the Road Map.  The Norwegian view is 
that Abbas believes there is "realistic opportunity" to 
engage in meaningful negotiations.  Bjoernstad told us that 
Abbas's clearly expressed his main fear is unilateral Israeli 
action. 
 
¶8.  (C) Stoltenberg asked Abbas if he thought Hamas would try 
to wreck his efforts to engage with Israel on the peace 
process.  According to Bjoernstad, after a slight pause Abbas 
responded that he did not believe that Hamas would go against 
any agreement which Abbas concluded with Israel.  Abbas 
stated that negotiating with Israel is clearly his 
Presidential prerogative and told the Norwegians that he 
believes that he has credibility with the Palestinian people. 
 
¶9.  (C) On the domestic Palestinian situation, Abbas told 
Stoltenberg that if "everything is still blocked" in three to 
four months time he would consider dissolving the Hamas 
government, but not dismiss the elected parliament.  Abbas 
added cryptically that he "has other means" to deal with the 
parliament. 
 
¶10.  (C) On other regional issues, Abbas told Stoltenberg 
that he believes that Lebanon is on the verge of a new 
internal conflict.  Abbas told Stoltenberg that he supports 
Lebanese PM Fouad Siniora, but that through the PLO 
organization he has warned Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
not to get entangled in internal Lebanese power struggles, 
and, above all, not be used as Syrian or Iranian agents.  On 
Iraq, Abbas told Stoltenberg that he believes the U.S. will 
be in Iraq "for fifty years," and that the only possibility 
for peace in the Middle East is if the U.S. continues to push 
for democracy in the region. 
 
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Hamas representatives potential visit to Norway 
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¶11.  (C) Bjoernstad told us that the issue of the possible 
visit to Norway by members of Hamas (and their mooted working 
level reception by the MFA) did not come up with Abbas.  The 
Ambassador spoke with Foreign Minister Stoere on April 25 to 
reiterate our position that a Norwegian MFA meeting with 
Hamas representatives, at any level, would send the wrong 
signal and be out of step with mainstream European and U.S. 
views on isolating Hamas.  Stoere pushed back, and maintained 
his position that the MFA will meet Hamas representatives at 
the non-political level if the Hamas officials come to Norway. 
 
¶12.  (C) We again made clear our views to the Prime 
Minister's Office on April 26, and urged that the PM work 
closely with Foreign Minister Stoere to make sure that Stoere 
does not meet Hamas representatives when he travels to region 
in June.  Bjoernstad told us that he was unaware of any 
planned meetings with Hamas at this stage and reiterated 
Norway's current position that it would not meet with Hamas 
at a political level. 
 
¶13.  (C) On the issue of visas for the Hamas visitors, 
Bjoernstad noted that no decision had been made on whether to 
grant national Norwegian visas if the travelers do not 
receive Schengen visas.  He also pointed out there are strict 
procedures which must be followed before a national visa can 
be issued.  For one thing, prior to issuing any such visa, 
Norway would be obliged to inform the Schengen countries of 
its intention issue a national visa and give its 
justification for doing so.  This procedure, Bjoernstad 
suggested, would allow other Schengen countries to make their 
opposition (but not their veto) known to Norway, before 
Norway issued a national visa. 
 
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Comment 
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¶14.  (C) The Norwegian government's goal in inviting Abbas 
was to help carve out a role for Norway in promoting Middle 
East peace and strengthening its position as a coordinator 
for donor assistance to the Palestinians.  Norway's political 
leaders are pleased with the visit, even though it did not 
produce significant deliverables.  We can expect that 
busy-bee Foreign Minister Stoere will be ever more anxious to 
push for donor assistance to the PA that does not directly 
support Hamas.  In fact, he is under considerable domestic 
pressure to do so. 
 
¶15.  (C) There is no question that the Hamas visitors will 
get a meeting with MFA officials if they come to Norway in 
May.  The real question is whether they are able to get here. 
 Politically the Foreign Ministry will feel compelled to 
issue national visas to the Hamas representatives; Stoere 
will not stand up and say "no" to those in his own party and 
in the government coalition who will clamor for the MFA to 
issue national visas.  However, the Norwegian government 
might be hoping that the Schengen consultation mechanism will 
provide enough of the necessary cover to excuse them from 
issuing the visas. 
 
Visit Oslo's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m 
 
WHITNEY