VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNK #0471/01 1111242
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 211242Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5395
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 6330
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0168
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 7555
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC

S E C R E T NOUAKCHOTT 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC, PLEASE PASS TO 
DS/LNO TO EUCOM PETER HARGAVE PLEASE PASS TO PEACE CORPS. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016 
TAGS: ASEC PREL PTER ABLD CASC MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA: EMEGERNCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING 
(EAC) THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 2006 
 
REF: A. A. TD-314/27617-06 
     ¶B. B. TD/314-18637-06 
     ¶C. C. 12 FAH 6 H-113 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH LEBARON, REASON 1.4 (B), (C), (D) 
 
----------------- 
(S/NF) Key Points 
----------------- 
 
-- Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met to discuss recent 
threats made by Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC), see references A and B, and efforts to mitigate or 
respond to those threats referencing. 
 
-- Despite the lack of corroborating information, the EAC is 
carefully assessing the current security situation to 
mitigate the following: (1.) surveillance against AmEmbassy 
Nouakchott by posing as visa applicants to infiltrate a 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) into 
AmEmbassy Nouakchott and detonate within the compound during 
the late morning hours inflicting maximum amount of 
casualties, (2.) surveillance on U.S. Ambassador, 
(3.) threat to kidnap and ransom western tourists traveling 
in and around the Adrar area of Mauritania. 
 
-- EAC emphasized the need to strengthen specific security 
measures to include the implementation of more vigorous 
vehicle inspections to be reassessed after 30 days for those 
requesting access to the Embassy compound, reinforce personal 
security measures, mitigate vulnerabilities to the 
Ambassador, pass tear line information to host country, 
encourage personal security safeguards, query all prior visa 
applicants within a 90 day window beginning in March 15, 2006 
and working backward, and consider implementing a warden 
message to warn tourists in the Adrar province. 
 
END KEY POINTS. 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) On April 20, 2006 at 1100 hours the Embassy's 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met to discuss recently 
obtained threat information which added specificity to 
previously acquired ambiguous information (reftels A and B). 
The threat suggested that GSPC teams have conducted 
surveillance operations under the guise of visa applicants in 
an attempt to infiltrate AmEmbassy Nouakchott with a VBIED 
and detonate within the compound during the late morning 
hours ensuring the maximum amount of casualties possible. 
Further threat information also indicated separate GSPC teams 
were surveilling the Ambassador to monitor his habits and 
movements inside the country.  Other information indicated a 
desire to kidnap western tourists driving sport utility 
vehicles in and around the area of Adrar. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) EAC discussed the implementation of security 
measures to mitigate the aforementioned threats in accordance 
with a more rigorous interpretation of the policies and 
procedures outlined in 12 FAH 6 to cover: vehicle access and 
screening, personnel access and screening to include possible 
allowances to VIP,s, and mitigating the threats posed to the 
Ambassador. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) The EAC agreed that vehicles will undergo a more 
comprehensive screening process prior to obtaining 
authorization for access to the compound.  The EAC did note 
that Visa applicants are prohibited from entering the 
security zone that encompasses the embassy, and that any 
applicant attempting to enter would be stopped and turned 
away by host country National Guard personnel permanently 
assigned to protect the Embassy.  However, visa applicants 
could park within proximity of the Embassy,s outer perimeter 
in an area controlled by the Spanish Embassy. 
 
¶4. (SBU/NF) A vehicle inspection sally port with newly 
installed hydraulic barriers is nearing completion, however; 
technical difficulties have precluded commencing operations 
for the moment.  However, upon remedying all of the 
deficiencies, and project certification, post will move its 
current vehicle screening to the new inspection area and 
dismantle the locally fabricated vehicle arrest system 
presently used at the former location. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) EAC discussed means by which to ensure the 
Ambassador,s security without impinging upon his ability to 
conduct foreign policy.  EAC agreed that further restricting 
access to the Ambassador,s schedule was warranted, lessening 
lead times to the media where their presence is sought, as 
well as making sure organizers of private events that seek 
the U.S. Ambassador,s attendance take an active role in 
arranging an appropriate level of security as a requirement 
for his attendance. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) In addition to the threat tear line information 
that has been passed to host country security services, 
Mauritanian security officials continue to monitor the 
situation and are working diligently to mitigate these 
threats. The EAC recommended that the Foreign Ministry also 
be informed of the threat and of our efforts to counter the 
threat. 
 
¶7.  (SBU/NF) The EAC continues to stress to Embassy employees 
the vital importance that all employees take ownership of 
their personal security.  The EAC has stressed to supervisors 
that they have a continuing responsibility to ensure that 
sufficient security precautions and practices are being 
adhered to by their subordinates.  All employees are 
repeatedly encouraged to vary routes and times especially 
when traveling to and from work. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) The EAC also agreed that the new, specific 
information regarding the possible kidnapping in the Adrar 
area of foreign tourists merited further attention.  The 
Adrar region includes popular tourist locations such as the 
historic cities of Chinguetti and Ouadane, and the oasis, 
Terjit.  The regional capital, Atar, hosts several hotels and 
travel agencies that cater to and organize groups traveling 
through the desert.  There are nine PCVs in Adrar.  The EAC 
determined that the information did not warrant limiting 
travel to Adrar or removing the PCVs from the area but did 
consider issuing a Warden Message. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Following the meeting, the Embassy received 
further information that the purported attackers were using a 
female LES as a witting or unwitting accomplice (Ref B). 
Embassy is taking immediate and appropriate steps to follow 
up on this latest information. 
 
--------------- 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) The EAC made the following recommendations: 
 
--  Immediately implement a more thorough screening of 
vehicles.  (RSO) 
 
--  Bring new sally port on line as soon as possible. (Post, 
OBO, DS) 
 
--  Develop procedures for improved security for Ambassador 
during public events, and inform host government of the 
threat. (DCM, RSO, PAO) 
 
--  Conduct a detailed name check of names of all visa 
applicants who applied at the Embassy 90 days prior to the 15 
March 2006. (CONS, RSO) 
 
-- Draft Warden Message for EAC consideration. (CONS, RSO) 
 
-- Interview selected LES to determine whether elicitation 
has occurred.  (RSO) 
 
 
LeBaron 
LeBaron